ERO Reliability Risk Priorities Report

Transcription

1 ERO Reliability Risk Priorities Report Peter Brandien, Reliability Issues Steering Committee Chair Member Representatives Committee Meeting November 8, 2017

2 Summary Key Inputs RISC s subject matter expertise Reliability Leadership Summit FERC technical conference Pulse point interviews Review of a number of NERC technical studies Department of Energy grid study Nine inherent risk profiles for continued level of attention No new profiles; shift in Profile 4 from asset management and maintenance to increasing complexity in protection and control systems Categorized as High, Moderate, or Lower Includes recommended actions to mitigate the risks Supports the ERO Enterprise Long-Term Strategy and Operating Plan 2 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

3 Levels Of Risk High emerging; known to exist, but more recently identified and impacts not generally understood Moderate evolving; have been identified, but impacts only somewhat understood Lower known or existing; risks that are predictable, welldefined, and universally understood Note: All risks are important and a Moderate or Lower ranking does not indicate that the risk is not a threat to reliable operation of the system 3 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

4 Proposed 2017 Risk Profiles High Changing Resource Mix Bulk Power System Planning Resource Adequacy and Performance Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Moderate Increasing Complexity in Protection and Control Systems Loss of Situational Awareness Extreme Natural Events Physical Security Vulnerabilities Lower Human Performance and Skilled Workforce 4 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

5 Prioritization Of Inherent Reliability Risks 5 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

6 Next Steps First draft currently posted for stakeholder comment Comments due November 17 Prepare final report based on stakeholder comments Present final report to NERC Board of Trustees in February 2018 for acceptance 6 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

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8 ERO Enterprise Long-Term Strategy, Operating Plan, and 2018 Metrics Michael Walker, Senior Vice President and Chief Enterprise Risk and Strategic Development Officer Member Representatives Committee Meeting November 8, 2017

9 Long-Term Strategy Highlights emerging risks and potential reliability impacts Incorporates applicable recommendations from the Reliability Issues Steering Committee s (RISC) draft report Focus areas: Building on and preserving current achievements o Achieving and maintaining risk-based operations o Being more effective and efficient Adapting to change o Identifying and assessing emerging risks o Promoting leading security practices, information sharing and analysis, and resilience o Knowledge transfer and effective communication o Strengthening engagement across North America 2 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

10 Operating Plan Three-year horizon Incorporates applicable draft RISC recommendations Compliments contributing activities identified by the ERO Enterprise Alignment of long-term strategy, operating plan, and high priority risk profiles: o Cybersecurity o Changing Resource Mix o Bulk Power System Planning o Resource Adequacy Subject to review and updating based on final RISC recommendations presented in February 3 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

11 2018 Metrics Enhancements Metric 4 (Reduced risk from unauthorized access) Frequency of physical security events impacting the Bulk Electric System Baseline using available data Cases resulting in malware inside a network or device Baseline using existing and new data Cyber hygiene and internet risk scores Baseline using new data Cyber and physical readiness Develop program and baseline using new data Metric 5 (Reduced risk from noncompliance) Adjusted how serious risk violations are measured 4 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

12 2018 Metrics Enhancements Metric 6 (Reduced risk in targeted areas) Removed sub-metric for generators forced out by cold weather One target of no transmission line outages due to FAC-003 violations Metric 7 (ERO Enterprise efficiency and effectiveness) NERC expenses within +/- 1% budget plus $2M year-end operating reserve target; each Regional Entity will establish its own financial targets Develop plans to achieve 1% ($6M) ERO Enterprise-wide cost reductions Enterprise IT cost benefit review of projects completed in 2017 Targeted improvements in the three most unfavorable stakeholder survey results 5 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

13 Updated Planning Calendar 6 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

14 Operating Area Focus Five Key Areas Regulatory role Changing grid Security Reliability and resilience Enterprise-wide resource planning and talent management Resource needs and talent roadmap (security and technical expertise) Reducing costs o Driving operating efficiencies o Leveraging technology o Opportunities to centralize services Effective employee and stakeholder engagement 7 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

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16 Appendix Additional Background Information 9 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

17 ERO Enterprise Resources Overview 20,000+ hours per year supporting the Board, Board committees, and standing committees Additional resources supporting standard drafting teams, subcommittees, and task forces Considerable additional resources supporting Regional Entity boards and stakeholder committees 1,000+ individuals from the ERO Enterprise and industry supporting the ERO Significant resources also supporting governmental reliability frameworks and initiatives in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico 10 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

