Design, Safety Technology, Operability Features and

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1 PAD rev.1 PSN US-ABWR and EU-ABWR Design, Safety Technology, Operability Features and their Current Deployment 5-July, 2011 Toshiba Corporation 1/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

Development history of ABWR 70s 80s 90s 00s Latest Proven Plant TEPCO Higashidori unit

unit 1 ABWR common design by AET* USA US ABWR ABWR FOAKE TVA DOE study AET

Certification BWR90+ Westinghouse ABWR in USA EU-ABWR Latest Generation III+ Reactor

4 Development history of ABWR 70s 80s 90s 00s Latest Proven Plant TEPCO Higashidori unit 1 Japan Conceptual design Fundamental design Common eng g K-6/7 K-7 H-5 J-Power Ohma unit 1 ABWR common design by AET* USA US ABWR ABWR FOAKE TVA DOE study AET :TOSHIBA,TEPCO GE, Hitachi, ASEA-ATOM Europe ASEA ATOM Nordic BWR BWR90 NRC Design Certification BWR90+ Westinghouse ABWR in USA EU-ABWR Latest Generation III+ Reactor ABWR for STP3/4 Potential demands in Europe 4/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

Overview of US-ABWR Reactor Pressure Vessel, Core Improved core Improved internals Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel Short construction period Low construction cost Reactor Building Compact

5 Overview of US-ABWR Reactor Pressure Vessel, Core Improved core Improved internals Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel Short construction period Low construction cost Reactor Building Compact building Strong structure to withstand high vibration load Turbine Generator High thermal efficiency Reheat cycle Reactor Internal High safety Simplicity Fine Motion Control Rod Drive High reliability High operability Emergency Core Cooling System Reduced capacity High safety Main Control Room Automatic operation to reduce startup time Fully digital system 5/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

6 European BWR Technologies are applied in EU-ABWR. ABWR is adapted to meet European safety requirements. RCCV - Provisions for Hydrogen Control Overview of EU-ABWR Armored R/B 1600 MWe out put - Airplane Crash MW Thermal Power - 72 inch Turbine Heat Removal by PCCS Severe Accident Management Core Catcher - Provisions for Molten Core Cooling ECCS PCCS - Severe Accident Management - 100% x 3 Independent ECCS(N+2 Requirement) Steam Suction Drain Line Design changes to satisfy safety requirements PCCS Pool PCCS Hx Lower drywell flooder line Core Catcher 6/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

8 Key Features of US, EU-ABWR Principle ABWR design based on the integration of the proven technologies of BWR fleet Plentiful construction and operation experience of Japanese BWRs and ABWRs Latest Westinghouse BWR design mixture Approach Extension of the JP- ABWR design for wide application accounting for US,European safety requirements Thermal Thermal Power Power Electrical Electrical Output Output Design Design Life Life time time Plant Plant Availability Availability US-ABWR 3,926 3,926 MWt MWt 1,400 1,400 MWe MWe years years >90 >90 % EU-ABWR 4,300 4,300 MWt MWt 1,600 1,600 MWe MWe years years >90 >90 % 8/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. 8

9 Approach to US, EU-nize nized ABWR JP ABWR STP-3/4 Utility Req. US-ABWR Process 10CFR Regulatory Guide URD (concept) STP-3/4 Site Condition US Standard ABWR (DCD) STP-3/4 ABWR US DCD renewal (DCDR) US Code & Std. URD (specific) Reflect on K-6/7 plant operation US ABWR (DCDR) Utility Req. EU-ABWR Process WENRA Finland YVL guide EUR (concept) Europeanize Standard of ABWR (EU-DCD) Site Condition EUR (specific) Utility Specific EU-ABWR EU Code & Std. Application for US,EU Regulations 9/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

10 Footprint of Buildings of US-ABWR Turbine Building (T/B) Control Building (C/B) Reactor Building (R/B) UHS house Radwaste Building (RW /B) Footprint to satisfy the design condition on STP 3/4 site 10/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

