Wide Area Measurements & Control Systems

Transcription

1 The 8 th Electric Power Control Centers Workshop June 5-8, 2005, Les Diablerets, Switzerland Wide Area Measurements & Control Systems NERC Security Coordinators and Interregional Security Network Nodes Dejan J. Sobajic Mladen Kezunovic Grid Engineering LLC Texas A&M Univ. HQ MARITIMES BPA PG&E WAPA- Loveland APS MAPP SPP OH NYPP MECS ECAR MAIN AEP APS Duke TVA Southern NEPOOL PJM VP June 6, 2005 Les Diablerets, Switzerland Western nterconnection SEC. CTR. ERCOT Interconnection FP&L Eastern Interconnection Security Coordinator Interregional Security Network Node

2 Wide Area Measurements & Control Systems Two Complementary Paradigms Systems that are used to monitor, assess and enhance power system security over large geographic areas often comprised of several control areas and/or reliability coordination regions Examples Real Time Security Data Display System (RSDD) North American Electricity Infrastructure Security Monitoring System (NESEC) 2

3 Wide Area Measurements & Control Systems Two Complementary Paradigms Systems that are used to gather high resolution sensory data from (a) digital relays, (b) phasor measurement units, (c) digital fault recorders (d) sequence of event recorders etc. and to transmit system control & command signals to the power system; Decision making process relies on the information derived from the EMS/SCADA and the WAMS data. Examples: Bonneville Power Administration, Southern California Edison, EI Phasor Measurements Project 3

4 Wide Area Measurements & Control Systems Two Complementary Paradigms Systems that are used to monitor, assess and enhance power system security over large geographic areas often comprised of several control areas and/or reliability coordination regions Purpose: Reliability Coordination Wide Area View Each RC must have a wide area view of its own RC Area and that of neighboring RCs. 4

5 5 NERC Control Areas

6 6 NERC Reliability Coordinators

7 7 Existing and Proposed RTOs and ISOs

8 Real Time Security Data Display RSDD EPRI Reliability Initiative ( ) Real time information on flowgates and key voltages displayed on top of transmission gridmap Web server, Interregional Security Network (ISN) real time data Operational since June 14, 2000 Fully implemented will include about 50 flowgates and 300 voltages Color coded for voltage threshold settings and Transmission Loading Relief levels Initial access for Reliability Coordinators and Control Area operators NERC Security Data Confidentiality Agreement 8

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10 10 On-line Probabilistic Reliability Indices Displayed by Zone - Concept

11 11 RSDD Displaying the progression of severe weather across the grid service area

12 North American Electricity Infrastructure Security Monitoring System (NESEC) Project Objectives Develop an on-line security monitoring system of the electricity infrastructure for DHS with active collaboration of NERC, the electric utilities, ISOs, and RTOs. Identify and display indicators of the health of the electric power grid and key load centers Provide cross-infrastructure information to the electric utilities and DHS during critical events Advise emergency response personnel Establish 2-way communication system linking RCs and DHS Increase understanding at DHS of industry s operations and recovery capabilities 12

13 Legend: NMC = NESEC Monitoring Center ISO = Independent System Operator RC = Reliability Coordinators CA = Control Area WAMS = Wide Area Measurement System Level 3 NMC Level 2 ISO ISO ISO ISN Interregional Security Network RC RC RC CA CA CA Level 1 Non-electrical parameters Video MW, MVAR, KV, KA, Hz WAMS Sound 13

14 ALERT LEVEL RC Input Form with Some Grouping and Combination of Triggers (Sub-regions of RC) TRIGGERING EVENT EXAMPLES OF TRIGGERS RC S MAY USE DHS Color RED Supply Impact Major loss of load Uncontrolled loss of load on bulk transm. System Underfreq. & undervoltage load shedding Major loss of equip. Known attacks in progress ORANGE System Emergency Load / Capacity Emergency EEA 2 EEA 3 Public appeal, volt reduction, etc. as individual actions Purchasing emerg. Energy Primary reserve objective not met Manual load shedding or firm load reduction Zero reserves Reactive Emergency Loss of reactive reserve Transmission Emergency Islanding or transmission loop opening Sustained outage of dc intertie Irl violation in process of tlr lv 6 Multiple outages of gen. &/or transm. Fuel Emergency Fuel shortage Cyber Emergency Prolonged loss of ems / observability Security Emergency Attacks several YELLOW Stressed System Load / Capacity EEA 1 Reserve objective not met Severe weather cold or hot Interruptible load implemented Public appeal Reactive Lost reactive reserve Transmission Irl violation in process of tlr lv 1-5 Severe storm Geomagnetic storm Major fires Dc intertie loss brief Series of events (ES equip. failures) Unsolvable congestion Fuel Fuel reserves below target Cyber Loss of primary control center Loss of major ems functions greater than 60 mins. Loss of alarm functions greater than 30 mins. Loss of control function Loss of wide area observability sustained Security Bomb threat at major facility General threats Specific threats or suspected attack Wide spread sabotage w/o loss of load GREEN Non-alert Status Absence of checked events 14

