Fuzzing. compass-security.com 1
|
|
|
- Paulina Preston
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Fuzzing compass-security.com 1
2 Fuzzing Finding bugs by bombarding target with nonconform data Think: Flip a few bits in a PDF, then start Acrobat with that PDF Just more automated Steps: Create input corpus Select an input Modify input file ( fuzz it ) Start program with input file (Observe program) Identify crashes compass-security.com 2
3 Fuzzer A program which generates new inputs Mutation: Modify existing test samples Shuffle, change, erase, insert Generation: Define new test sample based on models, templates, RFCs or documentation compass-security.com 3
4 Fuzzer: Mutation Mutation fuzzing examples: Ffmpeg: Movie files Winamp: MP3 files Antivirus: ELF files Take an input file, modify it a bit, continue compass-security.com 4
5 Fuzzer: Generation Generation fuzzing: Browser: JavaScript Browser: HTML Cannot just bit flip etc, as it is not a binary protocol alert(1); is valid: al1rt(e); is garbage compass-security.com 5
6 HTTP RFC compass-security.com 6
7 HTTP RFC compass-security.com 7
8 AFL compass-security.com 8
9 AFL compass-security.com 9
10 AFL Overview compass-security.com 10
11 AFL Code Coverage American fuzzy lop tries to find a reasonable middle ground between sophistication and practical utility. In essence, it's a fuzzer that relies on a form of edge coverage measurements to detect subtle, local-scale changes to program control flow without having to perform complex global-scale comparisons between series of long and winding execution traces - a common failure point for similar tools. compass-security.com 11
12 AFL Input Generation The output from this instrumentation is used as a part of a simple, vaguely "genetic" algorithm: 1) Load user-supplied initial test cases into the queue, 2) Take input file from the queue, 3) Repeatedly mutate the file using a balanced variety of traditional fuzzing strategies 4) If any of the generated mutations resulted in a new tuple being recorded by the instrumentation, add mutated output as a new entry in the queue. 5) Go to 2. compass-security.com 12
13 AFL Conclusion What does this all mean? User gets several representative example files (e.g. valid WAV files) Put them into a directory AFL will: find similarities of these files create new input files based on the existing start the target program with these input files check which code path has been taken in the target program (coverage) check if the program crashes Repeat Result: Input files and corresponding core files compass-security.com 13
14 Demo compass-security.com 14
15 DARPA CDC compass-security.com 15
16 CBC DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge 2016 Like the autonomous car challenge Teams create an autonomous system to attack and defend programs Programs are not real x86, but a more simplistic version Find bugs Patch bugs in your teams computers Exploit bugs in the other team computers Some serious HW (one rack per team, ~1000 cores, 16TB RAM) Defcon Las Vegas 2016 (I was there!) compass-security.com 16
17 CDC compass-security.com 17
18 CDC Shellphish compass-security.com 18
19 CDC Shellphish compass-security.com 19
20 CDC Shellphish compass-security.com 20
21 CDC Shellphish compass-security.com 21
22 CDC Shellphish compass-security.com 22
23 Compiler Flags compass-security.com 23
24 Compiler Flags Compiler options to enable advanced error detection routines GCC Clang Will slow down the program massively Will find bugs which do not directly lead to crash Use together with fuzzing compass-security.com 24
25 Compiler Flags AddressSanitizer (ASAN) -fsanitize=address Fast memory error detector Out-of-bounds access to heap, stack, globals Use-after-free Use-after-return Use-after-scope Double free, invalid free For testing only (do not compile public releases with it!) UndefinedBehaviourSanitizer (Bsan) -fsanitize=undefined Finds various kinds of undefined behaviour Null ptr, signed integer overflow, For testing only compass-security.com 25
26 Other fuzzing related things compass-security.com 26
27 Intentionally break protocols The future: Roughtime is like a small chaos monkey for protocols, where the Roughtime server intentionally sends out a small subset of responses with various forms of protocol error compass-security.com 27
28 Fuzzing: Recap compass-security.com 28
29 Fuzzing Recap Fuzzing is: Finding bugs in programs Especially exploitable bugs By bombard a program with: Mutated/modified valid data Generated semi-valid data compass-security.com 29
30 References Browser Bug Hunting and Mobile (Syscan 360) Shellphish: Shellphish-Cyber%20Grand%20Shellphish-UPDATED.pdf compass-security.com 30
Copyright 2015 MathEmbedded Ltd.r. Finding security vulnerabilities by fuzzing and dynamic code analysis
Finding security vulnerabilities by fuzzing and dynamic code analysis Security Vulnerabilities Top code security vulnerabilities don t change much: Security Vulnerabilities Top code security vulnerabilities
Fuzzing AOSP. AOSP for the Masses. Attack Android Right Out of the Box Dan Austin, Google. Dan Austin Google Android SDL Research Team
Fuzzing AOSP For the Masses AOSP for the Masses Attack Android Right Out of the Box Dan Austin, Google Dan Austin Google Android SDL Research Team Exploitation: Find the Needle Needles are Interesting
The Fuzzing Project https://fuzzing-project.org/
The Fuzzing Project https://fuzzing-project.org/ Hanno Böck 1 / 18 Motivation Motivation Fuzzing C Memory Bugs Invalid memory access example Do you use tools like strings, less, file, convert, ldd, unzip,...?
