Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist
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1 Chair of Network Architectures and Services TUM Department of Informatics Technical University of Munich (TUM) Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist Oliver Gasser, Quirin Scheitle, Sebastian Gebhard, and Georg Carle Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, April 8, 2016
2 IPv6 needs a different scanning paradigm than IPv4 0/0 approach does not work on IPv6 address space Active security scans continue to be a valuable tool Discover vulnerable devices Assess severity and prevalence of security problems History of IPv4 hit lists Opportunistic log file parsing Passive taps Repeated scans to determine stable IPs Scanning it all Our approach Create a tailored hitlist of IPv6 addresses for security scanning Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 2
3 Sources for IPv6 addresses Passive Large European IXP MWN: uplink of Munich Scientific Network with 100k users Evaluate for response rate and stability Active Alexa Top 1M Rapid7 IPv4 rdns Rapid7 DNS ANY DNS zone files CAIDA IPv6 router DNS names Evaluate for response rate Traceroute Evaluate additional IPs learned Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 3
4 Passive sources MWN: less IPs, better AS and prefix coverage, higher response rate Characteristic IXP MWN Targets 146,722,097 2,687,679 ASes 6,783 7,398 AS coverage 66.61% 72.65% ASes unique to source 821 1,436 Prefixes 12,858 15,478 Prefix coverage 49.87% 60.04% Prefixes unique to source 2,076 4,696 Combined AS coverage 8,219 (80.71%) Combined prefix coverage 25,781 (68.09%) ICMP response rate 13% 31% Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 4
5 Active sources Many unique ASes/prefixes for DNS ANY, ICMPv6 gives higher response rate than TCP/80 for Alexa Alexa Top 1M rdns DNS Any Zone Files File size 22MB 56GB 69GB 2.6GB Unique addresses 43, ,185 1,440, ,748 AS coverage 14.0% 47.1% 56.1% 23.3% ASes unique to source Prefix coverage 6.57% 26.2% 33.0% 11.62% Prefixes unique to source , ICMPv6 response rate 95.3% 68.8% 72.6% 90.6% tcp80 response rate 94.2% 28.4% 51.6% 88.3% tcp443 response rate 75.8% 21.2% 27.8% 58.6% Combined AS coverage 7,331 (71.9%) Combined prefix coverage 12,854 (49.8%) Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 5
6 Temporal stability of IPv6 addresses How long do observed addresses respond? Passive sources: Trigger measurement immediately after observation Repeat measurement using exponential back-off Measure observed port/protocol and ICMPv6 zmap extended with IPv6 capabilities for high-volume scans Active sources: Scan ICMPv6 Scan tcp80 and tcp443 Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 6
7 IXP response rates Servers stable, full population with low response rate Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 7
8 MWN response rates Generally higher and more stable response rate Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 8
9 IXP Hamming weight indicates privacy extensions Interface ID: Commonly last 64 bits in IPv6 address Privacy extensions (RFC 4941): 6th bit zero, other 63 bits random Central limit theorem: 63 independent single-bit distributions normal distribution N (31.5, 15.75) Frequency (%) N(31. 5, ) Number of host bits set to '1' (IXP) Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 9
10 Traceroute Hamming weight indicates managed IP assignements Frequency (%) N(31. 5, ) Number of host bits set to '1' (Scamper) Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 10
11 Analyzing EUI-64 IPs (ff:fe) in data sets Different vendor types in IXP and traceroute data sets Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 11
12 Sources for an IPv6 hitlist Characteristic Active sources Passive sources Traceroutes CAIDA Targets 2,699, ,631, , ,580 ASes 5,750 8,219 4,170 5,488 Announced prefixes 8,602 17,554 5,367 9,269 AS coverage 56.46% 80.71% 41.00% 53.90% ASes unique to source 128 1, Prefix coverage 33.37% 68.09% 20.76% 36.00% Prefixes unique to source 346 5, ICMPv6 response rate 75.5% 13.3% n/a 42.0% Combined unique IPs 149,619,624 Combined AS coverage 8,531 (83.77%) Combined prefix coverage 18,502 (71.77%) Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 12
13 Specific approach for your scan type Most efficient sources to focus on Internet structure finding links and nodes passive, CAIDA, ::1 for missing prefixes Assessing security posture many server hosts active sources Internet routers CAIDA, traceroute to active sources Client protocols passive tap, but be very quick! Finding active prefixes passive sources Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 13
14 Key Contributions Extensive evaluation of various hitlist sources IPv6 capabilities for zmap Regularly created ready-to-use hitlists Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 14
15 Key Contributions Extensive evaluation of various hitlist sources IPv6 capabilities for zmap Regularly created ready-to-use hitlists Questions? Oliver Gasser Quirin Scheitle More information, zmap-v6 and data set available under: Oliver Gasser (TUM) Quirin Scheitle (TUM) TMA 16 Scanning the IPv6 Internet: Towards a Comprehensive Hitlist 14
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