11 Footprint of Buildings of EU-ABWR Reactor Building (R/B) Auxiliary Building (Ax/B) Turbine Building (T/B) Control Building (C/B) Heat Exchanger & Diesel Generator Building (Hx&DG/B) Footprint from viewpoints of European requirements 11/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

Reactor Primary System Reactor Pressure Vessel Safety Relief Valve (8/18SRVs:Automatic Depressurization system (ADS)) Main Steam line Main Steam Isolation Valve Main Steam line

12 Reactor Primary System Reactor Pressure Vessel Safety Relief Valve (8/18SRVs:Automatic Depressurization system (ADS)) Main Steam line Main Steam Isolation Valve Main Steam line Feedwater line Reactor Internal Fine Motion Control Rod Drive Safety Relief Valve discharge line (SRVDL) SRVDL quencher 12/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

13 Status of RPV Fabrication in the Shop Hot Roll Bending of Shell Course 2 plate RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel Turning over the bottom head-ring 13/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

Reactor Recirculation System (RRS) Steam Dome Saturated Steam Saturated Water Two-phase reactor coolant Feedwater Subcooled Water Core Steam dryer assembly Steam separator assembly Main Steam Fuel

14 Reactor Recirculation System (RRS) Steam Dome Saturated Steam Saturated Water Two-phase reactor coolant Feedwater Subcooled Water Core Steam dryer assembly Steam separator assembly Main Steam Fuel assemblies Reactor Recirculation System RRS provides forced circulation of reactor water through the core, removing the heat produced by the fuel. RRS controls the reactor power by changing the recirculation flow. The flow is controlled by the use of Adjustable speed Drive. Reactor Internal 14/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

Reactor Internal s (RIPs) RPV Shaft Stator Shaft Impeller Diffuser Motor Rotor Anti-Reverse

15 Reactor Internal Ten RIPs are located at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) to circulate reactor coolant to the core. Reactor Internal s (RIPs) RPV Shaft Stator Shaft Impeller Diffuser Motor Rotor Anti-Reverse Rotation Device Stator Motor Casing Lower Journal Bearing No large piping nozzles below Top of Active Fuel 15/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

Control Rod Drive System (CRD System) Control Rod Drive System The CRD System controls changes in core reactivity by electric motor driven movement and positioning of control rods within the core

The CRD System provides rapid control rod hydraulic insertion(scram) in response to manual or automatic signals from the Reactor Trip and Isolation System (RTIS).

16 Control Rod Drive System (CRD System) Control Rod Drive System The CRD System controls changes in core reactivity by electric motor driven movement and positioning of control rods within the core in fine increments in response to control signals from the Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS). The CRD System provides rapid control rod hydraulic insertion(scram) in response to manual or automatic signals from the Reactor Trip and Isolation System (RTIS). The CRD System consists of FMCRD, HCU and CRDHS. Scram line Inlet HCU;Hydraulic Control Unit FMCRD Motor Control System CRD PUMP Diversity Motor driven Hydraulic movement Insertion Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRDHS) FMCRD;Fine Motion Control Rod Drive 16/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

17 Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV) The primary containment vessel contains the reactor primary systems (Reactor Pressure Vessel, etc.) and prevents the spread of radioactivity released from the reactor on an accident. The RCCV uses a Dry well top head reinforced-concrete wall and steel liner to prevent leaks. Biological shielding wall Shell wall Diaphragm floor Suppression chamber Reactor Pressure Vessel pedestal Lower dry Well equipment hatch Vent pipe Upper dry well Access tunnel Reactor Pressure Vessel 下部 Lower dry well ドライウェル Base mat Upper slab Proven Technologies in JP,US-ABWR Vent vacuum breaker valve Suppression chamber entrance Lower dry Well personnel airlock 17/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