Writing a fuzzer. for any language with american fuzzy lop. Ariel Twistlock Labs
Writing a fuzzer for any language with american fuzzy lop Ariel Zelivansky @ Twistlock Labs What is fuzzing? Technique for testing software by providing it with random, unexpected or invalid input Dumb
Software Security IV: Fuzzing
1 Software Security IV: Fuzzing Chengyu Song Slides modified from Dawn Song 2 Administrivia Homework1 Due: Friday Oct 27 11:59pm Questions regarding reading materials Talk Security R&D in a Security Company:
Automatizing vulnerability research
Innova&on & Research Symposium Cisco and Ecole Polytechnique 8-9 April 2018 CEDRIC TESSIER INSTRUMENTATION TEAM LEADER / ctessier@quarkslab.com Automatizing vulnerability research to better face new software
CS 161 Computer Security
Popa & Wagner Spring 2016 CS 161 Computer Security Homework 2 Due: Monday, February 22nd, at 11:59pm Instructions. This homework is due Monday, February 22nd, at 11:59pm. It must be submitted electronically
logistics: ROP assignment
bug-finding 1 logistics: ROP assignment 2 2013 memory safety landscape 3 2013 memory safety landscape 4 different design points memory safety most extreme disallow out of bounds usually even making out-of-bounds
Dynamic code analysis tools
Dynamic code analysis tools Stewart Martin-Haugh (STFC RAL) Berkeley Software Technical Interchange meeting Stewart Martin-Haugh (STFC RAL) Dynamic code analysis tools 1 / 16 Overview Introduction Sanitizer
Smarter fuzzing using sound and precise static analyzers
Smarter fuzzing using sound and precise static analyzers Pascal Cuoq, Chief Scientist, TrustInSoft January 31, 2017 Pascal Cuoq, Chief Scientist, TrustInSoft smarter fuzzing January 31, 2017 1 / 8 Introduction
CSC 405 Introduction to Computer Security Fuzzing
CSC 405 Introduction to Computer Security Fuzzing Alexandros Kapravelos akaprav@ncsu.edu Let s find some bugs (again) We have a potentially vulnerable program The program has some inputs which can be controlled
Software security, secure programming
Software security, secure programming Fuzzing and Dynamic Analysis Master on Cybersecurity Master MoSiG Academic Year 2017-2018 Outline Fuzzing (or how to cheaply produce useful program inputs) A concrete
CAP6135: Programming Project 2 (Spring 2010)
CAP6135: Programming Project 2 (Spring 2010) This project is modified from the programming project 2 in Dr. Dawn Song s course CS161: computer security in Fall 2008: http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/fa08/
FUZZING JAVASCRIPT ENGINES FOR FUN & PROFIT AREUM
FUZZING JAVASCRIPT ENGINES FOR FUN & PROFIT AREUM LEE@SSG SINGI@THEORI HITBAMS2018 - FUZZING JAVASCRIPT ENGINES FOR FUN AND PROFIT AREUM LEE Areum Lee Member @ SSG Undergrad student @ Sejong Univ Former
KLEE Workshop Feeding the Fuzzers. with KLEE. Marek Zmysłowski MOBILE SECURITY TEAM R&D INSTITUTE POLAND
Feeding the Fuzzers with KLEE Marek Zmysłowski MOBILE SECURITY TEAM R&D INSTITUTE POLAND This presentation was created with help and commitment of the Samsung R&D Poland Mobile Security team. KLEE and
Structure-aware fuzzing
Structure-aware fuzzing for real-world projects Réka Kovács Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary rekanikolett@gmail.com 1 Overview tutorial, no groundbreaking discoveries Motivation growing code size -> growing
Software Vulnerability
Software Vulnerability Refers to a weakness in a system allowing an attacker to violate the integrity, confidentiality, access control, availability, consistency or audit mechanism of the system or the
Finding media bugs in Android using file format fuzzing. Costel Maxim Intel OTC Security
