Imagining the Unimaginable

Transcription

1 Imagining the Unimaginable Submitted March 1, 2014

2 Background Newtown. The Boston Marathon. Hurricane Sandy. These simple words do little to convey the emotion, devastation and loss that can occur in a single moment and change lives forever. As the public transportation provider in Greater Cincinnati, Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority has particular vulnerability when it comes to maintaining a secure environment for its employees and passengers. With 297 peak buses on the road every weekday providing 17 million passenger trips each year, Metro takes this responsibility seriously. It has expended time, effort and resources developing procedures and plans to respond to any emergency situation. And while plans and procedures help provide an action blueprint for what to do in the face of the unthinkable, nothing takes the place of practice. Toward this end, Metro imagined the unimaginable to test its readiness in the face of one of the public transit industry s greatest threats and fears: a terrorist attack. With a multi-pronged approach stressing cooperation, awareness and mutual benefit, Metro engaged the Department of Homeland Security and brought together a national leader in emergency response planning, its own crisis management team and local responders in a full-scale exercise (FSE) on Feb. 13, Objectives The objectives of the exercise were to focus on emergency response procedures, identify areas for improvement and achieve collaboration between all players in the following areas: On-scene incident command Emergency Operations Center (EOC) management Emergency public information and warning Communications Responder health and safety Participants The FSE was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under the Transit Security Grant Program and consisted of 33 participants from the following agencies:

3 ARMADA, a world-class provider of mitigation, prevention, preparedness, protection, response and recovery solutions, assisted in planning, running and evaluating the exercise; Metro staff from Operations, Maintenance, Risk Management, Safety, Security and Public Affairs were among the players, as well as the entire senior management team Members of the Hamilton County Emergency Management Agency also provided control and participated as players and evaluators Members of the Cincinnati Police Department also provided control and participated as players and evaluators Scenario (Note: No one but the controllers knew the scenario beforehand.) On Wednesday, Feb. 13, 2013 at 7 a.m., the Hamilton County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) is notified by Cincinnati Police (CPD) that the FBI has received credible information indicating an imminent threat to rail cars in and around the Greater Cincinnati area. The credible threat causes the EMA to contact facilities with close proximity to railways, including Cincinnati Metro, and advise them of the immediate threat. In response, Metro orders a full evacuation of its Queensgate facility at approximately 9 a.m. At 9:30 a.m., a tanker containing styrene gas explodes directly behind the Metro Queensgate facility. Damage to the facility is presumed extensive, but unknown. Access to the facility will be limited for several days, forcing Metro to plan for extended operations at reduced capacity. In response, Metro activates its Operations Control Center at its Bond Hill facility. The Regional Operations Center is also activated to help coordinate resources for first responders. At 9:45 a.m., social media posts begin to surface that point toward the Aryan White Resistance (AWR) organization claiming responsibility for the attacks. The (fictional) organization has been monitored by the FBI for the past several years because of its anti-union stance and aggressive behavior towards any union professions. Response efforts continue throughout the day. Due to the act of terrorism, the FBI deploys units to conduct a thorough investigation of the scene. It is expected that the Queensgate facility will be unavailable for Metro operations for several weeks.

4 Assumptions Given the constructs of the scenario, many assumptions were made to imply the factual foundation for the exercise and were assumed to be present before the exercise commenced. These included: The exercise will be conducted in a no-fault learning environment wherein systems and processes will be evaluated, not individual performance. Exercise simulation will be realistic and plausible and will contain sufficient detail upon which to respond. Exercise players will react to situations and information as they are presented in the same manner as if it were a real incident. Throughout the exercise, controllers continued to modify the constructs, introducing additional threats and conveying additional details, partly to simulate a real-time event in which facts and situations are rapidly changing and partly in response to Metro s successful handling of the exercise elements to that point. Some of these included additional threats aimed at bridges across the Ohio River and downtown targets, necessitating an evacuation of the Central Business District; early dismissal of area schools, system-wide service detours and calls to other transit systems asking for loaner buses. They also introduced other elements including panicked members of the public, emotionally distraught bus operators and thoughtless riders complaining about service disruptions. Results Overall, Metro s performance was outstanding in this exercise. Its systems, procedures and personnel were tested and proven to be very effective in responding to a threat of this magnitude. Some of the strengths identified in the After-Action Report included: The overall culture of cooperation within the Metro EOC is strong. It is clear that Metro personnel have been well-trained and understand what is expected of them during an event that forces the EOC activation. Metro maintains a robust emergency public information system. Public information staff identified appropriate measures for keeping the public, media, and employees notified. Consistently throughout the exercise, Metro EOC personnel took the well-being of the community, community partners and Metro employees into consideration when planning response actions. At one point, the CEO even reminded everyone to get up and stretch and stay hydrated. There were a few areas for development identified as a result of the exercise, and all were remedied:

5 Many simple and inexpensive upgrades to the EOC would allow for an already well-trained EOC staff to become even more effective (additional landline phones, a direct connection between Metro s Radio Control Center and the ROC, vests or some other way to readily identify chains of command) Metro is traditionally a support agency called upon by first responders and the EMA. During an event where Metro is directly impacted, it is expected that support from those agencies is reciprocal. The EOC staff should be educated on the availability and processes for requesting those reciprocal resources. Additional Security Enhancements While this exercise was valuable, it in no way constituted the end of Metro s readiness planning. These are just a few of the additional ways Metro continues to improve security for its passengers and employees: Two standing committees the General Manager s Security Oversight Committee (GMSOC) and the Onboard Security Team perform security audits, provide outreach and highlight security concerns. It is notable that the GMSOC consists of representatives from every department within Metro who disseminate security information back to their respective departments. Participation in the national TransitWatch program enlists customers assistance through on-board and online advertising. Keycard access control at facilities and employee parking lots. Uniformed police officers ride free on all buses and police details randomly ride buses and patrol Government Square, the downtown transit center. A comprehensive Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Program identifying personnel, procedures, roles and responsibilities in the event of a catastrophic event, including stocked go bags for essential employees. Working with local law enforcement and fire departments to prepare them for dealing with situations involving public transit (bus accidents, hostage rescue, fire, etc.) Conclusion The FSE outlined in this application was funded by the DHS, but the commitment of time and effort by Metro staff helps to underscore the importance Metro places on readiness. And while the initiatives Metro undertook in preparation for the FSE did not cost a great deal or represent major innovations, they all yield an immeasurable return in peace of mind that translates to increased ridership, improved employee morale and greater community confidence in the system and its service. And these approaches will provide similar results for any public transportation provider, regardless of size, budget or service area. For information about funding your own FSE, please visit

6 Exhibit I Metro Overview The Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA) is a tax-supported, independent political subdivision of the State of Ohio. SORTA operates Metro fixedroute bus service and Access paratransit service for people whose disabilities prevent their riding Metro buses. SORTA is governed by a 13-member volunteer citizens' board of trustees. Seven trustees are directly appointed by the City of Cincinnati and six are directly appointed by Hamilton County. The funding relationship between SORTA and the City is established by the City/SORTA Agreement of employees 356 fixed-route buses; 44 paratransit vehicles 17 million annual passenger trips 99% of all rides begin and end in City of Cincinnati 50% of Metro's rides are work-related 20% of all downtown workers ride Metro to work $92.9 million annual operating budget

7 Exhibit II Sample Emergency Exercise Communication

8 Exhibit III Images from the Full-Scale Exercise FSE controllers confer on the progress of the exercise. An Ops manager instructs dispatchers in the Emergency Operations Center. Employees in Public Affairs prepare an emergency status update. Metro s senior staff respond to the latest developments in the FSE.