Contractor to provide a draft and final power study report to be reviewed by the Engineer.

Transcription

1 ADDENDUM NO. 3 PROJECT: Penticton Advanced Waste Water Treatment PAGE: of 3 Plant MCC- Upgrade DATE: March, -TENDER MCC- UPGRADE PROJECT NO.: 579 CONTRACT NO.: DISTRIBUTION: OWNER: City of Penticton Owner ( X ) RANDY CRAIG 7 Main Street PM ( X ) BRANDON STEARNS Penticton, BC Design Eng. ( X ) DAVID JOHNSON VA 5A9 File ( X ) ISSUED BY: David Johnson TO ALL BIDDERS OF RECORD. GENERAL. This Addendum is issued prior to Tender closing to provide for certain revisions as noted herein.. All such revisions will become part of the Work and the effects shall be included in the Tender Price..3 All work shall be performed in accordance with the Contract Documents.. SECTION ELECTRICAL GENERAL REQUIREMENTS. Revise item.3. as follows: Contractor to provide the complete power study that includes coordination, short circuit, and arc flash studies for all new and revised existing electrical equipment. Contractor to provide arc flash labelling based on the final approved power study once equipment has been installed and commissioned. Refer to Section 5 Scope of Work and Section 35 Power System Study for more information.. Revise item.3. as follows: Contractor to provide a draft and final power study report to be reviewed by the Engineer..3 Add item.3.3 as follows: Contractor to provide the software model of the final power study. 3. SECTION 5 SCOPE OF WORK 3. Revise item..3. as follows: Provide Short Circuit and Arc Flash Study for the new MCC- electrical system. Use data from the Short Circuit and Arc Flash Study dated Oct. for information of the existing \\cakelpfpsw00\data\projects\579\500-deliverables\503 Issued for Tender Docs\Addendums\Addendum #3\Addendum 3 Mar-.doc

2 DATE: March, PROJECT NO.: 579 PAGE: of 3 CONTRACT NO.: ADDENDUM NO. 3 plant electrical system. Provide new Arc Flash Labels for the new electrical equipment. Refer to Section 35 Power System Study for more information.. SECTION 35 POWER SYSTEM STUDY. Revise item.3. as follows: Provide an analysis of a complete power systems study using ETAP software for the facility including new equipment, the existing upstream distribution associated with the new equipment and revised existing equipment with the following items:. Add item.3. as follows: The Contractor may use the information from the previous Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis report for the new power system study related to the existing upstream equipment. The Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis is included in Appendix F..3 Add Appendix A Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis (attached with this Addendum #3). Revise item.5. as follows: Submit a draft and final version the complete report of the power system modeling for review..5 Add item.5.7 as follows: Contractor to provide the electronic software version of the power system model based on the final report. 5. ATTACHMENTS TO THIS ADDEMENDUM #3. APPENDIX A SHORT CIRCUIT, PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION AND ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS FORM 50 0/0 \\cakelpfpsw00\data\projects\579\500-deliverables\503 issued for tender docs\addendums\addendum #3\addendum 3 mar-.doc

3 DATE: March, PROJECT NO.: 579 PAGE: 3 of 3 CONTRACT NO.: ADDENDUM NO. 3 All Tenderers shall acknowledge receipt and acceptance of this Addendum by signing in the space provided and submitting the signed Addendum with the Tender. Tenders submitted without this Addendum may be considered incomplete. Receipt acknowledged and conditions agreed to this day of,. Tenderer Signature FORM 50 0/0 \\cakelpfpsw00\data\projects\579\500-deliverables\503 issued for tender docs\addendums\addendum #3\addendum 3 mar-.doc

4 APPENDIX A SHORT CIRCUIT, PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION AND ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS

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6 TABLE OF CONTENTS. ORGANIZATIONS AND STANDARDS OTHER ABBREVIATIONS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.... INTRODUCTION.... SYSTEM INPUT DATA AND SCOPE OF WORK....3 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Short-Circuit Analysis Device Coordination Analysis Arc Flash Hazards Analysis SHORT-CIRCUIT ANALYSIS GENERAL PROCEDURE DATA USED IN THE CALCULATIONS Utility Data Generator Data Transformer Data Motor Contribution to Short-Circuit Current ANALYSIS OF RESULTS SHORT-CIRCUIT COMPARISON TABLES Normal operation with motor contribution (High Utility) Generator operation with motor contribution Equipment Evaluation Table Input Data PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION ANALYSIS.... GENERAL PROCEDURE.... SPECIFIC PROCEDURE..... Protective Device Evaluation..... Low-Voltage Phase Fault Relay Settings Ground-Fault Protection Coordination Study..... Transformer Protective Devices Cable Protection ANALYSIS OF RESULTS...3. TIME-CURRENT COORDINATION PLOTS PROTECTIVE DEVICE SETTING TABLE FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS GENERAL PROCEDURE SPECIFIC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCEDURE ANALYSIS OF RESULTS PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT & APPROACH BOUNDARIES FLASH HAZARD TABLE LEGEND FLASH HAZARD TABLE NORMAL OPERATION (HIGH UTILITY & MOTORS RUNNING) BUS & LINE SIDE CALCULATION WORST CASE ARC FLASH INCIDENT ENERGY BUS & LINE SIDE CALCULATION WORST CASE ARC FLASH ENERGY WITH RECOMMENDED SETTINGS BUS & LINE SIDE CALCULATION...5. SYSTEM ONE-LINE DIAGRAM UTILITY DATA...3. REFERENCES... Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