Finding media bugs in Android using file format fuzzing Costel Maxim Intel OTC Security 1 Agenda File format fuzzing Generate high-quality corpus of files Fuzzing the Stagefright Framework Logging & Triage
Black Hat Webcast Series. C/C++ AppSec in 2014
Black Hat Webcast Series C/C++ AppSec in 2014 Who Am I Chris Rohlf Leaf SR (Security Research) - Founder / Consultant BlackHat Speaker { 2009, 2011, 2012 } BlackHat Review Board Member http://leafsr.com
Fuzzing techniques & software vulnerabilities
Xavier Claude Mathieu Fourcroy William Robinet Conostix S.A. 17th October 2016 Agenda 1 2 3 4 Definition Definition Origins Context Why fuzzing? Fuzzing techniques Definition Automated testing technique
Identifying Memory Corruption Bugs with Compiler Instrumentations. 이병영 ( 조지아공과대학교
Identifying Memory Corruption Bugs with Compiler Instrumentations 이병영 ( 조지아공과대학교 ) blee@gatech.edu @POC2014 How to find bugs Source code auditing Fuzzing Source Code Auditing Focusing on specific vulnerability
Rabbit in the Loop. A primer on feedback directed fuzzing using American Fuzzy Lop. by Kevin Läufer
Rabbit in the Loop A primer on feedback directed fuzzing using American Fuzzy Lop Abstract by Kevin Läufer This guide aims to provide the reader with a good intuition about the
Jack W. Davidson Department of Computer Science University of Virginia
A League of Extraordinary Machines: The First Steps to Autonomous Cyber Reasoning Systems Jack W. Davidson Department of Computer Science University of Virginia Cyber Grand Challenge International research
How to implement SDL and don t turn gray. Andrey Kovalev, Security Engineer
How to implement SDL and don t turn gray Andrey Kovalev, Security Engineer Agenda SDL 101 Yandex approach SAST, DAST, FSR: drawbacks and solutions Summary 3 How to implement SDL and don t turn gray SDL
Juwei Lin. - Joined TrendMicro Since Windows Kernel/Rootkit/Bootkit - Ransomware Decryption - ios/android/mac Vulnerability Hunting
Juwei Lin - @panicaii - Joined TrendMicro Since 2013 - Windows Kernel/Rootkit/Bootkit - Ransomware Decryption - ios/android/mac Vulnerability Hunting Lilang Wu - @Lilang_Wu - Joined Trend Micro Since 2016
Coverage-guided Fuzzing of Individual Functions Without Source Code
Coverage-guided Fuzzing of Individual Functions Without Source Code Alessandro Di Federico Politecnico di Milano October 25, 2018 1 Index Coverage-guided fuzzing An overview of rev.ng Experimental results
A Dozen Years of Shellphish. Journey to the Cyber Grand Challenge
A Dozen Years of Shellphish Journey to the Cyber Grand Challenge 1 Zardus rhelmot 2 HEX on the beach 3 4 5 19 17 4 1 1 :-( 6 # of Shellphish players (cumulative) 40 30 20 10 0 23 29 2015 7 # of Defcons
Programming in C. Lecture 9: Tooling. Dr Neel Krishnaswami. Michaelmas Term
Programming in C Lecture 9: Tooling Dr Neel Krishnaswami Michaelmas Term 2017-2018 1 / 24 Undefined and Unspecified Behaviour 2 / 24 Undefined and Unspecified Behaviour We have seen that C is an unsafe
Enhancing Memory Error Detection for Large-Scale Applications and Fuzz testing
Enhancing Memory Error Detection for Large-Scale Applications and Fuzz testing Wookhyun Han, Byunggil Joe, Byoungyoung Lee *, Chengyu Song, Insik Shin KAIST, * Purdue, UCR 1 Memory error Heartbleed Shellshock
CSE484/CSE584 BLACK BOX TESTING AND FUZZING. Dr. Benjamin Livshits
CSE484/CSE584 BLACK BOX TESTING AND FUZZING Dr. Benjamin Livshits Approaches to Finding Security Bugs 2 Runtime Monitoring Black-box Testing Static Analysis Fuzzing Basics 3 A form of vulnerability analysis
New features in AddressSanitizer. LLVM developer meeting Nov 7, 2013 Alexey Samsonov, Kostya Serebryany
