DTLS over SNMP. Wes Hardaker. 14 November Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
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1 DTLS over SNMP Wes Hardaker 14 November 2008 Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
2 Outline 1 Background 2 SNMP over DTLS: Details 3 Issues Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
3 Background Motivation Motivation Support X.509 Certificate Authentication Support for a UDP based security solution TCP vs UDP performance in bad networks is still a problem Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
4 Background The Resulting Document The Resulting Document draft-hardaker-isms-dtls-tm-01 Closely aligns in structure the SSH document Compliant with the TSM security model expectations Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
5 Background DTLS DTLS Defined in RFC4347 DTLS is functionally identically to TLS Uses the same on-the-wire format X.509 certificates for authentication. (Editor s Note: I m not a DTLS expert; hopefully Eric is here!) Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
6 Background DTLS Architecture Overview DTLS Architecture Overview Client Server ClientHello > Certificate* ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify* [ChangeCipherSpec] Finished > ServerHello Certificate* ServerKeyExchange* CertificateRequest* < ServerHelloDone [ChangeCipherSpec] < Finished Application Data < > Application Data Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
7 DTLS Considerations DTLS Considerations TLS relies on TCP for session demultiplexing Does not contain an in-protocol session identifier UDP doesn t provide session demultiplexing Result: we have to define how to demultiplex multiple connections Need a unique key to latch to a DTLS session Key: src addr, srt port, dst addr, dst port Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
8 X509 Certificates to securityname X509 Certificates to securityname X509 Certificates use a very different naming structure The Issuer: field identifies who handed out the certificate The Subject: field typically identifies a user and contains: Location information (C: Country, ST: State) Organization information (O: Name, OU: Unit) Personal Information (CN: Common Name) Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
9 Client X.509 Certificate Examples Client X.509 Certificate Examples Example: My Fedora User Certificate Subject: C=US, ST=North Carolina, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora User Cert, Issuer: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Raleigh, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora Project CA, CN=Fedora Project Example: Fedora CA XXX... Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
10 Server X.509 Certificate Examples Server X.509 Certificate Examples Example: The Fedora Server Certificate Subject: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Raleigh, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora Project CA, CN=Fedora Project Issuer: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Raleigh, O=Fedora Project, OU=Fedora Project CA, CN=Fedora Project Example: The HTTPS Certificate Subject: O = *.ietf.org, OU = Domain Control Validated, CN = *.ietf.org Issuer: CN = Starfield Secure Certification Authority, OU = O = Starfield Technologies, Inc., L = Scottsdale, ST = Arizona, C = US Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
11 X.509 Subject to securityname Mapping X.509 Subject to securityname Mapping The Subject field is the identifying field. The Common Name (CN) tag within it is typically the account name It is paired with the Issuer field to be unique Potential ways to be mapped into a securityname: Take the CN in raw form Map the CN to a securityname This mapping is configured through DTLSTM-MIB tables Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
12 DTLSTM-MIB DTLSTM-MIB Domain and Address definitions Counters Configuration dtlstmcertificatetosntable dtlstmparamstable Conformance statements Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
13 Incoming securityname Selection Incoming securityname Selection The dtlstmcertificatetosntable maps incoming certificates to securitynames. Two modes: Accept the CN directly from trusted CAs Map a Subject to specific securityname dtlstmcertificatetosntable Column Value dtlstmcertid(1) 1 dtlstmcertissuerdn(2) Fedora... dtlstmcertmaptype(3) specified (or bycn) dtlstmcertissuer*... dtlstmcertsubject* C=US, ST=North Carolina... dtlstmcertsecurityname(4) wes dtlstmcertstoragetype(5) nonvolatile dtlstmcertrowstatus(6) createandgo Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
14 Outgoing Certificate Selection Outgoing Certificate Selection The dtlstmparamstable maps an outgoing securityname to a certificate. The certificate is referenced by a Issuer and Subject dtlstmparamstable Column Value snmptargetparamsname(1) wes dtlstmcertissuer*... dtlstmparamssubject(1) C=US,... CN=hardaker... dtlstmparamsstoragetype(2) nonvolatile dtlstmparamsrowstatus(3) createandgo Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
15 Issues Issues A few MIB changes needed Awaiting completion of the other documents before WG consideration Need people to review it DTLS implementations are still few OpenSSL: implemented but poorly documented GnuTLS: not implemented Wes Hardaker () DTLS over SNMP 14 November / 15
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