Designing Cost-Effective Ethernet Automotive E/E Architecture Against Security Threats IEEE-SA Ethernet & Automotive Technology Day

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Vernon Henry
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1 Designing Cost-Effective Ethernet Automotive E/E Architecture Against Security Threats 2017 IEEE-SA Ethernet & Automotive Technoogy Day

2 2 Agenda Connected vehice attack surfaces High eve security needs Hardware security protection Ecosystem management Network Partitioning for security Hardware-secured TLS Ethernet switching requirements Exampe of secure Ethernet IVN

3 Cars Are Aready Connected More than 20% of vehices sod wordwide in 2015 incuded embedded connectivity soutions The new question: More than 50% of vehices sod wordwide in 2015 to be

3 3 Cars Are Aready Connected More than 20% of vehices sod wordwide in 2015 incuded embedded connectivity soutions The new question: More than 50% of vehices sod wordwide in 2015 to be connected (either embedded, tethered or smartphone integration) Every new car to be connected in mutipe ways by 2025 Wi these cars be connected with a foundation of security in mind?

4 High Visibiity Hacks Infuencing Market Trend Resuting in new reguations and OEM cybersecurity specs 4

5 Attack Surface Keeps Growing Increasing remote attack interfaces On-board diagnostic port Teematics Wi-Fi hotspot & ong-range wireess connectivity 3G, 4G, LTE Buetooth connections (smartphones)

5 5 Attack Surface Keeps Growing Increasing remote attack interfaces On-board diagnostic port Teematics Wi-Fi hotspot & ong-range wireess connectivity 3G, 4G, LTE Buetooth connections (smartphones) Passive entry / keyess systems Infotainment Storage media (CD, USB, SD card) Attack scenarios Safety critica (Brakes, engine contro ) Obstructive (Instrument reading, ights, infotainment ) No security on CAN2.0 & imited bandwidth to impement Ethernet VLANs for traffic separation not security

6 High-Leve Security Needs Ease of integration into existing architecture & Engine Contro Units (ECUs) Scaabe across patform modes Fexibe migration to

6 6 High-Leve Security Needs Ease of integration into existing architecture & Engine Contro Units (ECUs) Scaabe across patform modes Fexibe migration to next-generation architecture Common methodoogy across a types of In-Vehice Networking (IVN) Intrusion detection and OTA updates Cost effective tota soution!!

7 Attributes of Automotive Hardware Security Devices Secure Key Storage Trusted Ethernet nodes with secure boot & firmware update TLS key protection CAN communication keys & certificates storage CAN

7 7 Attributes of Automotive Hardware Security Devices Secure Key Storage Trusted Ethernet nodes with secure boot & firmware update TLS key protection CAN communication keys & certificates storage CAN communication session key(s) storage Ease of Integration Less code = ower cost Minima code updates on node microcontroer (MCU) Node Authentication & Key Agreement ECU authentication & key agreement scheme Encrypted and authenticated command sessions Hardware Crypto Acceerators Symmetric and asymmetric agorithms High quaity random number generators HMAC & CMAC for seria communication protection Automotive Grade-1 High-security storage

8 8 Unprotected Hardware Attack Microprobe to See Interna Device Nodes and Extract Keys Software can NOT protect private keys!

attacks Timing attacks Emissions anaysis

9 9 How Keys are Protected Matters! HW Crypto Devices Strong Muti-Leve HW Security Starts with active shied Pus a mutitude of environmenta tampers Protection modes Abiity to erase keys Designed to Defend Against Microprobe attacks Timing attacks Emissions anaysis attacks Faut, invaid command attacks Power cycing, cock gitches Standard Devices

10 10 Security Considerations at every Node in the Vehice SAE J3061 Consider risks associated with each vehice system

11 11 Ecosystem Management Protect your brand OEM s can manage approved suppiers for each node Ony approved safety critica nodes operate in the vehice X.509 certificates can hep in authentication genuine components

12 12 Digita Certificates The x.509 Digita Certificate is a unique verifiabe form of identity for the node It comprises three main components: The device pubic key A signature to enabe verification of the authenticity Data capturing any attributes the owner intends as part of the identity Certificates are standards driven forms of identity for the Internet Static Data (SN, mode number, etc.) Dynamic Data (Date, time, etc.) K PUB_DEVICE Device Pubic Key Signature

13 Creating a Certificate (Provisioning) 3.

PUB_DEVICE HW Security Device K PUB_DEVICE

13 13 Creating a Certificate (Provisioning) 3. Owner embeds certificate into device K PUB_DEVICE HW Security Device K PUB_DEVICE Device Static & Dynamic Data Signature Certificate K PRIV_DEVICE 1. Create a unique key pair for each participant Hash SIGN MCHP or OEM 2. MCHP or OEM creates device certificate K PUB_OWNER K PRI_OWNER Remember: private keys, no matter which, must remain secret!