New features in AddressSanitizer LLVM developer meeting Nov 7, 2013 Alexey Samsonov, Kostya Serebryany Agenda AddressSanitizer (ASan): a quick reminder New features: Initialization-order-fiasco Stack-use-after-scope
Juwei Lin. - Joined TrendMicro Since Windows Kernel/Rootkit/Bootkit - Ransomware Decryption - ios/android/mac Vulnerability Hunting
Juwei Lin - @panicaii - Joined TrendMicro Since 2013 - Windows Kernel/Rootkit/Bootkit - Ransomware Decryption - ios/android/mac Vulnerability Hunting Lilang Wu - @Lilang_Wu - Joined Trend Micro Since 2016
Security Testing. Ulf Kargén Department of Computer and Information Science (IDA) Division for Database and Information Techniques (ADIT)
Security Testing TDDC90 Software Security Ulf Kargén Department of Computer and Information Science (IDA) Division for Database and Information Techniques (ADIT) Security testing vs regular testing Regular
Automatic program generation for detecting vulnerabilities and errors in compilers and interpreters
Automatic program generation for detecting vulnerabilities and errors in compilers and interpreters 0368-3500 Nurit Dor Shir Landau-Feibish Noam Rinetzky Preliminaries Students will group in teams of 2-3
CSE 565 Computer Security Fall 2018
CSE 565 Computer Security Fall 2018 Lecture 16: Building Secure Software Department of Computer Science and Engineering University at Buffalo 1 Review A large number of software vulnerabilities various
Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification
Preventing Use-after-free with Dangling Pointers Nullification Byoungyoung Lee, Chengyu Song, Yeongjin Jang Tielei Wang, Taesoo Kim, Long Lu, Wenke Lee Georgia Institute of Technology Stony Brook University
Fuzzing For Worms 16/06/2018. Fuzzing For Worms. AFL for Linux Network Servers
1 AFL for Linux Network Servers 16/6/218 Fuzzing For Worms. About Me 2 1 16/6/218 SSL/TLS Recommendations // OWASP Switzerland 213 Dobin Rutishauser 2 BurpSentinel - Semi Automated Web Scanner // BSides
Test Automation. 20 December 2017
Test Automation 20 December 2017 The problem of test automation Testing has repetitive components, so automation is justified The problem is cost-benefit evaluation of automation [Kaner] Time for: test
Automatically Finding Patches Using Genetic Programming. Westley Weimer, Claire Le Goues, ThanVu Nguyen, Stephanie Forrest
Automatically Finding Patches Using Genetic Programming Westley Weimer, Claire Le Goues, ThanVu Nguyen, Stephanie Forrest Motivation Software Quality remains a key problem Over one half of 1 percent of
Static Analysis and Bugfinding
Static Analysis and Bugfinding Alex Kantchelian 09/12/2011 Last week we talked about runtime checking methods: tools for detecting vulnerabilities being exploited in deployment. So far, these tools have
Cyber Grand Shellphish POC 2016
Cyber Grand Shellphish POC 2016 HEX on the beach Shellphish? Founded in 2004 Oldest? Capture the Flag team around Semi-successful Won DEFCON CTF 2005 Qualified for DEFCON CTF every year but 2007 or so
finding vulnerabilities
cs6 42 computer security finding vulnerabilities adam everspaugh ace@cs.wisc.edu hw1 Homework 1 will be posted after class today Due: Feb 22 Should be fun! TAs can help with setup Use Piazza as first step
Fuzzing: Breaking software in an automated fashion
Fuzzing: Breaking software in an automated fashion Ilja van Sprundel December 8, 2005 1 Introduction Fuzzing is the art of automatic bug finding. This is done by providing an application with semi-valid
Programming Studio #9 ECE 190
Programming Studio #9 ECE 190 Programming Studio #9 Concepts: Functions review 2D Arrays GDB Announcements EXAM 3 CONFLICT REQUESTS, ON COMPASS, DUE THIS MONDAY 5PM. NO EXTENSIONS, NO EXCEPTIONS. Functions
