DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012

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1 DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 Andrew Lewman April 18, 2012 Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

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3 George Orwell was an optimist Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present controls the past George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty Four, 1949 Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

4 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

5 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

6 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

7 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

8 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

9 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

10 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

11 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

12 Internet Surveillance is getting more advanced Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

13 Twitter in Iran: Good. From Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

14 Twitter in USA: Bad. from raids queens home in g20 protes.php Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

15

16 The Tor Project, Inc. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of technologies for online anonymity and privacy Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

17 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

18 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

19 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) active research environment: Drexel, Univ of Waterloo, Georgia Tech, Princeton, Boston University, University College London, Univ of Minnesota, National Science Foundation, Naval Research Labs, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, MIT... Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

20 What is Tor? online anonymity software and network open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) active research environment: Drexel, Univ of Waterloo, Georgia Tech, Princeton, Boston University, University College London, Univ of Minnesota, National Science Foundation, Naval Research Labs, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, MIT... increasingly diverse toolset: Tor, Tor Browser Bundle, Tails LiveCD, obfsproxy, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, Torora, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, and so on. Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

21 Other Systems VPN - Virtual Private Network, 1 to 1 connection, can redirect all traffic, generally encrypted Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

22 Other Systems VPN - Virtual Private Network, 1 to 1 connection, can redirect all traffic, generally encrypted Proxy - 1 to 1 connection, per application traffic redirection, sometimes encrypted Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

23 Other Systems VPN - Virtual Private Network, 1 to 1 connection, can redirect all traffic, generally encrypted Proxy - 1 to 1 connection, per application traffic redirection, sometimes encrypted I2P - Garlic routing, closed network, anonymity and reputation Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

24 Other Systems VPN - Virtual Private Network, 1 to 1 connection, can redirect all traffic, generally encrypted Proxy - 1 to 1 connection, per application traffic redirection, sometimes encrypted I2P - Garlic routing, closed network, anonymity and reputation Freenet - closed network, anonymity, distributed file storage and sharing Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

25 Other Systems VPN - Virtual Private Network, 1 to 1 connection, can redirect all traffic, generally encrypted Proxy - 1 to 1 connection, per application traffic redirection, sometimes encrypted I2P - Garlic routing, closed network, anonymity and reputation Freenet - closed network, anonymity, distributed file storage and sharing GNUnet - closed network, anonymity, distributed file storage and sharing Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

26 How is Tor different from other systems? Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

27 How is Tor different from other systems? Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

28 How is Tor different from other systems? Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

29 Who uses Tor? Normal people Law Enforcement Human Rights Activists Business Execs Militaries Abuse Victims Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

30 Who uses Tor? Normal users linking sensitive information to their current identities, online advertising networks, search engines, censorship circumvention Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

31 Who uses Tor? Law enforcement accidental disclosure to targets, family and friend concerns, separating work from home life Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

32 Who uses Tor? Rights Activists Personal safety, family safety, narrowly-defined publicity, censorship circumvention Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

33 Who uses Tor? Business Execs separating work from home life, competitor research, censorship circumvention Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

34 Who uses Tor? Abuse Victims and Survivors complete separation of past abuse and current life, finding help and safety, need to help others anonymously Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

35 Who uses Tor? Militaries intelligence gathering, separating work from home life, other activities Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

36 Online and Offline change happens Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

37 You missed a use case Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

38 You missed a use case Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

39 You missed a use case Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

40 You missed a use case Andrew Lewman andrew@torproject.org () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

41 estimated 400k to 800k daily users

42 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Tor user Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Network Web server Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

43 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Entry node Middle node Exit node Tor user Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Network Web server Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

44 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Entry node Middle node Exit node Tor user Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Node Tor Network Encrypted tunnel Unencrypted TCP Web server Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

45 Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers Diagram: Robert Watson Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

46 Vidalia Network Map Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

47 Metrics Measuring metrics anonymously NSF research grant Archive of hourly consensus, ExoneraTor, VisiTor Metrics portal: Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

48 Tor hidden services allow privacy enhanced hosting Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

49 dot onion you say? Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

50 Thanks! Visit for more information, links, and ideas. Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

51 Credits & Thanks applied theory, third image: Information Week, , applied theory, fourth image: Al Jazeera, February 2011 six strikes, ars technica, major-isps-agree-to-six-strikes-copyright-enforcement-pla ars spring is in the air, Paco Pomet, who uses tor? Matt Westervelt, CC-BY-SA. danger!, hmvh, CC-BY-SA. 500k, http: // Luka Skracic, used with permission. Andrew Lewman () DFRI, Swedish Internet Forum 2012 April 18, / 23

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