18 Flexibility of configuration Integration with Reactor Building Compact structure Features of RCCV ;Center of gravity Reduction of height 10m lower than Mark-II Type Enhanced seismic resistance Shortened construction period Cost effective MARK- II Type Improvement (1100MWe class) 下部ドライウェル MARK- I Type ABWR RCCV Improvement (1100MWe class) (1350MWe class) Improvements over current Primary Containment Vessels 18/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

19 Modifications of RCCV for EU-ABWR European safety requirements are satisfied with limited modifications of the current ABWR RCCV. EUR Ch.9 12 hours rule and pursuit of No Vent (Passive containment cooling system:pccs) H 2 Overpressure (Adjustment of volume / pressure capability) Reduction of Shutdown Risk (double hatch) Provisions for core melt arrest (core catcher) 下部ドライウェル Filtered Vent (in long term) H 2 Overpressure (Adjustment of volume / pressure capability) 19/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

21 Safety technology for US-ABWR Event Classification Event Progression Level of Defense Normal operating condition Anticipated Operational Occurrence Accident (AOO) Accident Beyond DBA +CCF Process Control RCIC: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System ECCS: Emergency Core Cooling System EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator SA DBA; Design Base Accident CCF; Common Cause Failure Lines of Defense AFI: Alternate Feedwater Injection System CTG: Combustion Gas Turbine Generator SA Mitigation System COPS: Containment Overpressure Protection System Beyond-DBA+CCF Events require diversities 21/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

22 Engineered Safety Features;ESF US-ABWR design Safety systems and electrical supply systems consist of 3 divisions and meet N+1 criterion. I&C system consists of 4 divisions and 2-out-of-4 logic. Each Vital AC system and DC system consists of physically separated 4 divisions. 22/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

23 Engineered Safety Features of US-ABWR RHR(III) HPCF(III) Active EDG LPFL(RHR) (50%) RCIC (50%) ADS (50%) EDG HPCF HPCF EDG LPFL(RHR) LPFL(RHR) Active ADS RCIC Single Failure RHR(II) HPCF(II) RHR(I) Safety Systems The ABWR Safety Systems design incorporates three redundant and independent divisions of Emergency Core Cooling Systems ( ECCS) and two redundant Containment Spray Cooling Systems (CSCS). The ECCS is made up of two HPCF, one RCIC, three LPFL of RHR system and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The two RHR systems provide wetwell and drywell sprays to remove decay heat and condense steam in both the drywell and wetwell volumes following a LOCA. LPFL;Low Pressure Flooder System RHR:Residual Heat Removal System HPCF;High Pressure Core Flooder System RCIC:Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System ADS:Automatic Depressurization System EDG:Diesel Generator 23/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

24 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (US-ABWR) Emergency Core Cooling Systems Each sub-system of the ECCS belongs to a separate division, which is separated electrically and mechanically between the three divisions. SRV (ADS) Reactor AO AO Main Steam Line Feed Water Line From Feed Water RHR HPCF HPCF RHR RCIC RHR EDG-III EDG-II EDG-I Division III Division II Division I CTG Diversified Generator (Non-Safety) 24/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

25 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (HPCF Line Break : ECCS Design Mode) FDW EDG RCIC-PUMP MS ADS HPCF-PUMP LPFL(RHR)-PUMP LPFL;Low Pressure Flooder System RHR:Residual Heat Removal System HPCF;High Pressure Core Flooder System RCIC:Reactor Core Isolation CoolingSystem ADS:Automatic Depressurization System EDG:Diesel Generator N+1 Design LPFLx2+RCIC operation Active RCIC LPFL EDG EDG (50%) ADS HPCF HPCF LPFL LPFL (50%) (50%) Active (US-ABWR) EDG Single Failure 25/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

26 Containment Spray Cooling System (CSCS) (US-ABWR) RHR-Hx RHR-Hx RCW RCW RHR - 下部ドライウェル Single Failure RHR - RHR-Hx RCW N+1 Design RHR(50%)x2 operation RHR- Diversified Generator (Non-Safety) Division III Division I Division II 26/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