Overview AEG Conclusion CS 6V Automatic Exploit Generation (AEG) Matthew Stephen. Department of Computer Science University of Texas at Dallas
CS 6V81.005 Automatic Exploit Generation (AEG) Matthew Stephen Department of Computer Science University of Texas at Dallas February 20 th, 2012 Outline 1 Overview Introduction Considerations 2 AEG Challenges
Building Advanced Coverage-guided Fuzzer for Program Binaries
Building Advanced Coverage-guided Fuzzer for Program Binaries NGUYEN Anh Quynh WEI Lei 17/11/2017 Zero Nights, Moscow 2017 Self-introduction NGUYEN Anh Quynh, PhD
C/C++ toolchain. Static and dynamic code analysis. Karel Kubíček. Masaryk University. Brno, Czech Republic
C/C++ toolchain Static and dynamic code analysis Karel Kubíček Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic April 20, 2018 Questions Who uses C/C++? Karel Kubíček C/C++ toolchain April 20, 2018 2 / 12 Questions
Bruce Merry. IOI Training Dec 2013
IOI Training Dec 2013 Outline 1 2 Outline 1 2 What is GDB? Tool that peeks inside your program Helps examine what is happening Helps trace crashes Integrated into Eclipse, some other IDEs GDB vs debug
Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Media Software. isec Partners
Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Media Software Agenda Introduction Why media software? Why bugs are still out there How we're going to bang them out Fuzzing techniques Why/What/How Fuzzbox Codecs to attack
Virtualizing IoT with Code Coverage Guided Fuzzing
Virtualizing IoT with Code Coverage Guided Fuzzing HITB2018DXB, November 2018 NGUYEN Anh Quynh, aquynh -at- gmail.com KaiJern LAU, kj -at- theshepherd.io About NGUYEN Anh Quynh > Nanyang Technological
NEZHA: Efficient Domain-Independent Differential Testing
NEZHA: Efficient Domain-Independent Differential Testing Theofilos Petsios, Adrian Tang, Salvatore Stolfo, Angelos D. Keromytis and Suman Jana Department of Computer Science Columbia University, New York,
Foreword by Katie Moussouris... Acknowledgments... xvii. Introduction...xix. Chapter 1: The Basics of Networking... 1
Brief Contents Foreword by Katie Moussouris.... xv Acknowledgments... xvii Introduction...xix Chapter 1: The Basics of Networking... 1 Chapter 2: Capturing Application Traffic... 11 Chapter 3: Network
Simple Overflow. #include <stdio.h> int main(void){ unsigned int num = 0xffffffff;
Simple Overflow 1 #include int main(void){ unsigned int num = 0xffffffff; printf("num is %d bits long\n", sizeof(num) * 8); printf("num = 0x%x\n", num); printf("num + 1 = 0x%x\n", num + 1); }
Enhancing Memory Error Detection for Larg e-scale Applications and Fuzz testing
Enhancing Memory Error Detection for Larg e-scale Applications and Fuzz testing Wookhyun Han, Byunggil Joe, Byoungyoung Lee *, C hengyu Song, Insik Shin KAIST, * Purdue, UCR 1 Memory error Heartbleed Shellshock
The Automated Exploitation Grand Challenge. A Five-Year Retrospective
The Automated Exploitation Grand Challenge A Five-Year Retrospective Julien Vanegue IEEE Security & Privacy Langsec Workshop May 25th 2018 AEGC 2013/2018 vs DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge Was Automated Exploit
Automatic Binary Exploitation and Patching using Mechanical [Shell]Phish University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)
![Automatic Binary Exploitation and Patching using Mechanical [Shell]Phish University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)](/thumbs/84/89116457.jpg "Automatic Binary Exploitation and Patching using Mechanical [Shell]Phish University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)")