7 ABBREVIATIONS. Organizations and Standards CSA Canadian Standards Association CEC Canadian Electrical Code ANSI - American National Standards Institute IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IPCEA - Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association NEMA - National Electrical Manufacturers Association UL - Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc.. Other Abbreviations A - Amperes (RMS symmetrical) AFIE Arc Flash Incident Energy ATS - Automatic Transfer Switch C/B - Circuit Breaker CT - Current Transformer FLA - Full Load Amperes HP - Horsepower IL - Max. Demand Load Current at PCC ISC - Short-Circuit Current at PCC KVA - Kilovolt-Ampere KVAm - Kilovolt-Amperes of Motor Short Circuit contribution KW - Kilowatt L-L - Line-To-Line LRA - Locked-Rotor Amperes L.V. - Low Voltage MCC - Motor Control Center mohms - Milliohms MV - Medium Voltage O.L. - Overload PCC - Point of Common Coupling PF - Power Factor PWM - Pulse Width Modulated R - Resistance RMS - Root-Mean-Square SCA - Short-Circuit Amperes SCAm - Short-Circuit Amperes of Motor Contribution S.F. - Service Factor sym. - Symmetrical V - Line-To-Line Volts (RMS sym.) WCR - Withstand Current Rating X - Reactance Z - Impedance %Z - Percent Impedance Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC 3

8 . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Introduction This report documents the results for the Short-Circuit, Protective Device Coordination and Arc Flash Analysis for the City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC. The short-circuit analysis evaluates the adequacy of the electrical distribution equipment in the facility, based on the maximum available short-circuit current at its location. The study includes evaluation of the medium voltage switchgear and low voltage (V & V) power distribution equipment. The protective device, time-current coordination analysis, determines the suggested settings and, where appropriate, the ampere ratings and types for the electrical power system protective devices to achieve the desired system protection and electrical service continuity goals. The flash hazard analysis establishes the flash protection boundary around electrical equipment within which a worker exposed to an arcing fault would expect to receive nd degree burns if not adequately protected. The analysis also determines the incident energy level at a specific working distance from equipment, which can be used to select appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to be worn when working within the flash protection boundary. The results of the studies are summarized in Section.3. Section 3 provides additional detail on the short-circuit analysis, while the device coordination analysis is detailed in Section. The results of the arc flash hazard analysis are given in Section 5. One-line diagram corresponding to the every station in the plant is found in Section. Utility data is included in Section 7, while reference materials are included in Section. The proposed protective device settings should be reviewed to ensure that they meet the normal operation and load condition of the facility and they should be applied as per the Protective Device Settings Tables (Section.5). Note that the results of this study assume that all devices are operational and properly calibrated. Regular testing and maintenance of the electrical equipment in the facility can help ensure proper device operation. Also, it was assumed that the facility s power system grounding and bonding are effective to complete a low-impedance path for ground-fault current.. System Input Data and Scope of Work The results of the study were based on the technical information gathered on site and one-line diagram provided (drawings E-, E-, E-, E-, E-3, E-, E7-, E-, E-, ) as summarized below:. Single line diagram was built based on the one-line drawings provided.. The conductor length, type and size data for main switchboard, MCCs and panels provided by the Contractor (Keldon Electric); a few cable lengths (to PDC A, PDC B panels, etc.) were not provided and assumed to be m long for the short circuit calculation purposes. 3. Motor HP was based on the information found on the drawings and assumed for other MCCs. MCCs demand load was also considered in our calculations. Due to lack of data, we have to estimate the motor HP for MCC-, B, 5 and.. The model and type of protective devices (circuit breakers) per data collected on site by the Contractor for the existing breakers and per the BOM for new units. The circuit breakers that data was not available for (Heat Pump and MCC- SPL feeder breakers) were not considered for duty evaluation, coordination and arc flash analysis. 5. The maximum Short Circuit Current Available at the main transformer source (.3 KV) and the source fuse size, as per the Utility s reply to our inquiry; see Section 7 under Appendix. The type and rating of the main and distribution transformers as per data available or estimated as standard values for their KVA rating; typical values used for transformer X/R ratios. Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

9 The Coordination Study, Short Circuit Fault and Arc Fault analysis includes the following equipment: The main 500 KVA transformer (.3/0. kv). The existing main switchboard The existing and new V MCCs, distribution transformers and panels The V distribution panelboards in the plant floor area. The existing and new motor loads.3 Results And Recommendations.3. Short-Circuit Analysis The short circuit current calculation was run for three phase fault currents as well as single phase fault currents that are limited to Amps (neutral grounding resistor let-through current) on V system. The ANSI fault calculation method was used in this study. The results of the short-circuit analysis for normal operation with the motors contributing to the fault currents and the power utility delivering maximum short circuit fault level indicate that all circuit breakers considered in our study passed the interrupting rating evaluation test. The Fail criterion was set to 0% and the Marginal to 95% of the short circuit current duty for the protective device interrupting ratings. The status of the overcurrent protective devices installed in the power distribution system is shown in the Equipment Evaluation tables. A complete analysis is included in Section Device Coordination Analysis The coordination study showed that a good degree of selectivity was accomplished among devices in the system after revising the as found settings. Some mis-coordination issues have been flagged and related comments were included further in this report. The existing settings and the proposed changes (along with recommended settings for new breakers) are listed in the corresponding tables in Section.5. The changes to these settings have been proposed mainly for improving coordination with upstream and/or downstream devices as the reduction of the arc flash energy could not be achieved by adjusting protective device settings. More details are given in Section..3.3 Arc Flash Hazards Analysis The results of the arc flash analysis show both the calculated arc flash incident energy and flash protection boundary distance at each bus under study. Two calculations have been performed the bus calculation where energy levels were computed at each bus in the system based on next upstream protective device (e.g. a switchboard main breaker) clearing the fault, and the line side calculation where the fault is assumed to be on the line side of the immediate upstream protective device. In the most cases, the values shown in the bus calculation will be the correct value to consider. However, in some cases, the values computed in the line side calculation should also be considered. This is because it may be possible for arcing faults particularly those that originate close to the main section and are not cleared instantaneously to propagate to the line side of the main breaker. If this happens, then the fault can no longer be cleared by the switchboard main, but rather by the next upstream overcurrent protective device. In the cases where the next upstream device is fuse or relay on the primary side of the step-down transformer, the fault clearing time and resulting incident energy level can increase significantly. Specific equipment testing has not been performed to assess the risk of such fault propagation, but the possibility should at least be considered when work may be performed at these locations. The high arc flash energy levels calculated at some locations ( line calculations ) might be taken into account only if there are activities performed on these cubicles without de-energization of the line side and the live parts could be reached at by the workers. Additional discussion of buses with high arc flash incident energy is detailed in Section 5.3. Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC 5

