An Identification Protocol based the secure USB

Transcription

1 An Identification otocol based the secue UB Chol-Un KIM ok-jun AN and u-nam HAN Faculty of Mathematics Kim Il ung Univesity yongyang..r.k. Abstact In this pape we poposed an identification potocol which can be used in some use authentication system based on such secue devices as secue UB memoies o RFIs that ae widely used fo identifying pesons o othe objects ecently. Keywods: secuity use authentication identification potocol secue UB RFI MC 2010: 94A62 pimay); 68M12 seconday) 1. Intoduction In this pape we poposed an identification potocol which can be used in some use authentication system based on such secue stoage devices as secue UB memoies smat cad o RFIs. Nowadays ae studied a lot of authentication potocols using stoage devices such as secue UB smat cad o RFIs to identify the identity of thei uses and such authentication potocols ae capable of stoing pesonal identification infomation secuely[1~3]. But many potocols among them have vaious vulneabilities and they don t satisfy the equiements fo applications. Fo example the potocols in [1 2] expose the device's I o cannot to be clea the equiements of anonymity and esistence fo device taceability because of using fixed hash value fo each device and the potocols in [3] have the poblem that the load of authentication seves ae apidly inceasing as the numbe of devices gows. We poposed an mutual identification potocol that can cove such secuity poblems as ones of above potocols.

2 2. Ou identification potocol In this pape the authentication system consists of the secue stoage devices being capable of stoing the legitimate use s I and having some cyptogaphic computation capability such as secue UB memoies smat cads o RFIs the authentication seve that maintains the Is of all legitimate uses on thei intenal database and confims the existence of the specific use s I in the I database esponding to authentication equests and the bokes which ae placed between the secue devices and authentication seve and tansmit any messages of them fo example the use authentication softwae on the compute that the secue devices ae connected). [Notations] I A specific secuity) device. The I of the device namely the I of the legistimate device owne that the system have to identify). The andom numbe geneated by the authentication seve and stoed in the device. Hello The I quey message that the boke send to the secue stoage device. H :{0 1} {0 1} RNG * h The h-bit cyptogaphic hash function that have the peimage esistence and the collision esistence cyptogaphic hash function h is a positive intege). The pseudo-andom geneato implemented in the authentication seve. We suppose that the bit length of andom numbe geneated by it cannot be beyond the one of hash value of H h ). KE KeyGen E ) The secue public-key cyptosystems implemented in the authentication seve and secue stoage devices. e d ) The pai of public and pivate key of KE geneated by KeyGen. It assumes that the decyption keythe pivate key) is only known to the authentication seve. KE KeyGen E ) The secue symmetic-key cyptosystems implemented in the authentication seve and secue stoage devices.

3 Ou potocol consists of the pepaation step and the authentication step. [The epaation tep] Any secue stoage device egisteed in the authentication system ae maintained the andom numbe geneated by the authentication seve. The andom numbe is unique fo the device so it diffes by devices. The authentication seve must maintain the andom numbes in some peiod fo esisting the eplay attacks and guaantee thei uniqueness. It stoe all I fo any secue stoage devices in the system to its secue intenal database by making H I ) as the seach pimay key. [The Authentication tep] tep 1 : The boke initiats the potocol un by sending the message Hello to the device. tep 2 : The device un the following actions by using its I andom numbe in its memoy. 2-1) x H I ) 2-2) a E e x) boke. 2-3) C E x ) I and the 2-4) end a H x) C H )) to the authentication seve though the tep 3 : The authentication seve pefoms the following actions afte eceiving a H x) C H )). 3-1) x d a) 3-2) x C) 3-3) Use H x) and H ) to veify the accuacy of the x and. 3-4) H I ) x 3-5) I deive the value of magnetic mateial at the base of the seach key H I ).. eve will get identification of ecuity devices afte the end of this step. tep 4: The authentication seve pefoms the following behaviou. 4-1) Geneate andom numbe that is diffeent used by

4 RNG. 4-2) y H I ) 4-3) b E I ) 4-4) Tansfe secuity device b H y) H )) though an intemediay. tep 5: The secuity device pefoms the following actions afte eceiving b H y) H )) 5-1) I b) 5-2) Confim the accuacy of the used by the hash value H ) 5-3) Compae H H I ) ) and the eceipted hash value H y) If the two values match the secuity device will get the identification and eliability fo kept. based on the 5-1).In this case should be 3. ecuity intepetations [Theoem 1] This potocol ensues anonymity. oof) Message that is sent ecuity devices to the seve ae included a H x) C H )). If you guaantee safety fo KE the attacke can t get accuate x and because don t know the encyption key that was used to encypt the symmetic key Ciphetext fo decyption is impossible theefoe don't know H I ). end of poof) [Theoem 2] This potocol conventions pevent eplay attacks.. The attacke neve know oof) In the otocol tags and seve ae used tempoay as a andom numbe only fo the duation of the convesation and it will be updated Afte successful authentication. Also because All Infomation of Conventions notice depend andom numbe eplay attacks is impossible. end of poof) [Theoem 3] This otocol ealizes the inteactive identification between the

5 secuity devices and the authentication seve. oof) Because identify a numbe I of physical secuity devices is known olny self-secuity devices and authentication eve in step33-5) eve will confim the identity of the secuity device and in step 55-3) secuity divice will confim the identity of the seve. end of poof) 4. Conclusion The Covenant pesented in this pape ae able to use one compute system secuity emote use authentication is based on softwae secuity UB RFI and etc. Refeences [1].A. Weis.E. ama R.L. Rivest.W. Engels: ecuity & ivacy Aspects of Low-Cost Radio Fequency Identification ystems ecuity in evasive Computing 2003 LNC ~ ) [2] A.. Henici. Maulle: Hash-based enhancement of location pivacy fo adio-fequency identification devices using vaying identifies eec 04 at IEEE ecom 149~ ) [3] J.C. Chang H.L. Wu: A Hybid RFI otocol against Tacking Attacks IIH-M ~142009)