14 Monoithic Approach to Securing Ethernet KEY

Boot Authentication ü Compex X Fexibe X Scaabe X

14 14 Monoithic Approach to Securing Ethernet KEY STORAGE MULTI-PORT ETHERNET SWITCH VLAN ACL PTP DPI Ingress Poicing DEBUG, TEST, SCAN APPLICATION SOFTWARE Secure Coding CPU Secure Boot Authentication ü Compex X Fexibe X Scaabe X Common methodoogy X Existing architecture? Cost effective? Secure Encryption Downoad / OTA Physica protection / Tamper-proof à Impractica à Partition network

15 Partitioning Network for Security Separate common network security from data traffic processing Common Network Functions Physica defence mechanisms Secure boot & downoad Authentication Key

15 15 Partitioning Network for Security Separate common network security from data traffic processing Common Network Functions Physica defence mechanisms Secure boot & downoad Authentication Key management Ecosystem and certificate chain management Network Specific Processing Virtua LANs Access contro Deep packet inspection Ingress / egress poicing Intrusion detection / protection Optimizes security performance, fexibiity and cost Any ECU, any architecture, any configuration, any bus

16 16 Scaabe Security for IVN Ethernet Ethernet MOST Processor or Microcontroer Processor or Microcontroer Processor or Microcontroer Processor or Microcontroer Processor or Microcontroer Secure Boot & Ethernet TLS Secure Boot, CAN Security, Ethernet TLS Secure boot & HDCP Secure Boot, Upgradabe to CAN security Secure Boot, CAN Security CAN Bus CAN Bus CAN Bus Security IC Addresses arge number of ECU architectures Secure Boot at each node

17 17 Software-Ony TLS Authentication Authentication Request Performs cryptographic functions in software in the device MCU Requires more code space Requires more processing oad or Main Software Stack Crypto API Cipher Suite SW Modue & KEYS Houses keys in software and unsecured memory Sma nodes with ow-end processors are too sow Device main MCU Software-ony TLS is vunerabe! TLS = Transport Layer Security

18 18 Hardware Secured TLS Authentication Authentication Request Hardware-TLS offoads cryptographic functions from the device MCU Access via HW-TLS API or Main Software Stack Microchip HW-TLS API Security IC Security IC handes a computation Minima code space & computationa oad Keys are generated & protected in secure hardware Device main MCU Authentication Key agreement Key storage Keys are secure!

19 Expoiting Automotive Ethernet Network Characteristics Fixed star / hybrid network topoogy Typicay maximum eight network ports on ECU Appications, traffic fows are known and pre-determined Network

19 19 Expoiting Automotive Ethernet Network Characteristics Fixed star / hybrid network topoogy Typicay maximum eight network ports on ECU Appications, traffic fows are known and pre-determined Network configuration is static (MAC, IP addresses) Broadcast, muticast and unicast traffic Limited use of protocos TCP/UDP, DoIP, PTP, SOME/IP. We-defined and bounded network Expoit to depoy intrusion detection / protection LEARN à MODEL à ANALYSE à ACT

Ethernet Switch Security Requirements Requires hardware features to support intrusion detection / protection Prevent typica attacks; spoofing, fooding, misuse / faiures Dynamicay update to adapt to

20 Ethernet Switch Security Requirements Requires hardware features to support intrusion detection / protection Prevent typica attacks; spoofing, fooding, misuse / faiures Dynamicay update to adapt to changing network behavior 802.1Q VLAN AVB (time synchronized) 802.1Qci Ingress poicing and fitering (per stream per port) Extensive network statistics gathering (metadata) TCAM-based ayer 2,3,4 deep packet inspection Forward, drop, mirror Time stamp Count Modify packet Rate imit 802.1x Port and MAC authentication Enhanced diagnostics (harness defect detection) Seamess redundancy 20

21 21 Exampe Secure Ethernet IVN CAN Ethernet Antenna Teematics Fexibe, Scaabe Cost-effective & Secure! Infotainment AMP Dispay?? Head Unit Gateway OBD Door Sensor Fusion Lights Fan ADAS Body CAM CAM Lidar Radar Add tiny Security companion IC = Secure Link

22 22 Come and visit us at Booth #2 J Ethernet Gateway Security Demonstrator Ethernet AVB Streaming Demonstrator

23 Thank You!

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