18 2018 Consolidated ERO Enterprise FTEs [add FTE table]department 2018 FTEs Standards Compliance ReliabilityAssessment and Performance Analysis Training Event Analysis Situational Awareness and Infrastructure Security Critical Infrastructure Protection and E-ISAC General and Administrative Legal and Regulatory Information Technology Human Resources Finance and Accounting Technical Committee and Member Forums 5.20 Business Process and Risk Assessment 7.00 Total RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

19 NERC Industry Resources Snapshot NERC Stakeholder Committee or Group Number of Participants Technical and Standing Committees Operating Committee 38 Planning Committee 38 Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee 34 Compliance and Certification Committee 35 Standards Committee 22 Personnel Certification Governance Committee 10 Member Representatives Committee 29 Reliability Issues Steering Committee 19 Total 225 Examples of Subcommittees, Task Forces, Working Groups, etc. Essential Reliability Services Task Force (Operating and Planning Committees) 30 Reliability Assessment Subcommittee (Planning Committee) 30 System Protection and Control Subcommittee (Planning Committee) 23 ERO Monitoring Subcommittee (Compliance and Certification Committee) 10 Project Management and Oversight Subcommittee (Standards Committee) 12 Standard Drafting Teams Average RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

20 Top Four 2018 Consolidated ERO Enterprise Budget Categories Personnel Expenses $131.6M Contracts and Consultants $22M Meeting and Travel Expenses $10.6M Office Costs $10.3M 13 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

21 2017 Long-Term Reliability Assessment Preliminary Overview John Moura, Director, Reliability Assessment and System Analysis Member Representatives Committee Meeting November 8, 2017

22 Overview New format for 2017 More succinct; similar to seasonal assessments Additional clarification on data terms and concepts Front-end stakeholder input 2 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

23 Preliminary Key Findings Canceled nuclear expansion in SERC-East Slower demand growth, conventional generation retirements More robust planning approaches to ensure adequate essential reliability services and fuel assurance Significant transmission needed to maintain reliability and meet policy objectives 3 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

24 Key Finding #1: Reserve Margin Short-Fall In SERC-East 2020 Reserve Margins fall below NERC Reference Margin Level Cancelled expansion of V.C. Summer nuclear power plant (approximately 2,200 MW) 4 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

25 Key Finding #1: Reserve Margin Short-Fall In SERC-East Sufficient resources projected for 2022, but some risk remains Nuclear expansion cancelled 4,600 MW of retirements announced 5 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

26 Key Finding #2: Continued Evolution Of Resource Mix 10-year annual demand growth rate for North America is the lowest on record, at 0.61% (summer) and 0.60% (winter) 6 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

27 Key Finding #2: Continued Evolution Of Resource Mix NERC-wide, generation retirements since 2011 Coal (46.5 GW) Natural gas (20 GW) Natural gas, solar, and wind lead 10-year (Tier 1) planned additions over the next decade 7 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

28 Key Finding #2: Continued Evolution Of Resource Mix On-peak natural gas-fired capacity has increased to 442 GW, up from 280 GW in GW of Tier 1 gas-fired capacity is planned during the next decade Assessment Area 2022 (%) FRCC 78.1% WECC-CAMX 68.2% Texas RE- ERCOT 63.3% NPCC-New England 52.3% WECC-SRSG 51.8% WECC-AB 51.8% 8 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

29 Key Finding #2: Continued Evolution Of Resource Mix Solar PV continues to expand at a rapid pace 37 GW of utility-scale 20 GW of distributed energy resources 9 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

30 Key Finding #3: ERS And Fuel Assurance To ensure sufficient generator response, ERCOT and Hydro Quebec interconnections have established low system inertia requirements ERCOT has identified its critical inertia to be ~100GW/seconds. o Below that threshold, voltage oscillations control issues can manifest Primary Frequency Response(MW) Inertia (GW s) 10 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

31 Key Finding #3: ERS And Fuel Assurance Increasing solar PV expands system ramping and generator cycling requirements CAISO has revised its estimated three-hour upward ramp for 2020 to exceed 16,800 MW. Maximum Upward Three- Hour Ramp (MW) CAISO maximum monthly three-hour upward net-load ramps for 2016 through ,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 2016 (Actual) RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

32 Key Finding #3: ERS And Fuel Assurance Nearly half of MRO, RF, and NPCC US natural gas generation relies on interruptible fuel service Significant positive policy and market attention on this trend NG Max Simultaneous Capacity Unscheduled Outage # of days with at least 1 outage 12 Reported GADS Outages of Natural Gas Generation Due to Lack of Fuel ( ) RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

