RF Cloak: Securing RFID Cards Without Modifying them
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1 RF Cloak: Securing RFID Cards Without Modifying them Haitham Hassanieh Jue Wang, Dina Katabi, Tadayoshi Kohno
2 RFIDs Are Used in Sensitive Applications Access Control Credit Cards Passports Pharmaceutical Drugs Anti Theft Car Immobilizers Public Transportation
3 RFIDs Are Used in Sensitive Applications Access Control [SECRYPT 09, S&P 09 ESORICS 08, Usenix 08] Credit Cards [DefCon 13, ShmooCon 12, DefCon 11, Usenix 05] Passports [DefCon 12, HackaDay 12, BlackHat 06] Pharmaceutical Drugs [CCS 09, RFID 06] Anti Theft Car Immobilizers [Usenix 12, Usenix 05] Public Transportation [Defcon 08, MIT 08, S&P 09]
4 Hacking RFIDs for Dummies
5 Hacking RFIDs Simply By Eavesdropping RFIDs adopt weak encryption protocols
6 Hacking RFIDs Simply By Eavesdropping RFIDs adopt weak encryption protocols Goal of RFID Industry: Dramatically reduce the power, size, and cost of RFIDs
7 Protect your RFID cards against active attacks
8 Protect your RFID cards against active attacks Most attacks demonstrated by eavesdropping Need solution for eavesdropping that works with existing RFIDs
9 RF Cloak System that protects RFIDs against eavesdropping attacks Does not require any modification to the RFID cards Protects against a wide range of attackers including multi antenna MIMO eavesdroppers Theoretically proven the security guarantees Implemented the system and empirically demonstrated its benefits
10 RFID Communication Reader transmits constant waveform: RFID reflects the reader s signal using ON OFF switch Reader receives (full duplex) : Eavesdropper receives: Replace constant waveform waveform with a random
11 RF Cloak Solution Reader transmits random waveform: RFID reflects the reader s signal using ON OFF switch Reader receives (full duplex): Eavesdropper receives: Replace constant waveform waveform with a random
12 RF Cloak Solution Reader transmits random waveform: RFID reflects the reader s signal using ON OFF switch Reader receives (full duplex): Eavesdropper receives: Reader knows Can decode Eavesdropper doesn t know Cannot decode
13 RF Cloak: Randomizing the Reader s Signal Random waveform acts like a one time pad on the air Naïve solution: Multiply each bit with random number RFID Signal: Value Time Value Time
14 RF Cloak: Randomizing the Reader s Signal Random waveform acts like a one time pad on the air Naïve solution: Multiply each bit with random number RFID Signal: Value Time Value Random waveform must destroy internal signal patterns of the bits Time
15 RF Cloak: Randomizing the Reader s Signal Random waveform: Must change as fast as any transition in the RFID signal has same bandwidth as RFID signal Must be indistinguishable from white noise i.e. flat frequency profile samples taken from complex Gaussians Value Value Frequency Time
16 RF Cloak: Randomizing the Reader s Signal Threat model: Single antenna eavesdropper using the optimal decoder Guarantee: (informally restated) Theorem 1: Using RF Cloak s random signal an eavesdropper will not be able to distinguish a 0 bit from a 1 bit which is no better than a random guess
17 What if the attacker has multi antenna MIMO capability?
18 MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO RX Reader transmits random waveform: Eavesdropper receives: 1 st receiver: 2 nd receiver:
19 MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO Eavesdropper can eliminate the random Reader transmits random waveform: Eavesdropper receives: 1 st receiver: 2 nd receiver: MIMO RX waveform and decode the RFID bits.
20 RF Cloak vs MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO RX Antenna War!
21 RF Cloak vs MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO RX Antenna War!
22 RF Cloak vs MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO RX RF Cloak combines antenna motion and rapid antenna switching Emulate a very large number of fast changing antennas
23 RF Cloak vs MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO RX Channels to eavesdropper change very fast Cannot separate RFID signal from Reader signal Cannot decode Reader (full duplex) Only receives reflection from RFID Can decode
24 RF Cloak: Randomizing the Wireless Channel Threat model: Multi antenna MIMO eavesdropper using the optimal decoder. Guarantee: (informally restated) Theorem 2: Using RF Cloak s channel randomization, a MIMO eavesdropper will not be able to distinguish a 0 bit from a 1 bit which is no better than a random guess
25 Evaluation Implemented RF Cloak on USRP N210 software radios and combined it with a 1725 rpm motor and ADG904R RF switches. Evaluated it against different types of commercial RFID cards Evaluation metric : Bit error rate (BER)
26 RF Cloak Random Waveform vs Single Antenna Eavesdropper Single Antenna Bit Error Rate Eavesdropper has mean BER of with std. dev Very close to a random guess
27 RF Cloak Random Waveform vs Two Antenna MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO 2 Ant. Bit Error Rate A two antenna MIMO eavesdropper can correctly decode the RFID bits
28 RF Cloak Channel Randomization vs MIMO Eavesdropper MIMO 5Ant. Bit Error Rate RF Cloak can prevent a MIMO eavesdropper from decoding the RFID s data
29 Related Work Physical layer security: [JCM 07, TCOM 13, SIGCOMM 11, Oakland 13, ICC 12, INFOCOM 11, MobiSys 13, SIGCOMM 13, MobiSys 14] Securing RFIDs against eavesdropping: [CHES 07, RFIDSec 11, CARDIS 06, JRSC 12, PerCom 07] Moving antennas: [SIGCOMM 14, MOBICOM 14, HOTNETS 14, MOBICOM 13, SIGCOM 13, HotMobile 12, ISJ 14]
30 Conclusion RF Cloak is the first system that can protect deployed RFIDs against eavesdropping without any modification to the RFID RF Cloak is the first system that can hide the signal from MIMO attacker with many antennas even when the reader has no MIMO capability. RF Cloak provides a defense in depth solution.
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