Malware
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- William Hood
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1 reloaded
2 Malware
3 Motivation Design principles / architecture Features Use cases Future work
4 Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Techniques to trace the execution of a binary (or system) Monitor different events E.g.: An instruction is executed, a memory address is written Allow to write our own instrumentation code
5 Many instrumentation frameworks PIN DynamoRIO WinAppDbg PyKD Unicorn PyDbg S2E PANDA Avatar DynInst TEMU/DECAF Frida
6 Technical aspects Single process/binary, or whole system? What events does it hook / instrument? Transparency? Practical aspects How easy is it to use? Programming languages? Other aspects How often is it updated? Community? Is the project even alive?
7
8 Frameworks based on emulation Full system instrumentation Full system == Monitors all the operating system Allows to instrument / inspect kernel Allows to monitor inter-process interaction
9 QEMU Started using TEMU and Decaf Based on QEMU User-mode emulation Hypervisor (KVM) Full system emulation Emulate CPU, BIOS, memory, devices Boot and fully emulate unmodified O.S. Tiny Code Generator (TCG)
10 TCG TCG code Guest machine code (ARM, MIPS, PowerPC, x86 ) Translated blocks Virtual CPU Virtual memory Virtual devices
11 TCG TCG code insert callbacks to our instrumentation Guest machine code (ARM, MIPS, PowerPC, x86 ) Translated blocks Virtual CPU Virtual memory Virtual devices
12 TCG TCG code insert callbacks to our instrumentation Guest machine code (ARM, MIPS, PowerPC, x86 ) Our callback function Translated blocks Virtual CPU Virtual memory Virtual devices
13 QEMU Transparent instrumentation Emulated memory is not modified No agent needed
14 Some shortcomings PANDA, DECAF Why reinvent the wheel? Plugins are coded in C/C++ I prefer python! Faster development Great libraries Complex QEMU modifications Risk of not updating frequently QEMU evolves, vulnerabilities get fixed
15 Intel VT What about hardware assisted virtualization? E.g.: KVM Faster, but Target & host arch. must be the same Host O.S. dependent (e.g.: KVM won t run on Windows)
16 So, what does PyREBox offer? IPython shell Inspect the system (memory/registers) Set breakpoints In a nutshell: interactive analysis Scripting (python) Callbacks on events (execution, memory, o.s. events ) Define new commands
17 Scripting Loaded or unloaded at any moment Callbacks (on demand, dynamically) Instruction/block begin/end Memory read/write Specific opcode execution Process create/remove Module load/unload TLB flush / context change
18 Scripting Can start a shell at any time start_shell() Can read/write registers, memory Can set breakpoints Use any Python library!
19 Agent, for automation File transfer and execution Communication with host via invalid opcodes Windows and Linux guests supported, 32 & 64 bits From shell or scripts: agent.copy_file(src_path, dest_path) agent.execute_file(path, args=[], env={}, exit_afterwards=false)
20 Compatibility, documentation Compiles and runs (tested): Linux Windows (thanks to linux subsystem) Docker is supported Supports Windows and Linux guests 32 and 64 bit (intel) Example scripts provided Complete PyREBox documentation
21 Updated Updated regularly Currently, latest stable QEMU version It is free!! (as in freedom) General Public License
22 :-( No support for Taint analysis (PANDA, DECAF) Record & replay (PANDA) Other architectures (ARM, MIPS ) But it will, hopefully, in the future
23 Design
24 QEMU (600 LoC of modifications) Glue PyREBox (C/C++) Keep Instrumentation Simple Stupid Listen to events Volatility (VMI) Python Core (PyREBox) API Inspect system Script1.py Python run-time
25 VMI We see the system as a raw CPU!! Only memory, registers, devices Sequence of instructions Processes, threads, handles, libraries Abstractions of the O.S. Virtual Machine Introspection Understand these abstractions
26 QEMU (600 LoC of modifications) Glue PyREBox (C/C++) + Basic routines in C/C++ Volatility (VMI) Python run-time Python Core (PyREBox) API Script1.py
27 Triggers Python can be prohibitively expensive Instruction begin, memory read Triggers C/C++ snippets Compiled as shared libraries (.so) Loaded at runtime Returns 0 if callback should not be delivered, 1 otherwise. int trigger(callback_handle_t handle, callback_params_t params){ return should_deliver; }
28 QEMU (600 LoC of modifications) Glue PyREBox (C/C++) Volatility (VMI) Python run-time Python Core (PyREBox) Callback API Callback Script1.py
29 QEMU (600 LoC of modifications) Trigger (plugin) gets callback notification. Decides whether it must be delivered or not Glue PyREBox (C/C++)?.so Volatility (VMI) Python Core (PyREBox) API Callback Script1.py Python run-time
