Is it Still a Valid Element?
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- Clarence Blankenship
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1 MARCH ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE FOR PROTECTIVE RELAY ENGINEERS, MARCH 26 MARCH 29, 2018 Simplicity in Relay Protection Design Is it Still a Valid Element? Eduardo Colmenares, Regional Technical Manager, ABB Inc.
2 Simplicity in Relay Protection Design Agenda Introduction What Is Simplicity Protection System Definition How Protective Relays Have Evolved And How This Impact Protection System Design? Regulatory Entities And Their Impact In Protection System Design Reliability Standards And Their Impact In Protection System Design Other Aspects That Have An Impact Protection System Design Conclusions April 3, 2018 Slide 2
3 INTRODUCTION Simplicity is one of the key elements of a good Relay Protection System design together with Reliability, Selectivity and Speed. However, with the evolution of the protection relays, protection schemes have evolved in a way that they can be described to be anything but simple. This paper analyzes the evolution of protection system design and the advantages and disadvantages of the current approach. April 3, 2018 Slide 3
4 WHAT IS SIMPLICITY? In the 20 century, Albert Einstein asserted that our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas [4]. In the early 21 century, it is typically just equated with the general maxim that simpler theories are better than more complex ones, other things being equal. [4]. This is known as Ockham s Razor principle. Nature does nothing in vain, and more causes are in vain when fewer will suffice. For Nature is simple and does not indulge in the luxury of superfluous causes. [4] Simplicity in Protection System design is defined by Blackburn as the minimum protective equipment and associated circuitry to achieve the protection objectives. [2] April 3, 2018 Slide 4
5 PROTECTION SYSTEM DEFINITION According with the document Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards, Protections System is defined as Protective relays, associated communication systems, voltage and current sensing devices, station batteries and DC control circuitry. April 3, 2018 Slide 5
6 HOW PROTECTIVE RELAYS HAVE EVOLVED AND HOW THIS IMPACT PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN? The first stage was the era of electromechanical relays, which started early in the 1900 s. The next era was static or solid state relays, which were introduced in the 1960s. The era of microprocessor based relays started in the 1980s The first fully numerical relay was introduced The era of integrated control and protection started in mid 1990 s April 3, 2018 Slide 6
7 HOW PROTECTIVE RELAYS HAVE EVOLVED AND HOW THIS IMPACT PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN? Changing technology from electromechanical to discrete semiconductor, to integrated circuits, to microprocessor techniques has enhanced the ability to solve old gnawing problems and it is in itself a fascinating study Walter Elmore. Modern microprocessor relays provides the user with a flexibility in design to levels that were not even dreamed with electromechanical relays Flexibility comes hand to hand with Complexity as Flexibility and Simplicity are mutually exclusive concepts. April 3, 2018 Slide 7
8 REGULATORY ENTITIES AND THEIR IMPACT IN PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN Once different utilities needs to be interconnected to increase Power System Reliability, there is the need of an entity that defines and regulate the critical path for power transmission also called Bulk Electric System or Transmission Backbone Network. The most widely known of the regulatory entities is the North American Electric Reliability Corporation aka NERC. All Elements and Facilities necessary for the reliable operation and planning of the Interconnected Bulk Power System are included as BES elements. Special Protection System (SPS) vs Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) April 3, 2018 Slide 8
9 REGULATORY ENTITIES AND THEIR IMPACT IN PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN Special Protection System (SPS) vs Remedial Action Schemes (RAS). Definition was found to lacks clarity and specificity necessary for consistent identification and classification of protection schemes as SPS or RAS across the eight NERC Regions. The term Special Protection System was eliminated and the term RAS adopted to eliminate the confusion associated with the two defined terms. The new definition for RAS is A scheme designed to detect predetermined System conditions and automatically take corrective actions that may include, but are not limited to, curtailing or tripping generation or other sources, curtailing or tripping load, or reconfiguring a System(s). Not Protection Systems; however, they may share components with Protection Systems. [9] April 3, 2018 Slide 9
10 RELIABILITY STANDARDS AND THEIR IMPACT IN PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN There are 21 Reliability Standards related to protection and control subject to enforcement in United States that have impact on protective relaying. There are 11 Cybersecurity Standards. April 3, 2018 Slide 10
11 OTHER ASPECTS THAT HAVE AN IMPACT ON PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN Substation design changed from hardwired to communication based. April 3, 2018 Slide 11
12 OTHER ASPECTS THAT HAVE AN IMPACT ON PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN Power System design changed as it moved from unidirectional power flow to Bidirectional power flow. April 3, 2018 Slide 12
13 OTHER ASPECTS THAT HAVE AN IMPACT ON PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN Personal profile for relay design has changed from protection engineers to code writers. Life Cycle of the protection devices changed from 60 + years in electromechanical relays to years in the case of Microprocessor relays which means the several generations of relay will need to coexist. New constrains like environmental do not allow the construction of new infrastructure at the same speed the load need grows. The evolution of communication and communication protocols like IEC61850 has also driven more and more communication based protection systems. April 3, 2018 Slide 13
14 CONCLUSIONS Simplicity is still a valid element of a good protection system design; Simplicity is applicable in every aspect of protection system design. Protection engineer should focus on the application when selecting relay protection settings and protection functions to be enabled. Flexibility and simplicity are mutually exclusive concepts. The same way you cannot have a system that it 100% dependable and 100% secure, you cannot have a system that is 100% flexible and 100% simple. Relay evolution has allowed a level of flexibility in terms of monitoring, diagnostic and adaptivity but all this comes with complexity. April 3, 2018 Slide 14
15 CONCLUSIONS In the words of Walter Elmore: Protective relaying is a constantly changing and expanding science that challenges even those who are deeply and totally involved with it We should expect protection system design will continue changing and it is up to the protection engineers to find the adequate balance of simplicity and complexity. April 3, 2018 Slide 15
16 Simplicity in Relay Protection Design It is still a valid Element? QUESTIONS? April 3, 2018 Slide 16
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