Cyber-Security Challenges for Power Distribution in Smart Campuses

Transcription

1 Cyber-Security Challenges for Power Distribution in Smart Campuses Aranya Chakrabortty North Carolina State University Internet2 Global Summit April 25, 2017, Washington DC 1

2 Why is Communication So Important for Controlling Power Systems? 12 KV Microgrid 1 Microgrid 2 Microgrid 3 ZLine1 ZLine2 ZLine3 Grid Z1 Z2 Z3 SST 1 SST 2 SST 3 Can be a campus micro-grid Power Distribution Grid Architecture 2

3 Why is Communication So Important for Controlling Power Systems? 12 KV Microgrid 1 Microgrid 2 Microgrid 3 ZLine1 ZLine2 ZLine3 Grid Z1 Z2 Z3 SST 1 SST 2 SST 3 Companies and asset owners take control actions inside their regions agnostic of the health of other parts of the grid 3

4 Why is Communication So Important for Controlling Power Systems? 12 KV Microgrid 1 Microgrid 2 Microgrid 3 ZLine1 ZLine2 ZLine3 Grid Z1 Z2 Z3 SST 1 SST 2 SST 3 Agnostic local control actions can easily lead to instability 4

5 Why is Communication So Important for Controlling Power Systems? 12 KV Microgrid 1 Microgrid 2 Microgrid 3 ZLine1 ZLine2 ZLine3 Grid Z1 Z2 Z3 SST 1 SST 2 SST Northeast blackout 5

6 Why is Communication So Important for Controlling Power Systems? US West Coast Approximate Capacities Up to 3000 MW Up to 6000 MW Up to 9000 MW Above MW Area MW 2000 MW Area 1 Continuous status updates between the micro-grids are necessary 6000 MW Area 3 - Need a rot, secure, communication network Area MW 9000 MW - SDN, cloud computing, Internet2 Area 5 6

7 Balancing Regions are Sensitive to Data Privacy! US West Coast Approximate Capacities Up to 3000 MW Up to 6000 MW Up to 9000 MW Close the loop from cloud to grid Above MW E 2 δ 2 E 1 δ 1 r12 jx12 V 1 θ 1 Area MW ASG3 E 3 δ 3 jx3 P 3 V 3 θ 3 V 5 θ MW Area 1 V 4 θ 4 E 5 δ 5 E 4 δ MW Area 3 Area MW 9000 MW Area 5 Third-Party Private Cloud + Controllable Network Internet2 7

8 Interesting Things Going on in the Communication Plane Shared Resources Cloud Platform (Google, Amazon, AT&T, GENI, DETER) Controllable Network - Internet2 Different types of attacks: 1. Denial-of-Service 2. Data manipulation 3. GPS spoofing 4. Replay attacks 8

9 Denial-of-Service Attack 9

10 Denial-of-Service Attack 10

11 ExoGENI-DETER-WAMS Testbed at NC State DoS Attack in DETER Testbed FRESCO Middleware provided by Green Energy Corporation and RTI 11

12 Networked Cloud Computing Testbed-ExoGENI ExoGENI provides in virtual IaaS services for innovative research on distributed applications for Wide-Area Monitoring and Control (14 rack sites at universities & labs over the US) Software Layer Other GENI Resources GENI Experimenter Tools (Flukes) Other GENI Resources RENCI SM ExoSM(Slice Manager) N SM RENCI AM LEARN AM BEN AM I2 AM NLR AM SL AM ANI AM N AM Physical Layer: LEARN OpenFlow RENCI Rack BEN X I2/ION PMU based WAMS at NC State NLR X Circuit Providers StarLight GENI AM API ORCA AM API Native IaaS API ESnet OpenFlow Rack N 12

13 Project Impacts: DETER Demo at NIST & Smart-America 2014 Best Energy App Award at US Ignite 2015 US Ignite & NIST Smart Cities Application Summit, Austin, TX,

14 Thank You Website: 14