27 US-ABWR Coping Capability against SBO AC Power Generators unavailable=sbo SRV (ADS) Reactor AC Independent ECCS (RCIC) AO AO Main Steam Line Feed Water Line From Feed Water Reactor steam driven High pressure RPV coolant makeup 8 hours DC Battery for electrical operation RHR HPCF HPCF RHR RCIC RHR Power Supply 3 redundant EDG Alternative AC power (CTG) Connection to Bus in 10 minutes 7 Days operation capability EDG-III EDG-II EDG-I Division III CTG Division II Division I Diversified Generator (Non-Safety) 27/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

28 SRVs maintain or depressurize reactor pressure. Station Black Out; SBO CTG can supply power to one of three ECCS divisions as a backup to EDGs AO SRV (ADS) AO Main Steam Line Reactor Feed Water Line From Feed Water AFI maintains RPV water level. Suppressio n Pool RHR HPCF HPCF RHR RCIC RHR Two AFI Water Storage Tank Division III Division II Division I Alternate Feed Water Injection Diversified Generator (Non-Safety) CTG is started with AC Power Generators unavailable. AFI can be operated with CTG as a diversity of RCIC/HPCF 28/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

29 US-ABWR Severe Accident Management Overview & sketch of the measures for Severe Accident;SA 1 : Inerted containment 2 : Alternate core cooling 3 : Ex-vessel debris cooling 4 : Vapor condensation by PCV spray RHR line 4 5 : COPS (Containment Overpressure 1 Protection System) Fire Protection Water Tank or Condensate Strage Tank Venting Feed water line 5 Rupture Disk Fire Engine Fire Protection System 2 下部 Suppression Pool 3 ドライウェル Alternate Feed Water Injection Line Maintain primary containment integrity ; SA Management 29/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. 2

30 Safety technology for EU-ABWR Event Classification Event Progression Level of Defense Normal operating condition Anticipated Operational Occurrence Accident (AOO) Accident Beyond DBA +CCF IC: Isolation Condenser Process Control ECCS: Emergency Core Cooling System EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator SA DBA; Design Base Accident CCF; Common Cause Failure Lines of Defense AFI: Alternate Feedwater Injection System CTG: Combustion Gas Turbine Generator SA Mitigation System SA EDG: Diesel Generator for SA CCCS: Corium & containment Cooling System Beyond-DBA+CCF Events require diversities (Passive Containment Cooling System & Core Catcher) 30/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

31 Engineered Safety Features;ESF EU-ABWR design Improvement of High Pressure injection system to meet N+2 criterion Increase of capacity of each RHR system to meet N+2 criterion Change of ADS logic from 1-out-of-2 logic to 1- out-of-3 logic to meet N+2 criterion No major modifications for I&C system, vital AC system and DC system because of 4 divisions and 2-out-of-4 logic EU-ABWR meets European Regulations 31/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

32 N+2 Criterion: ECCS for EU-ABWR ECCS consists of 3 division (100% each). LPFL;Low Pressure Flooder System RHR:Residual Heat Removal System HPCF;High Pressure Core Flooder System ADS:Automatic Depressurization System EDG:Diesel Generator PCCS; Passive Containment Cooling system IC; Isolation condenser Maintenance HPCF LPFL EDG (100%) EDG ADS HPCF HPCF LPFL LPFL (100%) (100%) EDG Active Single Failure 32/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

33 N+2 Criterion: ECCS for EU-ABWR Main Steam Line To Turbine AO SRV (ADS) AO Reactor Change: HPCF instead of RCIC to enhance Diversity & Redundancy Feed Water Line From Feed Water Diversity (Non-Safety) IC PCCS RHR HPCF HPCF RHR HPCF RHR Division IV Division III Division II Division I Two Combustible Turbine Generator (CTG) AC Power Generator for Div IV Diversified Generator (Non-Safety) 33/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