33 Key Finding #4: Transmission 6,200 miles of transmission additions are needed to maintain reliability and meet policy objectives 13 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

34 Key Finding #4: Transmission 6,200 miles of transmission additions are needed to maintain reliability and meet policy objectives 14 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

35 LTRA Timeline Date Milestone November December 4 December 14 NERC Board of Trustees and MRC review NERC Board of Trustees conference call for report s acceptance Target release 15 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

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37 Winter Reliability Assessment Thomas Coleman, Director, Reliability Assessment Member Representatives Committee Meeting November 8, 2017

38 Reserve Margins are Sufficient for Each Assessment Area 2 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

39 Key Findings Resource Adequacy all assessment areas meet or exceed planning reference margin level for upcoming winter Winter Preparedness winter reliability programs and preparedness workshops continue to provide added reliability assurance Market based initiatives in several areas mitigate winter risk PJM Capacity Performance Initiative ISONE Pay for Performance (June 2018) Summer hurricanes are not expected to impact winter reliability Service interruptions to Aliso Canyon are not expected to have an additional impact to winter reliability 3 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

40 Assessment Area Example 4 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

41 2017/18 WRA Timeline Date Milestone October 27 November 3 NERC Executive Management review of report November 7 November 15 Send to NERC Board of Trustees and MRC for information WRA released 5 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

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43 Advanced Analytics to Improve Models and Conduct Forward-Looking Assessments of Emerging BPS Risks Ryan D. Quint, PhD, PE Senior Manager, Advanced Analytics & Modeling Member Representatives Committee Meeting November 8, 2017

44 Outline Strategic Goals Modeling Improvements MOD-032 Designee Feedback Loop Forward-Looking Frequency Response Assessment Inverter-Based Resource Performance Oscillation Analysis using Synchrophasors 2 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

45 Strategic Goals Cross-Departmental Support throughout the ERO Enterprise Building out NERC s Analytical Capabilities Developing Technical Materials Increase Industry Expertise Providing Technical Leadership to Industry Stakeholder Groups Supporting ERO Enterprise Development Training and Education 3 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

46 Modeling Improvements And MOD-032 Designee Feedback Loop NERC Case Quality Metrics Assessment MOD-032 Designee Tracking Modeling Notifications NERC Type Phase EI TI WI Powerflow Phase 1 MOD-032 Designee Phase 2 Dynamics Phase 1 Phase 2 Equipment Owners 4 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

47 Forward-Looking Assessment Frequency Response 5 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

48 Inverter-Based Resource Performance 6 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

49 Oscillation Analysis Using Synchronized PMUs 7 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

50 Changing Resource Mix? How About Changing Power System! Proactive Engagement with Industry Joint Task Forces Reliability Guidelines Reliability Assessments and Studies Model Improvements 8 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

51 Guidelines And Group Webpages Reliability Guideline: Modeling DER in Dynamic Load Models Reliability Guideline: DER Modeling Disturbance Report: 1200 MW Solar PV Loss Blue Cut Fire NERC Inverter Based Resource Performance Task Force (IRPTF) NERC System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (SAMS) NERC Load Modeling Task Force (LMTF) NERC Power Plant Modeling & Verification Task Force (PPMVTF) NERC Synchronized Measurement Subcommittee (SMS) NERC Report: EI Frequency Response Assessment DERTF Report: Distributed Energy Resources ERSTF Report: ERS Measures Framework 9 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

52 Ryan D. Quint, PhD, PE Senior Manager NERC Advanced Analytics & Modeling (202) Ganesh Velummylum Senior Manager NERC System Analysis (404) RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

53 CenterPoint Energy s Response to Hurricane Harvey Kenny Mercado, Senior Vice President, Electric Operations

54 Hurricane Harvey A Record-breaking Storm August 26 September 4: 52 inches of rainfall in southeast Texas Harvey made landfall multiple times Category 4 near Port Aransas, Texas Tropical storm in Cameron, Louisiana More than 42,000 lightning strikes Record number of tornado warnings in southeast Texas 2

55 Harvey by the Numbers Electric Operations Response 1.27 million total restorations 293 circuits locked out and 4,494 fuses out 17 substations out of service or inaccessible due to high water 7 transmission lines locked out 2,200 employees plus 1,500 contractors & mutual assistance from 7 states 308 SAIDI minutes 755 million total minutes out over 10 days 83 buildings in Downtown Houston lost electrical service due to high water 3

56 Harvey Video Hurricane Harvey Video 4

57 Harvey by the Numbers Electric Operations Response 5 staging sites 352,000 total hours worked during EOP event (160 hours per employee) Approximately 85 crew spokespersons used 104,412 meals served More than 12,000 hotel rooms utilized 5