10 3. SHORT-CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 3. General Procedure An electrical system short-circuit analysis is used for the following: ) To compare the calculated maximum fault current with the interrupting ratings of overcurrent protective devices, such as fuses and circuit breakers. ) To investigate applicable short-circuit series ratings and the protection of electrical equipment by current-limiting devices. 3) To verify the adequacy of other equipment (such as transformers, switches, equipment bussing) to withstand the effects of the calculated maximum fault current levels. ) To assist in the selection and/or determination of settings for relays, fuses and circuit breakers. This analysis was made utilizing a digital computer programmed to calculate the maximum available three-phase, RMS symmetrical and asymmetrical short-circuit amperes at each piece of equipment in the system. The calculation procedures are based on recommendations included in ANSI/IEEE standards C37.3-9, C , and C The computer program simulates a bolted three-phase fault at each point of consideration in the system and calculates the maximum available short-circuit current at that point without any reduction due to current-limiting protective devices which may be present. The calculated short-circuit values are RMS symmetrical amperes and are comparable with the RMS symmetrical short-circuit ratings of electrical equipment. In addition, when the X/R ratio associated with this calculated RMS symmetrical current is greater than the tested breaker X/R ratio, the calculated value is increased by an appropriate multiplying factor. Electrical distribution equipment must be able to withstand and/or interrupt the most severe fault duty that it may be subjected to at its location in the system. In particular, CEC Section -0 requires circuit breakers to have a rating sufficient for interrupting the maximum available fault current present at their line side terminals. For locations where calculated fault currents exceed the ratings of equipment, recommendations for remedies are provided. The included one-line diagram is a simplified version of the engineer's drawing, showing those parts of the electrical system under consideration. The various circuit locations on the diagram have been labeled with bus identification names, so input data could be supplied to the computer and the computer output could be readily interpreted. 3. Data Used in the Calculations 3.. Utility Data The City of Penticton Electric Utility has advised that their system is capable of delivering a maximum available three-phase short-circuit current of 9, Amps at.3 kv at their substation and a ground fault current of,509 Amps. The minimum fault current available was also provided. No X/R ratio was provided, so we used the conservative value of X/R ratio of. These values determined the starting point for the short-circuit analysis. 3.. Generator Data City of Penticton AWWTP facility has a standby generator to back up the emergency loads as the nature of their activity requires the vital loads to run during power outages. Consequently, the short circuit analysis included generator operation as well. Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

11 3..3 Transformer Data Transformer nameplate impedance for the main unit, standard values for distribution transformers and typical X/R values were used in this study. The connection and ratings are shown in the "Input Data" printout. 3.. Motor Contribution to Short-Circuit Current Motor contribution to the short-circuit current is taken into account in this short-circuit analysis. During the first few cycles of a fault, the running motors act as generators and produce a current which will combine with the Power Company short-circuit current flowing to the fault. For calculation of low voltage fault duty, the contribution from the induction motors fed from MCC buses, adjusted by the load factors and using typical subtransient impedances (locked rotor current ratios) was taken into account. 3.3 Analysis of Results The results of the short circuit analysis are presented in the attached table and single line diagram. The report includes a list of medium (main transformer primary) and low voltage buses with the available fault duties and calculated X/R ratios. A tabular format of the short circuit calculation results is attached, showing the three phase and single phase to ground current values. As the V power distribution system is high resistance grounded, the ground fault current level is limited to only Amps. These values give a detailed picture of the short circuit stress on the buses and connected equipment as well as the adequacy of the timed and instantaneous settings of the trip units. The short circuit calculation algorithm is based on the ANSI method of separately derived resistance and reactance at the fault location. This X/R ratio is then used to determine the multiplying factors and the ac decrement of motors and generators (if any) that are local to the fault point location are modeled. The multiplying factors are calculated based on the X/R ratio and the instant of time that the fault occurs. For example, the X/R ratio for medium voltage breaker duties is used in the formula below for multiplying factor: where MF τ = + e in cycles is the instant of time that the fault occurs. πτ X R The calculations of Low Voltage Multiplying Factor (LVF) for low voltage circuit breakers use the following formulae: For X/R., LVF =.0 + e Unfused PCB LVF = + e π Calc X / R π Test X / R Fused LVPCB or MCCB LVF = + e + e π Calc X / R π Test X / R Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC 7