34 N+2 Criterion: ECCS for EU-ABWR (HPCF Line Break: ECCS Design Mode) ADS Change: HPCF instead of RCIC to enhance Diversity & Redundancy M M FDW MS M EDG HPCF-PUMP LPFL(RHR)-PUMP N+2 Design LPFLx1 operation Maintenance HPCF LPFL EDG EDG ADS HPCF HPCF LPFL LPFL (100%) (100%) (100%) Active EDG Single Failure 34/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

35 N+2 Criterion: CSCS for EU-ABWR Change: RHR capacity from 50% to 100% IC Hx PCCS Hx RHR-Hx RCW N+2 Design RHR(100%)x1 operation Diversity IC (Non-Safety) PCCS RHR - M Maintenance 下部ドライウェル Single Failure RHR - RHR-Hx RCW RHR-Hx RCW RHR- Diversified Generator (Non-Safety) Division IV Division III Division I Division II 35/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

36 EU-ABWR Coping Capability against SBO Discharge limitation of primary coolant at transient Isolation Condenser serves passive decay heat removal capability to maintain reactor pressure under the set-point of safety relief valves so that safety relief valves can not be consecutively actuated based on Finnish YVL Requirement. It provides diversity for residual heat removal to cope with an SBO; Station Blackout for 72 hours after isolation event. Equipment Pool for make-up Water FMCRD IC/PCCS Hx Cooling Water Tank Isolation Condenser Steam Suction Line Condensate Drain Line Reactor Pressure (MPa[abs]) Relief Valve ; Only 1 Lift Relief Valve ; Consecutive Actuation IC Capacity 3% Rated Power Without IC Time (sec) Reactor pressure transient following isolation 36/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

37 EU-ABWR Severe Accident Management PCCS serves passive heat removal and overpressure protection capability w/o containment venting at least 12h (extending over 72h) under severe accident condition based on EUR and Finnish YVL Requirement. It also provides diversity for containment cooling. PCV Pressure (Mpa[abs]) CCCS; Corium & Containment Cooling system IC/PCCS Hx Cooling Water Tank Steam Suction Line Ultimate Pressure (0.93MPa [gage]) Melting Core Cooling by Heat Removal by PCCS flooding PCCS Hx PCCS; Passive Containment Cooling system Onset of Core Melt RPV Failure Fusible Valves Open D/W W/W Design Pressure Driving force of Gas Vent Gas Vent Line Condensate Drain Line Time after Accident (hr) Driving force of Gas Vent Containment pressure transient following severe accident 下部ドライウェル Core Catcher Fusible Valve PCCS conform with 72 hours and no vent 37/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

38 Overview of safety I&C Architecture Redundancy Four independent & redundant divisions Four independent & redundant divisional power sources Independence Physical and functional separation Independence from non-safety systems Diversity Reactor Trip and Isolation System (RTIS) diverse from Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Control and Logic System (ELCS) which actuates ESF functions RTIS and ELCS diverse from non-safety and balance of plant I&C systems RTIS diverse from hardwired Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) logic Hardwired manual backup for RTIS/ELCS against a Common Cause Failure (CCF) 38/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

39 I&C Defense-in in-depth and Diversity Event Classification Event Progression Level of Defense Normal operating condition Anticipated Operational Occurrence Accident (AOO) Accident Beyond DBA +CCF Process Control Function Diversity between FPGA based RTIS and CPU based ELCS (existing) RTIS ATWS logics as a diversity means in RTIS (existing) SA DBA; Design Base Accident CCF; Common Cause Failure Lines of Defense RTIS + ELCSS Diverse Actuation System Hardwired backup systems for RTIS/ELCS (existing) Severe Accident mitigation system 39/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