Automatic Binary Exploitation and Patching using Mechanical [Shell]Phish Antonio Bianchi antoniob@cs.ucsb.edu University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) HITCON Pacific December 2nd, 2016 Shellphish
Undefined Behaviour in C
Undefined Behaviour in C Report Field of work: Scientific Computing Field: Computer Science Faculty for Mathematics, Computer Science and Natural Sciences University of Hamburg Presented by: Dennis Sobczak
Fuzzilli. (Guided-)fuzzing for JavaScript engines. Samuel Groß
Fuzzilli (Guided-)fuzzing for JavaScript engines Samuel Groß (saelo@google.com) Motivation Cool bugs in JS engine runtime implementations, JIT compilers, etc. var a = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]; var i = {}; i.valueof
Browser Bug Hunting and Mobile
Hunting and Mobile About us COSEINC Formerly Red Hat Product Security Fedora Security Team ios Mobile Security OSS Security COSEINC Focused on Linux Kernel radare2 evangelist r2pipe node mantainer Whiskey
Firefox quality. Mozilla Paris FOSDEM Feb 3rd 2018
Firefox quality Mozilla Paris FOSDEM Feb 3rd 2018 Bonjour! Je suis Sylvestre Ledru Je parle de Firefox Quality Twitter @SylvestreLedru 2 Bonjour! 3 Bonjour! 4 Bonjour! 5 The Firefox scale About:Firefox
SQLite with a Fine-Toothed Comb. John Regehr Trust-in-So1 / University of Utah
SQLite with a Fine-Toothed Comb John Regehr Trust-in-So1 / University of Utah Feasible states for a system we care about No execu
Guarding Vulnerable Code: Module 1: Sanitization. Mathias Payer, Purdue University
Guarding Vulnerable Code: Module 1: Sanitization Mathias Payer, Purdue University http://hexhive.github.io 1 Vulnerabilities everywhere? 2 Common Languages: TIOBE 18 Jul 2018 Jul 2017 Change Language 1
Defeat Exploit Mitigation Heap Attacks. compass-security.com 1
Defeat Exploit Mitigation Heap Attacks compass-security.com 1 ASCII Armor Arbitrary Write Overflow Local Vars Exploit Mitigations Stack Canary ASLR PIE Heap Overflows Brute Force Partial RIP Overwrite
Code: analysis, bugs, and security
Code: analysis, bugs, and security supported by Bitdefender Marius Minea marius@cs.upt.ro 4 October 2017 Course goals improve skills: write robust, secure code understand program internals learn about
Improving Linux development with better tools
Improving Linux development with better tools Andi Kleen Oct 2013 Intel Corporation ak@linux.intel.com Linux complexity growing Source lines in Linux kernel All source code 16.5 16 15.5 M-LOC 15 14.5 14
Trends in Open Source Security. FOSDEM 2013 Florian Weimer Red Hat Product Security Team
Trends in Open Source Security FOSDEM 2013 Florian Weimer fweimer@redhat.com Red Hat Product Security Team 2013-02-02 Overview 2 Vulnerability tracking Tool-chain hardening Distribution-wide defect analysis
Automated Software Analysis Techniques For High Reliability: A Concolic Testing Approach. Moonzoo Kim
Automated Software Analysis Techniques For High Reliability: A Concolic Testing Approach Moonzoo Kim Contents Automated Software Analysis Techniques Background Concolic testing process Example of concolic
Computer Security Course. Midterm Review
Computer Security Course. Dawn Song Midterm Review In class: Logistics On time: 4:10-5:30pm Wed 1 8x11 page cheat sheet allowed Special requirements: see TA Part I, II, III Scope Software Security Secure
Hunting Security Bugs
Microsoft Hunting Security Bugs * Tom Gallagher Bryan Jeffries Lawrence Landauer Contents at a Glance 1 General Approach to Security Testing 1 2 Using Threat Models for Security Testing 11 3 Finding Entry
Product Security. for Consumer Devices. Anton von Troyer Codenomicon. all rights reserved.