12 If LVF is less than.0 it uses.0 Then, the program calculates the adjusted Interrupting factor I int,adj = LVF* I sym,rms (the ½ cycle interrupting short circuit) and compares I int,adj against the CB symmetrical interrupting rating. If Device Symmetrical rating is higher than I int,adj, then the device passes. Two scenarios have been created to calculate the short circuit fault duties at each bus considered in the study:. Maximum Utility fault current available and all motor running (normal operation). Generator running and feeding all loads considered in the study After running the calculations, the distribution equipment was checked to determine its adequacy to interrupt or withstand the effects of the calculated maximum three phase short-circuit current at its location. The bolted fault current values for each bus were used by the program for device evaluation. The short circuit analysis results shows that all equipment examined is adequately rated. The circuit breakers and buses they are connected to are shown in the Protective Device Short Circuit Evaluation Table. The printouts in Section 3. show the complete input and output data from the SKM.5 software. 3. Short-circuit Comparison Tables Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

13 3.. Normal operation with motor contribution (High Utility) Three phase and single phase to ground fault currents Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC 9

14 SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENT CALCULATION Normal Operation (High Utility) ANSI Three & Single Phase Fault Currents Low Voltage Summary Momentary Duty Summary Interrupting Duty Summary----- Fault Location Bus 3 Phase X/R SLG X/R 3 Phase X/R SLG X/R 3 Phase X/R SLG X/R Bus Name Voltage kamps 3 Ph kamps SLG kamps 3 Ph kamps SLG kamps 3 Ph kamps SLG BUS TXMR Main PRI BUS MAIN PDC BUS MCC BUS MCC BUS MCC BUS -LCP PNL BUS MCC-B BUS MCC BUS MCC BUS PDC-A BUS MCC-/E BUS MCC BUS PNL A BUS PNL AA BUS PNL AC BUS MCC-E BUS New HEAT PUMP BUS PDC-A BUS MCC-A BUS PDC-A BUS PDC-A AHU BUS PDC-B BUS PDC-B UV-PDC BUS PNL LP BUS PNL 03-LPA BUS MCC BUS PDC-7A BUS MCC- SPL BUS PNL 7A

15

16 3.. Generator operation with motor contribution Three phase and single phase to ground fault currents Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

17 SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENT CALCULATION Generator Operation ANSI Three & Single Phase Fault Currents Low Voltage Summary Momentary Duty Summary Interrupting Duty Summary----- Fault Location Bus 3 Phase X/R SLG X/R 3 Phase X/R SLG X/R 3 Phase X/R SLG X/R Bus Name Voltage kamps 3 Ph kamps SLG kamps 3 Ph kamps SLG kamps 3 Ph kamps SLG BUS MAIN PDC BUS MCC BUS MCC BUS MCC BUS -LCP PNL BUS MCC-B BUS MCC BUS MCC BUS PDC-A BUS MCC-/E BUS MCC BUS PNL A BUS PNL AA BUS PNL AC BUS MCC-E BUS New HEAT PUMP BUS PDC-A BUS MCC-A BUS PDC-A BUS PDC-A AHU BUS PDC-B BUS PDC-B UV-PDC BUS PNL LP BUS PNL 03-LPA BUS MCC BUS PDC-7A BUS MCC- SPL BUS PNL 7A

18 3..3 Equipment Evaluation Table Low Voltage Equipment Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

19 DEVICE EVALUATION High Utility Device Name Connected Bus Status Frame/Model Bus Volts Calc INT Device INT Series Rating Rating INT % Calc MOM Device Cl-L Rating % (V) Duty (KA) (KA) (KA) Duty/Device (KA) (KA) Cl-L Duty/Dev CB Main BUS MAIN PDC Pass HL, USD 37.7 (*N) CB MCC- BUS MAIN PDC Pass HL, USD 37.7 (*N) CB MCC-B BUS MAIN PDC Pass HL, USD 37.7 (*N) CB MCC-A BUS MAIN PDC Pass Masterpact NW, 5.0 & CB BUS MCC-A BUS MCC-A Pass Powerpact P-Frame, 5.0 & CB BUS MCC-3 BUS MCC-3 Pass KDB, KD CB MCC-/E BUS MAIN PDC Pass HL, USD 37.7 (*N) CB MCC-5 BUS MAIN PDC Pass HL, USD 37.7 (*N) CB MCC- BUS MCC- Pass KDB, KD CB MCC-7 BUS MAIN PDC Pass Masterpact NW, 5.0 & CB BUS MCC-7 BUS MCC-7 Pass LX / LXI, Micrologic CB MCC- BUS MCC- Pass LDB CB BUS MCC- BUS MCC- Pass LX / LXI, Micrologic CB -LCP BUS MCC- Pass HJ CB BUS PDC-A BUS PDC-A Pass LC CB BUS PDC-B BUS PDC-B Pass LC CB BUS PDC-7A BUS PDC-7A Pass J-Frame, Powerpact CB BUS PDC-A BUS PDC-A Pass HJ CB BUS PDC-A LGST BUS PDC-A Pass HJ CB BUS PNL LP BUS PNL LP Pass QB.30 (*N) CB EF PUMP BUS MCC-A Pass HL CB M 0-F-3 BUS PDC-A Pass HJ CB MCC-7 CTRFG BUS MCC-7 Pass LX / LXI, Micrologic CB MCC-7 CTRFG BUS MCC-7 Pass LX / LXI, Micrologic CB PDC-A BUS MCC-A Pass LI CB PDC-A AHU BUS PDC-A Pass HJ CB PDC-B BUS MCC-A Pass LI CB PDC-B UV-PDC- BUS PDC-B Pass HJ CB PDC-A BUS MCC-E Pass HL CB PDC-A Main BUS PDC-A Pass HJ CB PDC-7A BUS MCC-7 Pass J-Frame, Powerpact CB PDC-A BUS MCC- Pass HJ