40 Overview of Safety I&C Architecture in ABWR Manual trip Main Control Room Manual actuation Control RTIS ATWS ELCS Reactor Control System Building Reactor Building RMU RMU RMU RMU RMU Reactor Building Electrical Eq Room Sensors for RPS MSIV Closure Hydraulic Scram signal Sensors for ESF, Reactor Control Sys Diverse function of reactor scram SLC, FMCRD, RIP trip Sensors for ESF ARI: Alternate Rod Insertion ESF: Engineered Safety Feature RMU: Remote Multiplexing Unit RSS: Remote Shutdown System Actuators Sensors Actuators HPCFx2 optical fiber hard wire -Safety Class -Non-Safety Class Based on N+1 criterion 40/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

Overview of ABWR I&C System Plant Level Manual actuation of HPCF-B/C Manual trip SW Main Control Room A-PODIA Process Computer (CPTR) Annunciation (ANN) Network System Level Safety I&C Sys.

41 Overview of ABWR I&C System Plant Level Manual actuation of HPCF-B/C Manual trip SW Main Control Room A-PODIA Process Computer (CPTR) Annunciation (ANN) Network System Level Safety I&C Sys. Power Generation Control To ANN,CPTR To ANN,CPTR CPTR Reactor Trip and Isolation Sys. ESF Logic & Control Sys. Neutron Monitor ROD Control &Inform. Sys. Auto. Core Power Flow RegulatorControl Feed Water Control Reactor Aux. Station Power Control Turbine Control GeneratorTurbine Control Aux. Equipment Level RMU MSIV closure signal Scram signal RMU RMU To ECCS, Valve TOSHIBA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT(2026-4,08-04 A-Xw0.5) To HPCF FMCRD Inverter Sensor RIP Inverter RMU NSSS/ Station M/C CV,CIV Feed Water To, Valve Plant RMU Turbine Generator Power electronics Optical Cable Metal Cable Digital monitoring/ control unit RMU:Remote Multiplexor Unit M/C:Metal-Clad switchgear CV:Control Valve CIV: combined Intermediate Valve 41/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

ABWR Main Control Room (A-PODIA PODIA ) The First Generation MCR Design Bench-type panel with hard-wired

Display Information and Automation ) Separation of main and sub panels Adoption of CRTs Partial automation

Large Display Panels Adoption of CRTs and Flat displays Automation for CR operation and post scram

42 ABWR Main Control Room (A-PODIA PODIA ) The First Generation MCR Design Bench-type panel with hard-wired HMI devices ABWR A-PODIA The Second Generation MCR Design (PODIA : Plant Operation by Display Information and Automation ) Separation of main and sub panels Adoption of CRTs Partial automation of auxiliary systems The Third Generation MCR Design Advanced PODIA (A-PODIA ) Compact Main Console and Large Display Panels Adoption of CRTs and Flat displays Automation for CR operation and post scram operation Human Machine Interface design 典 : 第 27 回日韓原子力産業セミナー講演資料 42/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

43 Features of Advanced MCR (A (A-PODIA TM : Advanced Plant Operation by Display Information and Automation) Concept Provide for one person operation Design by work-load analysis Expansion of automated operation scope Compact Main Console using Flat displays with touch screens and Hard Switches Information sharing by Large Display Panels Plant fully digital system Introduction of self-diagnosis capability Signal multiplexing and digital networking using optical fiber Hardwired Backup Operation (A-PODIA TM TM ) 43/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

44 TM Overview of A-PODIA TM Plant safety related alarms Four main plant trip events ; Scram/ MSIV closure/tb trip/gen. trip Main parameters of plant performance Variable plant parameters Automatic display during emergency or alarm Plant Level Alarms Large Mimic Panels Large Display Panels Flat displays Video Display Units Flat displays Hard Switches Safety system operation by touchoperation method Dedicated to each safety division ABWR( C1) Emergency switches for safety systems Switches for high frequency usage Main Console Non-safety system operation by touch-operation method System status changes monitoring 44/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