Product Security Anton von Troyer for Consumer Devices About Codenomicon Founded in Autumn 2001 Commercialized the academic approach built since 1996 Technology leader in security test automation Model-based,
Applications. Cloud. See voting example (DC Internet voting pilot) Select * from userinfo WHERE id = %%% (variable)
Software Security Requirements General Methodologies Hardware Firmware Software Protocols Procedure s Applications OS Cloud Attack Trees is one of the inside requirement 1. Attacks 2. Evaluation 3. Mitigation
CS527 Software Security
Security Policies Purdue University, Spring 2018 Security Policies A policy is a deliberate system of principles to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes. A policy is a statement of intent, and
Using a debugger. Segmentation fault? GDB to the rescue!
Using a debugger Segmentation fault? GDB to the rescue! But first... Let's talk about the quiz Let's talk about the previous homework assignment Let's talk about the current homework assignment K findkey(v
Taintscope: A Checksum-Aware Directed Fuzzing Tool for Automatic Software Vulnerability Detection
: A Checksum-Aware Directed Fuzzing Tool for Automatic Software Vulnerability Detection Tielei Wang Tao Wei Guofei Gu Wei Zou March 12, 2014 is: A Fuzzing tool Checksum-Aware Directed Why a new fuzzing
C++ Undefined Behavior What is it, and why should I care?
C++ Undefined Behavior What is it, and why should I care? Marshall Clow Qualcomm marshall@idio.com http://cplusplusmusings.wordpress.com (intermittent) Twitter: @mclow ACCU 2014 April 2014 What is Undefined
This time. Defenses and other memory safety vulnerabilities. Everything you ve always wanted to know about gdb but were too afraid to ask
This time We will continue Buffer overflows By looking at Overflow Defenses and other memory safety vulnerabilities Everything you ve always wanted to know about gdb but were too afraid to ask Overflow
Software Vulnerabilities August 31, 2011 / CS261 Computer Security
Software Vulnerabilities August 31, 2011 / CS261 Computer Security Software Vulnerabilities...1 Review paper discussion...2 Trampolining...2 Heap smashing...2 malloc/free...2 Double freeing...4 Defenses...5
STARCOUNTER. Technical Overview
STARCOUNTER Technical Overview Summary 3 Introduction 4 Scope 5 Audience 5 Prerequisite Knowledge 5 Virtual Machine Database Management System 6 Weaver 7 Shared Memory 8 Atomicity 8 Consistency 9 Isolation
Lecture 07 Debugging Programs with GDB
Lecture 07 Debugging Programs with GDB In this lecture What is debugging Most Common Type of errors Process of debugging Examples Further readings Exercises What is Debugging Debugging is the process of
Automotive Software Security Testing
Detecting and Addressing Cybersecurity Issues V1.1 2018-03-05 Code ahead! 2 Automated vulnerability detection and triage + = 3 How did we get here? Vector was engaged with a large, US Tier 1 and we were
Improving Linux Development with better tools. Andi Kleen. Oct 2013 Intel Corporation
Improving Linux Development with better tools Andi Kleen Oct 2013 Intel Corporation ak@linux.intel.com Linux complexity growing Source lines in Linux kernel All source code 16.5 16 15.5 M-LOC 15 14.5 14
What You Corrupt Is Not What You Crash: Challenges in Fuzzing Embedded Devices
What You Corrupt Is Not What You Crash: Challenges in Fuzzing Embedded Devices Marius Muench 1 Jan Stijohann 2,3 Frank Kargl 3 Aurélien Francillon 1 Davide Balzarotti 1 1 EURECOM 2 Siemens AG 3 Ulm University
Verification & Validation of Open Source
Verification & Validation of Open Source 2011 WORKSHOP ON SPACECRAFT FLIGHT SOFTWARE Gordon Uchenick Coverity, Inc Open Source is Ubiquitous Most commercial and proprietary software systems have some open
Security Testing. John Slankas
Security Testing John Slankas jbslanka@ncsu.edu Course Slides adapted from OWASP Testing Guide v4 CSC 515 Software Security What is Security Testing? Validate security controls operate as expected What
Software security, secure programming
Software security, secure programming Lecture 4: Protecting your code against software vulnerabilities? (overview) Master on Cybersecurity Master MoSiG Academic Year 2017-2018 Preamble Bad news several