58 Harvey by the Numbers Electric Operations Response Near zero injuries and accidents More than 1,200 safety orientations and 120 crew safety observations 36 air boats, 15 drones and 15 amphibious vehicles used 6

59 Impact of Grid Modernization Benefits of Advanced Metering System (AMS) and Intelligent Grid Intelligent Grid helped avoid outages Operated 250 devices impacting 140,000 customers Avoided 41 million outage minutes SAIDI minutes saved AMS meters increased efficiency during the storm Executed 45,000 orders remotely at 97% performance Billed 700,000 accounts with actual readings at 98.9% performance Executed remote turn off/on for safety reasons Use of real-time analytics to assess, monitor and resolve cases Aided in developing better situational awareness Allowed us to correlate weather and flooding information with outages, providing operations with critical decision-making tools 7

60 Impact of Grid Modernization Use of Technology during Storm Drones helped to assess damage and evaluate work conditions 500 locations were tracked using 15 drones Enabled real-time situational awareness Infrared capabilities helped identify equipment that needed further inspection Ability to use Power Alert Service (PAS) to keep customers informed Memorial mobile substation 50MVA mobile substation installed on private property in 7 days Flood wall at Grant substation helped protect service to Texas Medical Center 8

61 Harvey by the Numbers Customer Service Response Customer Service 176,193 calls to the call center 67,479 were answered by agents with IVR handling the remainder 352,629 outage notifications delivered through PAS service 22,257 new PAS enrollments 9

62 Harvey by the Numbers Customer Service Response Customer Service 160 Facebook posts that reached 1,095,314 people 566 tweets that reached 2,531,685 people 630,206 visits to CenterPointEnergy.com At the height of the storm, web traffic was more than 600% higher than average Translated more than 50 communications into Spanish 10

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64 Hurricane Preparation & Irma Response Mike Spoor Vice President, Transmission and Substation Operations, Florida Power & Light Company

65 35 counties 4.9 million customer accounts Serving more than half of Florida 27,000 Square miles Majority of FPL customers live within 20 miles of the coast

66 $3 billion+ invested in stronger, more resilient energy grid following hurricanes Distribution system improvements: Strengthened 860+ main power lines serving critical infrastructure 40% of main power lines hardened or underground 150,000 pole inspections each year 1.2 million inspections every eight years Clear vegetation from 15,000 miles of power lines every year

67 Strengthening investments also include transmission & substation structures 90% of transmission structures are now steel or concrete 223 substations upgraded with storm surge and flood mitigation

68 Smarter and more modern energy grid Deployed 4.9 million smart meters Installed more than 83,000 intelligent devices» Automated feeder switches» Automated lateral switches» Fault current indicators Established multiple diagnostic centers

69 Technology enables situational awareness in the field Mobile Command Centers and Community Response Vehicles are deployed to impacted areas Drones are used to assess damage Smart meters help to assess restoration status

70 Year-round planning and practice ensures our readiness

71 Hurricane Irma Roughly the size of Texas Affected all 35 counties served by FPL Slow-moving storm impacted some areas for nearly 24 hours

72 Largest restoration workforce in FPL s history Approximately 28,000 personnel activated ~9,000 FPL employees & embedded contractors ~19,000 external personnel 190+ utilities & other companies from 30 states + Canada provided assistance 29 staging/operations sites

73 Building and operating an army of restoration resources Fort Myers Lake City Daytona Beach Palmetto Miami

74 FRCC RC coordination was significant FPL and other entities in the FRCC, were in constant coordination» Prior to storm all entities shared damage forecasts, preparations and posture» During the storm FRCC RC in constant communications with all entities using the FRCC hotline» Post storm ensured coordination among all entities regarding customers/facilities affected and restoration efforts/forecasts

75 Winds alone weren t the biggest issue major damage from flooding and storm surge most outages caused by fallen trees and wind-blown debris

76 Flooding and storm surge on both coasts

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78 Most distribution outages caused by falling trees and wind-blown debris

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80 Wilma vs. Irma Hurricane winds (74+ mph) Strong tropical storm winds (55-73 mph) Moderate tropical storm winds (39-54 mph) Hurricane Wilma, 2005 Hurricane Irma, 2017 Saffir-Simpson Scale Category 3 Category 4 Maximum Sustained Winds in Florida 120 mph 130 mph Cyclone Damage Potential Index * FPL Counties Impacted Customer Impacted 3.2 million 4.4 million % of FPL Customers 75% ~90% *Index developed by the National Center for Atmospheric Research that rates a storm s ability to cause destruction