20 DEVICE EVALUATION High Utility Device Name Connected Bus Status Frame/Model Bus Volts Calc INT Device INT Series Rating Rating INT % Calc MOM Device Cl-L Rating % (V) Duty (KA) (KA) (KA) Duty/Device (KA) (KA) Cl-L Duty/Dev CB PNL 03-LPA BUS PNL LP Pass QO, 3-Pole.30 (*N) CB PNL 03-LPA LGST BUS PNL 03-LPA Pass QO, 3-Pole CB PNL AA BUS PNL A Pass QO, 3-Pole.37 (*N) CB PNL AC BUS PNL A Pass QO, 3-Pole.37 (*N) CB PNL AC Main BUS PNL AC Pass QB CB PNL 7A TXMR BUS PDC-7A Pass HJ CB TXMR PNL A BUS MCC- Pass HJ CB TXMR PNL LP BUS MCC-A Pass HJ CB GEN MAIN BUS MAIN PDC Pass Masterpact NW, 5.0 & (*N) System X/R higher than Test X/R, Calc INT ka modified based on low voltage factor.

21 3.. Input Data Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC 7

22 SHORT CIRCUIT INPUT DATA Cable Name Voltage Rating (V) Qty/Phase Size Length (m) Ampacity FDR Main FDR GEN FDR MCC FDR MCC- / FDR BUS MCC FDR -LCP / FDR MCC-B FDR MCC FDR BUS MCC-3 / FDR BF EX FAN FDR BF EX FAN FDR PDC-A FDR MCC-/E FDR BUS MCC FDR TXMR PNL A FDR PNL A FDR PNL AA FDR PNL AC FDR BUS MCC-E FDR HEAT PUMP FDR PDC-A FDR M 0-F FDR MCC-A FDR PDC-A FDR PDC-A AHU FDR PDC-B FDR PDC-B UV-PDC FDR TXMR PNL LP FDR BUS PNL LP FDR PNL 03-LPA FDR MCC FDR PDC-7A / FDR UTILITY FDR UTILITY FDR MCC- SPL FDR PNL 7A TXMR FDR PNL 7A.0.0 Transformer Size (KVA) Pri Conn Pri rated V Sec Conn Sec Rated V Z (%) TXMR Main Delta 3 Wye-Ground.9 TXMR PNL A Delta Wye-Ground 5.00 TXMR PNL LP Delta Wye-Ground 5.00 TXMR PNL 7A Delta Wye-Ground 5.00 LV Breaker Description Frm/Snsr/Plg Frame/Voltage SC Rating (KA) CB Main FEDERAL PIONEER 00.0A Interrupting 0.0 Static Trip HL, USD 00.0A Short Time 5.0 LSI, 50-00A CB GEN MAIN SQUARE D.0A Interrupting 5.0 Static Trip Masterpact NW, 5.0 &.0 A/.0A Short Time 5.0 LSI, A, ANSI CB MCC- FEDERAL PIONEER 0.0A Interrupting 0.0 Static Trip HL, USD 0.0A Short Time 30.0 LSI, 50-00A CB MCC- CUTLER-HAMMER 0.0A.0 Interrupting 35.0 Thermal Magnetic LDB 0.0A 300-0A

23 SHORT CIRCUIT INPUT DATA LV Breaker Description Frm/Snsr/Plg Frame/Voltage SC Rating (KA) CB MCC- WESTINGHOUSE 0.0A Interrupting 35.0 Thermal Magnetic KDB, KD 0.0A 0-0A CB -LCP SQUARE D 50.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 50.0A 5-50A CB MCC-B FEDERAL PIONEER 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Static Trip HL, USD 0.0A Short Time 30.0 LSI, 50-00A CB MCC-5 FEDERAL PIONEER 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Static Trip HL, USD 0.0A Short Time 30.0 LSI, 50-00A CB PDC-A SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 0.0A 5-50A CB MCC-/E FEDERAL PIONEER 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Static Trip HL, USD 0.0A Short Time 30.0 LSI, 50-00A CB PDC-A SQUARE D 0.0A.0 Interrupting 0.0 Thermal Magnetic HL 0.0A 5-50A CB TXMR PNL A SQUARE D 5.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 5.0A 5-50A CB BUS MCC- SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Static Trip LX / LXI, Micrologic 0.0A LSI, 0-0A 0.0A CB BUS MCC-3 WESTINGHOUSE 5.0A Interrupting 35.0 Thermal Magnetic KDB, KD 0.0A 0-0A CB M 0-F-3 SQUARE D 30.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 30.0A 5-50A CB MCC-A SQUARE D.0A 35 Interrupting 5.0 Static Trip Masterpact NW, 5.0 &.0 A/.0A Short Time 5.0 LSI, A, ANSI CB BUS MCC-A SQUARE D.0A Interrupting 0.0 Static Trip Powerpact P-Frame, 5.0 & 00.0A Override.0 LSI, 50-A CB PDC-A SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 0.0 Thermal Magnetic LI 350.0A 300-0A CB EF PUMP SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 0.0 Thermal Magnetic HL 0.0A 5-50A 9