MBFuzzer - MITM Fuzzing for Mobile Applications
MBFuzzer - MITM Fuzzing for Mobile Applications Fatih Özavcı Mentor of MBFuzer @ yakindanegitim.org fatih.ozavci at gamasec.net gamasec.net/fozavci Scope Yakindan Egitim Project Security Vulnerabilities
JOE ROZNER RE-TARGETABLE GRAMMAR BASED TEST CASE GENERATION
JOE ROZNER / @JROZNER RE-TARGETABLE GRAMMAR BASED TEST CASE GENERATION 2 TESTING PARSERS IS HARD 3 HOW WE GOT HERE Mostly black box (ish) implementation of complex languages (context-free-ish) ~35k lines
CS155: Computer Security Spring Project #1
CS155: Computer Security Spring 2018 Project #1 Due: Part 1: Thursday, April 12-11:59pm, Parts 2 and 3: Thursday, April 19-11:59pm. The goal of this assignment is to gain hands-on experience finding vulnerabilities
How to Break Software by James Whittaker
How to Break Software by James Whittaker CS 470 Practical Guide to Testing Consider the system as a whole and their interactions File System, Operating System API Application Under Test UI Human invokes
Analysis/Bug-finding/Verification for Security
Analysis/Bug-finding/Verification for Security VIJAY GANESH University of Waterloo Winter 2013 Analysis/Test/Verify for Security Instrument code for testing Heap memory: Purify Perl tainting (information
It was a dark and stormy night. Seriously. There was a rain storm in Wisconsin, and the line noise dialing into the Unix machines was bad enough to
1 2 It was a dark and stormy night. Seriously. There was a rain storm in Wisconsin, and the line noise dialing into the Unix machines was bad enough to keep putting garbage characters into the command
Last week. Data on the stack is allocated automatically when we do a function call, and removed when we return
Last week Data can be allocated on the stack or on the heap (aka dynamic memory) Data on the stack is allocated automatically when we do a function call, and removed when we return f() {... int table[len];...
Low level security. Andrew Ruef
Low level security Andrew Ruef What s going on Stuff is getting hacked all the time We re writing tons of software Often with little regard to reliability let alone security The regulatory environment
Application Note: Heap Memory Management
Application Note: Heap Memory Management Document Number: SWRA204 Texas Instruments, Inc. San Diego, California USA Copyright 2006-2009 Texas Instruments, Inc. All rights reserved. Version Description
CSE 127 Computer Security
CSE 127 Computer Security Alex Gantman, Spring 2018, Lecture 19 SDLC: Secure Development Lifecycle Defining Security Security is not a functionality feature Most of computer science is about providing
Adventures in Fuzzing Instruction Selection. 1 EuroLLVM 2017 Justin Bogner
Adventures in Fuzzing Instruction Selection 1 EuroLLVM 2017 Justin Bogner Overview Hardening instruction selection using fuzzers Motivated by Global ISel Leveraging libfuzzer to find backend bugs Techniques
C++ Undefined Behavior
C++ Undefined Behavior What is it, and why should I care? A presentation originally by Marshal Clow Original: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhclkb1vkay Original Slides: https://github.com/boostcon/cppnow_presentations_2014/blob/master/files/undefined-behavior.pdf
Deploying Dynamic Analyses and Preventing Compiler Backdoors with Multi-Version Execution
Deploying Dynamic Analyses and Preventing Compiler Backdoors with Multi-Version Execution Luís Pina l.pina@imperial.ac.uk Joint work with Cristian Cadar, Anastasios Andronidis John Regehr Imperial College
Dynamic Race Detection with LLVM Compiler
Dynamic Race Detection with LLVM Compiler Compile-time instrumentation for ThreadSanitizer Konstantin Serebryany, Alexander Potapenko, Timur Iskhodzhanov, and Dmitriy Vyukov OOO Google, 7 Balchug st.,
Control Flow Hijacking Attacks. Prof. Dr. Michael Backes
Control Flow Hijacking Attacks Prof. Dr. Michael Backes Control Flow Hijacking malicious.pdf Contains bug in PDF parser Control of viewer can be hijacked Control Flow Hijacking Principles Normal Control