46 TOSHIBA s s Construction Experiences Share of Gross Output as a prime contractor in Japan PWR 40% (24 units) M WEC TOSHIBA Group 41% 7% TOSHIBA 50,227MW 34% (56 units) H BWR 60% (32 units) Reference:Nuclear Onagawa 2 Power Plants in the Hamaoka 4 World 2009,JAIF Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 3 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 2 Hamaoka 3 Fukushima Daini 3 Onagawa 1 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 1 Fukushima Daini 1 Hamaoka 2 Fukushima Daiichi 6 Fukushima Daiichi 5 Hamaoka 1 Fukushima Daiichi 3 Fukushima Daiichi 2 Fukushima Daiichi 1 Tsuruga 1 G South Texas Project 4 South Texas Project 3 Ohma 1 Lungmen 2 Lungmen 1 Hamaoka 5 Higashidori 1 Onagawa 3 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 7 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 Italic:ABWR Planning Under Construction Constructed TOSHIBA constructed 22 plants (17 as prime contractor) 46/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

47 Construction Planning with 6DCAD TM Concept 3DCAD Design input Clear Understanding of the Quantities Quantities Piping,Duct, Cable Tray Equipment, Panel + Time + Resource Development of Simulation Technology <Target> 1. Module Selection ( Pipe Density Distribution Map ) 2. Shorten Work Period ( Parallel Work ) 3. Lower Manpower ( Manpower planning based on each area & job ) Hyper Module Multi-Module Optimization of Quantities, Time & Resources with Simulation 47/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

48 Hyper Module Multi-Module Module for Ohma Project Multiple Structure Building Equipment; Steel, Re-bar, Formwork M&E Equipment; Piping Support Equipment, Scaffolding 48/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

M&E Equipment; Piping Support Equipment, Scaffolding

49 Carry-in of Hyper Multi-Modules Modules Multiple Structure Building Equipment; Steel, Re-bar, Formwork M&E Equipment; Piping Support Equipment, Scaffolding 49/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

51 EPC Execution Structure for STP-3/4 The Best Experienced Company Team Owners (US-ABWR) Consortium Toshiba America Nuclear Energy - Project Management - Project Control - Licensing - NI and TI Basic Engineering - Construction Planning Shaw, Stone & Webster - Project Management - Project Control -Construction -Procurement - TI Engineering MPR - Licensing/Eng g Support Toshiba Power Systems - NI and TI Engineering Support - Licensing Support - Manufacturing/Procur ement of Main Components - Construction Planning Support Sargent & Lundy - NI Detailed Engineering Westinghouse -I&C Systems - Licensing Support Toshiba is the qualified vendor for STP-3/4 by US-NRC 51/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

52 STP-3/4 COLA US-ABWR License (Combined Construction and Operation License Application) Well Progressed COLA Review by US-NRC Projected COL Issuance in 2012 Time Frame US-ABWR Design Certification Renewal Current ABWR Design Certification Expires at June 2012 Toshiba Submitted DC Renewal Application in Nov US-NRC Accepted and Docketed on Dec /55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

53 Delivery Team in NPP for Europe Owners Owner s AE Japanese Utility Delivery Team (EU-ABWR) (Sweden and Germany) Civil design/composite Construction Planning Procurement Installation etc. System Design (NI/TI) Mechanical System Composite Major Equipment Supply (RPV, RIN, RIP, T/G etc.) Procurement Pre-ope. test etc. Licensing I&C, Electrical system Procurement Other European company (TBD) 53/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

54 Summary ABWR is the only Generation III reactor under operation in the world. US-ABWR and EU-ABWR are developed based on JP-ABWR design. Toshiba will provide ABWR designed to meet with the nation s s acts or regulations, i.e., technology is global but regulation is localized. 54/55 Copyright 2011 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.

ABWR Reactor Technology

9 th International School on Nuclear Power Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd. Property ABWR Reactor Technology Polish benefits from a U.K deployment Kazue Okumura HGNE Nuclear Engineering David Hinds GEH