81 Wilma vs. Irma Restoration Hurricane Wilma, 2005 Hurricane Irma, 2017 Customer Restoration 18 days 10 days 50% of Customers Restored 5 days 1 day 75% of Customers Restored 8 days 3 days 95% of Customers Restored 15 days 7 days Average Customer Outage 5.4 days 2.3 days

82 Wilma vs. Irma Restoration Transmission lines segments impacted Hurricane Wilma, 2005 Hurricane Irma, Substations De-energized Transmission structures lost 100 5

83 Key improvements moving forward Restoration Information Right Tree Right Place

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87 Michael Bardee, Director FERC Office of Electric Reliability November 8, 2017

88 Supplemental Request for Comments, RM16-6, 8/18/17 NOPR issued 11/17/16 Proposes to amend pro forma large & small generator interconnection agreements to require all new generating facilities to install, maintain and operate functioning governor or equivalent controls as a condition of interconnection Supplemental request seeks comments on whether and when electric storage resources should be required to provide PFR and the costs associated with PFR capabilities for small generators Comments were due 10/10/17

89 Final Rule, RM , 9/20/17 Approves Reliability Standards BAL (Balancing Authority Control) and FAC (Facility Interconnection Requirements) that clarify and consolidate existing requirements related to frequency control Revised standards support more accurate and comprehensive calculation of reporting Area Control Error Retires BAL b (Automatic Generation Control), FAC (Facility Interconnection Requirements) and BAL (Inadvertent Interchange) Effective 11/27/17

90 Final rule, RM , 9/20/17 Approves a revised reliability standard on Remedial Action Schemes (PRC-012-2) to ensure that they do not introduce unintentional or unacceptable reliability risks to the grid Establishes centralized process to review new or modified RAS before implementation by requiring periodic evaluations, tests and operational analyses of each RAS and an annual update of an area-wide RAS database Assigns specific responsibilities to the appropriate functional entities Effective 11/27/17

91 Proposed Rule, RM , 9/20/17 Proposes to approve revised reliability standards: Event Reporting (EOP-004-4) System Restoration from Blackstart Resources (EOP-005-3) System Restoration Coordination (EOP-006-3) Loss of Control Center Functionality (EOP-008-2) Proposed standards will: Provide accurate reporting to NERC s event analysis group Delineate roles and responsibilities of entities supporting system restoration from blackstart resources Clarify procedures and coordination requirements for reliability coordinator personnel to execute system restoration Refine required elements of an operating plan used to continue reliable operation of the grid if primary control functionality is lost Comments due 11/27/17

92 Order Terminating Proceeding, RM16-18, 10/2/17 Notice of Inquiry issued in part because of 2015 cyber attack on electric distribution companies in Ukraine Commission considered possible modifications to CIP reliability standards After reviewing NOI comments, Commission decided that record did not support requiring isolation from Internet or application whitelisting Commission will seek to provide guidance and other outreach on benefits where appropriate

93 Staff report on recommendations to help users, owners and operators of the bulk-power system assess their risk, compliance and overall cyber security Staff audits conducted in collaboration with NERC staff and Regional Entities Examples of recommendations: Ensure coordination between owners of shared facilities through clearly defined and documented responsibilities for CIP standards Ensure that policies and testing procedures for all electronic communications protocols are afforded the same rigor For each remote cyber asset conducting Interactive Remote Access, disable other access outside of the connection to the BES cyber system unless there is a documented business or operational need Issued 10/6/17

94 Proposed Rule, RM , 10/19/17 Proposes to revise CIP (Cyber Security - Security Management Controls) Directs NERC to develop modifications to: Provide clear, objective criteria for electronic access controls for low impact BES cyber systems Address the need to mitigate the risk of malicious code that could result from third-party transient electronic devices Comments due 60 days after publication in Federal Register

95 RM , 10/19/17 Order No. 779 (issued 5/16/13) directed owners and operators to develop and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the bulk-power system, caused by damage to critical or vulnerable equipment as a result of a benchmark GMD event Work plans must include strategies for protecting against the potential impact of GMDs based on factors such as age, condition, technical specifications, system configuration, or location of specific equipment Order accepts the preliminary GMD work plan Directs NERC to submit a final, or otherwise updated, GMD work plan within six months

96 Notice Inviting Comments on DOE s Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, RM Notice with deadlines for comments issued 10/2/17 Separate notice listing questions for commenters to address issued 10/4/17 Commenters need not answer all questions and may raise issues not presented in the questions Comments due 10/23/17

97 Thank you! Questions?