24 SHORT CIRCUIT INPUT DATA LV Breaker Description Frm/Snsr/Plg Frame/Voltage SC Rating (KA) CB BUS PDC-A SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic LC 350.0A 300-0A CB PDC-A AHU SQUARE D 50.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 50.0A 5-50A CB PDC-B SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 0.0 Thermal Magnetic LI 350.0A 300-0A CB BUS PDC-B SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic LC 350.0A 300-0A CB PDC-B UV-PDC- SQUARE D.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ.0A 5-50A CB TXMR PNL LP SQUARE D 5.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 5.0A 5-50A CB BUS PNL LP SQUARE D 5.0A Interrupting.0 Thermal Magnetic QB 5.0A 70-50A CB PNL 03-LPA SQUARE D.0A Interrupting.0 Thermal Magnetic QO, 3-Pole.0A 5-0A CB MCC-7 SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Static Trip Masterpact NW, 5.0 &.0 A/ 0.0A Short Time 5.0 LSI, A, ANSI CB BUS MCC-7 SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Static Trip LX / LXI, Micrologic 0.0A LSI, 0-0A 0.0A CB PDC-7A SQUARE D 50.0A Interrupting 35.0 Thermal Magnetic J-Frame, Powerpact 5.0A 50-50A, UL CB BUS PDC-7A SQUARE D 50.0A.0V Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic J-Frame, Powerpact 0.0A 0V 50-50A, UL CB PNL 7A TXMR SQUARE D 50.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 50.0A 5-50A CB BUS PDC-A SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 0.0A 5-50A CB BUS PDC-A LGST SQUARE D.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ.0A 5-50A

25 SHORT CIRCUIT INPUT DATA LV Breaker Description Frm/Snsr/Plg Frame/Voltage SC Rating (KA) CB PNL 03-LPA LGST SQUARE D.0A Interrupting.0 Thermal Magnetic QO, 3-Pole.0A 5-0A CB PNL AA SQUARE D.0A Interrupting.0 Thermal Magnetic QO, 3-Pole.0A 5-0A CB PNL AC SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting.0 Thermal Magnetic QO, 3-Pole 0.0A 5-0A CB PNL AC Main SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting.0 Thermal Magnetic QB 0.0A 70-50A CB PDC-A Main SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Thermal Magnetic HJ 0.0A 5-50A CB MCC-7 CTRFG SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Static Trip LX / LXI, Micrologic 0.0A LSI, 0-0A 0.0A CB MCC-7 CTRFG SQUARE D 0.0A Interrupting 5.0 Static Trip LX / LXI, Micrologic 0.0A LSI, 0-0A 0.0A Fuse Name Description Cartridge/Trip Bus/Dev Volts SC Rating (KA) FUS TXMR Main ABB 0.0A 0 Interrupting 50.0 High Voltage CEF-KV 0.0A 3-5A FUS MCC-3 GEC 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Low Voltage HRC II-C, 0V Class C 0.0A -0A FUS Main BRUSH 00.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Low Voltage LCL 00.0A -00A FUS MCC- BRUSH 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Low Voltage LCL 0.0A -00A FUS MCC-B BRUSH 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Low Voltage LCL 0.0A -00A FUS MCC-5 BRUSH 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Low Voltage LCL 0.0A -00A FUS MCC-/E BRUSH 0.0A 0 Interrupting 0.0 Low Voltage LCL 0.0A -00A

26 . PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION ANALYSIS. General Procedure A protective device, time-current coordination analysis, is an organized effort to determine their settings and, where appropriate the ampere ratings and types for the over-current protective devices in an electrical system. The objective of the coordination analysis is to produce a time-current coordination among the devices, thereby achieving the desired system protection and electrical service continuity goals. Maximum protection requires that the overcurrent protective devices be rated, selected, and adjusted to allow the normal load currents to flow while instantaneously opening the circuit when abnormal currents flow. However, maximum service continuity requires that the overcurrent protective devices be rated, selected, and adjusted so that only the overcurrent protective device nearest the fault opens and isolates the faulted circuit from the system, permitting the rest of the system to remain in operation. Protective devices farther from the fault location should therefore essentially act as backup protection for the devices nearer to the fault, allowing the fault to be cleared with a minimum of disruption to the system. This is referred to as "selective coordination" between the protective devices. This may allow longer duration faults when the fault point is nearer the service entrance. However, such faults are not as common, and setting the protective devices to operate in this manner is, generally, more desirable than de-energizing most or all of the system for a fault near one of the loads. Selecting and setting the protective devices is a procedure where the time-current characteristic curves of the various devices in series are compared with one another on a log-log graph. This procedure should take into account boundaries defined by load currents, short-circuit currents, and ANSI, IEEE and CEC requirements. Selective coordination usually will be obtained when the log-log plots of time-current characteristics show sufficient clear space or no overlap between the curves for the protective devices operating in series. Coordination will often stop short of complete selectivity when an acceptable compromise is reached between the various boundaries imposed on the selecting and setting procedure.. Specific Procedure.. Protective Device Evaluation As per IEEE Standard, certain time intervals must be maintained between time current curves of various protective devices. All protective device characteristic curves shown on the time-current plots cut out at the calculated maximum short-circuit current for the device... Low-Voltage Phase Fault Relay Settings All low voltage phase fault trip unit pick-up settings were based on the breaker and feeder current rated values; the short time delay (when available) and instantaneous values for the adjustable breakers were confirmed or selected for a proper coordination and, if possible, low arc flash incident energy. When these settings are reviewed and changed, if the size or type of load is changed, the calculations and coordination have to be reviewed as well...3 Ground-Fault Protection Coordination Study City of Penticton AWWTP facility s V power distribution system operates with neutral high resistance grounded. The ground fault protection is installed only in the main switchboard and set to trip the main circuit breaker for ground faults larger than Amps. Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