30 Demo time!
31 PyREBox shell QEMU monitor Regular QEMU commands E.g. Attach a USB $sh PyREBox shell Pauses the guest Inspect / modify Built-in commands Run volatility commands Run custom commands Run python code (ipython) Autocompletion, syntax
32 Use cases
33 Malware Monitor Set of PyREBox scripts Presented at HITB Amsterdam Sample execution automation, + analysis API tracer Can extract parameters Memory dumper Code coverage Memory monitor Track injections, droppers, unpacked shellcodes
34 Generic Unpacker Extremely simple generic unpacker ~250 LoC script Heuristics to track W+X at page level Leverages triggers to reduce overhead Leverages volatility for memory dump / memory info Fully automates sample execution Releasing the code today!
35 Generic Unpacker Simple model Monitor memory writes and memory execution Page level Current layer: 0 W X
36 Generic Unpacker Simple model Monitor memory writes and memory execution Page level Current layer: 0 W X 0 0 0
37 Generic Unpacker Simple model Monitor memory writes and memory execution Page level Current layer: 0 W W X
38 Generic Unpacker Simple model Monitor memory writes and memory execution Page level Current layer: 0 W X X DUMP HERE!
39 Generic Unpacker Simple model Monitor memory writes and memory execution Page level Current layer: 0 W X
40 Generic Unpacker Simple model Monitor memory writes and memory execution Page level Current layer: 0 W W X
41 Generic Unpacker Simple model Monitor memory writes and memory execution Page level Current layer: 0 W X X DUMP HERE!
42 Demo: Dridex MZ Layer 0.text [shellcode] Layer 1 MZ Layer 2.text.data [ ].data [ ]
43 Exploit analysis helpers (Demo 2) Shadow stack Detection of stack overflows (Demo 3) Stack pivoting detector For instance: ROP chain on Heap Shellcode detector Code being executed outside module address space Heap, Stack
44 Shadow stack Monitor all CALL instructions Keep track of return addresses (push to shadow stack) Monitor all RET instructions Check if return address is in the shadow stack If a return address is not a return point: Stop execution, start a shell: Shellcode? ROP chain / return to libc?
45
46 Demo: MS Word 2016 Microsoft Word (Equation Editor) CVE Stack based buffer overflow 32 bit process, no ASLR, no stack protection! Trivial to exploit
47 Stack pivoting detector Monitor modifications to ESP/RSP If ESP/RSP shifted > X bytes Check if ESP/RSP points outside stack ROP chain should be there Need to consider: Each thread has a stack User mode <-> Kernel mode
48 Shellcode detector Monitor modifications to EIP If EIP/RIP shifted > X bytes Check if EIP points outside of a module Shellcode may be there FP prone Build a whitelist per application?
49 Demo - Foxit Reader Foxit Reader (No CVE?) Reported by Sascha Schirra in 2015 PoC on exploit-db PNG parsing vulnerability PNG to PDF conversion Heap buffer overflow Partial overwrite of pointer to object
50 Demo - Foxit Reader Foxit Reader (1) Overwrite 2 bytes on object pointer (2) Object is dereferenced, vtable is dereferenced, function is called, we have control! (3) JOP gadget to do stack pivot to HEAP (4) ROP chain on HEAP (controlled buffer) Disables DEP Jumps into shellcode (5) Shellcode
51 Whats next?
52 What s next? Support for additional architectures (ARM / MIPS) Debugging backend for r2 / IDA R2 as a disassembler inside PyREBox Support for other backends (PANDA?)
53 Questions?
54 talosintelligence.com
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