27 .. Transformer Protective Devices Medium voltage transformer primary overcurrent protective devices were checked for compliance with CEC and transformer full load currents and magnetizing currents were also considered. To evaluate through fault protection according to the ANSI Guides, the applicable curve was plotted representing a transformer s projected damage threshold for the cumulative (thermal and mechanical) effects of through faults. All applicable primary and secondary overcurrent devices were checked to insure interruption before these through fault damage curves were reached. Magnetizing inrush currents were also considered and were estimated at times full load amperes. Further, to avoid nuisance interruptions, the primary overcurrent devices were also checked to assure they will carry the transformers equivalent magnetic inrush currents, which are plotted on the time-current graphs. The results are presented in Section....5 Cable Protection The main and feeder overcurrent protective devices were reviewed to verify the protection of their load side cables in accordance with CEC. The thermal damage curves of the feeders considered in the study are shown in the time current graphs according to the size, type and conductor material. For the existing settings of the protective devices all cables reviewed are properly protected. However, the above analysis does not include any aspects of cable ampacity adjustment factors such as derating for conduit fill, elevated ambient temperature, etc.3 Analysis of Results The final results of a protective device coordination analysis are the time-current coordination graphs that are plotted to illustrate the degree of selective coordination achieved in the system. Settings for all devices that have adjustable characteristics are also summarized in the appropriate protective device setting table. Smaller devices with fixed time-current characteristics are not shown on the graphs unless they directly affect the setting of an adjustable upstream device or are transformer protective devices. A satisfactory degree of selectivity among the devices in the system was found. In the next step, some changes (see Proposed TCC plots) to improve coordination as well as new protective device settings have been recommended. The existing protective devices whose setting changes have been revised along with the reason for it are shown below: Device Name Reason for changes Curve segment proposed for changes CB MAIN Improve coordination w downstream STD protective devices CB MCC- Improve coordination w upstream LTD, STPU, STD INST protective device CB MCC-B Improve coordination LTD, STD CB MCC-/E Improve coordination LTD, STD CB MCC-5 Improve coordination LTD, STPU, STD CB MCC- Improve coordination STD A good degree of selectivity among the devices and lower arc flash incident energy levels will be achieved if the proposed settings are implemented. A summary of the settings is shown in the Overcurrent Protective Device Settings Table. A few overcurrent protective devices do not coordinate (even after changing the settings) for fault current ranges as shown below: Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC 3

28 Plot # Description Notes 00 Miscoordination between the Main transformer primary and Utility s fuses in the range of fault currents less than 900 kv 00 MCC- and MCC- breaker trip curves do not coordinate in the thermal magnetic portion of the MCC- breaker 003 Miscoordination between MCC- and BUS MCC- breakers 005 MCC-5 breaker and MCC-3 fuse do not coordinate in the fault current range between V The Utility fuse is type K whereas the transformer primary fuse is a current limiting type fuse. Fuses have fixed characteristics and cannot be changed. The MCC- breaker settings coordinate with the upstream protective device and cannot be increased. The MCC- is a thermal magnetic type breaker and its settings were already adjusted to minimum. These breakers are in series and the coordination is not critical as long as they trip the same load MCC-5 breaker was set to coordinate with the upstream protective device and maintain the arc flash incident energy at low levels; the MCC-3 fuse has fixed characteristics and cannot be adjusted The time current curve overlapping in the instantaneous setting range cannot be avoided and is usually accepted as long as there is not enough impedance between the series overcurrent protective devices (current discrimination). However, the highest likelihood for a fault to occur is in the location of most of the feeders supplying panels, where the magnitude of fault currents is lower and the protective device curves coordinate properly as shown on the plots. The thermal damage curve of the main transformer is above the primary overcurrent protective device curves in the both ranges (thermal and mechanical damage), that is, the subject transformer is appropriately protected. Also, the inrush current value is outside of the tripping range of the transformer primary fuse at 0. seconds. The inrush current of the TXMR PNL A distribution transformer (estimated at xfla) might trip the primary breaker as it can be seen in the TCC 00 plot and nuisance tripping might occur during transformer energization if its inrush current reaches these peak values. The maximum magnetizing currents of this transformer has to be checked with the manufacturer(s) The time-current coordination plots are shown in Section.. Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC

29 . Time-Current Coordination Plots Short Circuit, Protective Device Coordination, and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis City of Penticton AWWTP, Penticton, BC 5

30 CURRENT IN AMPERES FUS UTILTIY Mfgr S&C Positrol,.kV Model Positrol, 0K Sensor/Trip 0.0 A 0 Amps UTILITY FDR UTILITY O/H UTILITY FUS UTILTIY FDR UTILITY FUS TXMR Main BUS TXMR Main PRI TXMR Main FDR Main FUS Main CB Main TXMR Main FDR Main REL GF Main TX Inrush K K K K K K K K FUS TXMR Main Mfgr ABB CEF-KV Model CEF Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Opening Clearing Curve TXMR Main kva InrushFactor.0 CB Main Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 50HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 00.0 A LTPU 0.9x (A) LTD STPU x (00A) STD 0. (I^t In) INST x (00A) REL GF Main Mfgr FPE GFR/GFR5 Model GFR-MR CT Ratio 00 / A GFR, Low PU (00A) Delay, (GFR). FUS Main Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL 00 Sensor/Trip 00.0 A K K FDR Main K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: 3 Current Scale: x Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 00 Utility, TXMR Main Fuses & Main Breaker Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: September 5, Page:

31 CURRENT IN AMPERES Proposed FUS UTILTIY Mfgr S&C Positrol,.kV Model Positrol, 0K Sensor/Trip 0.0 A 0 Amps UTILITY FDR UTILITY O/H UTILITY FUS UTILTIY FDR UTILITY FUS TXMR Main BUS TXMR Main PRI TXMR Main FDR Main FUS Main CB Main TXMR Main FDR Main TX Inrush K K K K K K K K FUS TXMR Main Mfgr ABB CEF-KV Model CEF Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Opening Clearing Curve TXMR Main kva InrushFactor.0 CB Main Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 50HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 00.0 A LTPU 0.9x (A) LTD STPU x (00A) STD 0.5 (I^t In) INST x (00A) FUS Main Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL 00 Sensor/Trip 00.0 A K K FDR Main K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: 3 Current Scale: x Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 00 Utility, TXMR Main Fuses & Main Breaker Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: October, Page: 7

32 CURRENT IN AMPERES CB MCC- Mfgr WESTINGHOUSE KDB, KD Model KD Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTD INST 5.0 (00A) CB Main BUS MAIN PDC FUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR MCC- BUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR MCC- FDR MCC- FDR MCC K K K K K K K K CB Main Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 50HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 00.0 A LTPU 0.9x (A) LTD STPU x (00A) STD 0. (I^t In) INST x (00A) CB MCC- Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 30HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTPU 0.9x (5A) LTD STPU x (A) STD 0.5 (I^t In) INST x (A) FUS MCC- Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL Sensor/Trip.0 A K K FDR MCC- FDR MCC- K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: Current Scale: x 0 Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 00 Main, MCC- & MCC- Breakers Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: September 7, Page:

33 CURRENT IN AMPERES CB MCC- Mfgr WESTINGHOUSE KDB, KD Model KD Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTD INST 5.0 (00A) CB Main REL GF Main BUS MAIN PDC FUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR MCC- BUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR MCC- FDR MCC- FDR MCC Proposed K K K K K K K K CB Main Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 50HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 00.0 A LTPU 0.9x (A) LTD STPU x (00A) STD 0.5 (I^t In) INST x (00A) CB MCC- Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 30HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTPU 0.9x (5A) LTD STPU x (A) STD 0.33 (I^t In) INST x (A) FUS MCC- Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL Sensor/Trip.0 A K K FDR MCC- FDR MCC- K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: Current Scale: x 0 Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 00 Main, MCC- & MCC- Breakers Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: October, Page: 9

34 CURRENT IN AMPERES CB -LCP Mfgr SQUARE D HJ Model HJ Sensor/Trip 50.0 A Fixed FDR BUS MCC- FDR -LCP FUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR MCC- BUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR BUS MCC- CB BUS MCC- BUS MCC- CB -LCP FDR -LCP K K K K K K K K CB MCC- Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 30HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTPU 0.9x (5A) LTD STPU x (A) STD 0.5 (I^t In) INST x (A) FUS MCC- Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL Sensor/Trip.0 A CB MCC- Mfgr CUTLER-HAMMER LDB Model LDB Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Thermal Curve (Fixed) INST (5- x Trip) 5 (00A) CB BUS MCC- Mfgr SQUARE D LX / LXI, Micrologic Model LX / LXI Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Plug 0.0 A LTPU.0 (0A) LTD STPU 5.0 (00A) STD-IT. (I^t Out) INST.0 (A) 50-0A Mag OR OR (7000A) FDR BUS MCC- FDR -LCP K K K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: Current Scale: x 0 Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 003 MCC-, MCC- & -LCP PNL Breakers Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: October, Page: 30

35 CURRENT IN AMPERES CB -LCP Mfgr SQUARE D HJ Model HJ Sensor/Trip 50.0 A Fixed FDR BUS MCC- FDR -LCP FUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR MCC- BUS MCC- CB MCC- FDR BUS MCC- CB BUS MCC- BUS MCC- CB -LCP FDR -LCP Proposed K K K K K K K K CB MCC- Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 30HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTPU 0.9x (5A) LTD STPU x (A) STD 0.33 (I^t In) INST x (A) FUS MCC- Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL Sensor/Trip.0 A CB MCC- Mfgr CUTLER-HAMMER LDB Model LDB Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Thermal Curve (Fixed) INST (5- x Trip) 5 (00A) CB BUS MCC- Mfgr SQUARE D LX / LXI, Micrologic Model LX / LXI Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Plug 0.0 A LTPU.0 (0A) LTD STPU 5.0 (00A) STD-IT. (I^t Out) INST.0 (A) 50-0A Mag OR OR (7000A) FDR BUS MCC- FDR -LCP K K K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: Current Scale: x 0 Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 003 MCC-, MCC- & -LCP PNL Breakers Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: October, Page: 3

36 CURRENT IN AMPERES CB Main BUS MAIN PDC FUS MCC-B CB MCC-B FDR MCC-B FDR MCC-B K K K K K K K K CB Main Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 50HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 00.0 A LTPU 0.9x (A) LTD STPU x (00A) STD 0. (I^t In) INST x (00A) CB MCC-B Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 30HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTPU 0.7x (A) LTD STPU x (A) STD 0.5 (I^t In) INST 5x (3000A) FUS MCC-B Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL Sensor/Trip.0 A K K FDR MCC-B K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: Current Scale: x 0 Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 00 Main & MCC-B Breakers Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: September 7, Page: 3

37 CURRENT IN AMPERES CB Main REL GF Main BUS MAIN PDC FUS MCC-B CB MCC-B FDR MCC-B FDR MCC-B Proposed K K K K K K K K CB Main Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 50HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 00.0 A LTPU 0.9x (A) LTD STPU x (00A) STD 0.5 (I^t In) INST x (00A) CB MCC-B Mfgr FEDERAL PIONEER HL, USD Model 30HL-3 w/fuse Sensor/Trip 0.0 A LTPU 0.7x (A) LTD STPU x (A) STD 0.33 (I^t In) INST 5x (3000A) FUS MCC-B Mfgr BRUSH LCL Model LCL Sensor/Trip.0 A K K FDR MCC-B K K TIME IN SECONDS Project Number: Ref Voltage: Current Scale: x 0 Project Name: AWWTP Upgrade, Pentincton, BC TCC Name: 00 Main & MCC-B Breakers Author: Dan Gavala, P. Eng Date: October, Page: 33