15 Conceptual View of NESEC Display: RC Region California Columbia Shasta Dam Prarie Island Niagara Falls Dam Nine Mile Point New York City Diablo Canyon Hoover Dam Chicago Washington D.C. Los Angeles Racoon Mt. Dam Dallas South Texas Crystal River Miami 15

16 Conceptual View of NESEC Display: RC Region California SYSTEM STATUS Facility: CA-ISO Date: 9/24/03 Time: 16:11:17EST Attribute 1: Attribute 2: Shasta Dam Columbia Attribute 3: Prarie Island Niagara Falls Dam Nine Mile Point New York City Diablo Canyon Los Angeles Hoover Dam Chicago Racoon Mt. Dam Washington D.C. South Texas Dallas Crystal River Miami 16

17 Conceptual View of NESEC Display: Metropolitan Area Columbia METRO STATUS Facility: New York City Date: 9/24/03 Time: 16:11:17 EST Attribute 1: Attribute 2: Attribute 3: Shasta Dam Prarie Island Niagara Falls Dam Nine Mile Point New York City Diablo Canyon Hoover Dam Chicago Washington D.C. Los Angeles Racoon Mt. Dam Dallas 17 South Texas Project Crystal River Miami

18 Wide Area Measurements & Control Systems Two Complementary Paradigms Systems that are used to gather high resolution sensory data from (a) digital relays, (b) phasor measurement units, (c) digital fault recorders (d) sequence of event recorders etc. and to transmit system control & command signals to the power system; Decision making process relies on the information derived from the EMS/SCADA and the WAMS data. Examples: Bonneville Power Administration, Southern California Edison, EI Phasor Measurements Project 18

19 Data Integration & Expansion of the Functional Space EMS Existing Functions New Functions Additional Functions NORMAL N R E SCADA/RTU SCADA/RTU + WAMS More Data Non-EL, A/V RESTORATION EMERGENCY ~40 years ago today tomorrow 19

20 Data Integration & Expansion of the Functional Space EMS Existing Functions New Functions Additional Functions NORMAL N R E SCADA/RTU SCADA/RTU + WAMS More Data Non-EL, A/V RESTORATION EMERGENCY ~40 years ago today tomorrow 20

21 Impact of WAMS data on Existing EMS Functions Existing Function RTU WAMS Improvements Static State Estimation Direct angle measurements Reduced measurement time-skew Topology Estimation Parameter Estimation Alarm Processing Increased Accuracy LMP Improved Error identification Improved Error identification Accurate fault location System Models Improved validation Dynamic Security Assessment Operator Training Simulator ACE On-Line Model calibration Dynamic load modeling Dynamic system response Increased Accuracy 21

22 Impact of WAMS data on Substation Applications and New EMS Functions Function IEDs WAMS Improvements Line Protection Out of step protection for tie-lines Fault location Two-terminal fault location Busbar protection Distributed implementation Transformer energizing Inrush analysis Parallel Transformer operation Circulating currents Transformer protection Voltage supervised current differential Switching sequences Exact timing for line opening Line energizing Synchro-check Power Quality Correlation between events System State Prediction Anticipation of system behavior UF Load Shedding using wide area frequency phasors Coordination of LS actions 22

23 Observations Infrastructure will become universal Same infrastructure will deal with all system states (N/E/R) Application functions will be distributed between the CCs and Substations Data exchange standards will become of critical importance WAMS infrastructure IED based IEDs will serve as distributed RTUs Networked IEDs will evolve into WAMS infrastructure WAMS systems will become scalable from substations, to CA, RC, ISO, RTO 23

24 24 Q&A

25 Reliability Coordination Wide Area View Purpose Each RC must have a wide area view of its own RC Area and that of neighboring RCs. Requirements RC must be able to determine any potential System Operating Limit and Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit violations within its RC Area. When a RC is aware of an operational concern, in a neighboring RC Area, it shall contact the RC in whose area the operational concern was observed. The two RCs shall coordinate any actions, including emergency assistance, required to mitigate the operational concern. RCs shall also know the status of any facilities that may be required to assist area restoration objectives. 25

26 NERC Inter-Regional Security Network - ISN The Interregional Security Network (ISN) is a near-realtime data exchange application for the purpose of sharing operational security information. The ISN is an Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) based application. 18 ISN nodes reside primarily at Reliability Coordinator sites and NERC. Each control area is responsible for supplying their data to an ISN node for retrieval by any Reliability Coordinator or any other control area. Control areas supply data to and retrieve data from their designated ISN nodes. 26

27 Data Integration & Expansion of the Functional Space When introduced state-based concept was ahead of the present-day IT capabilities and it was a driver for IT developments necessary to facilitate implementation of preventive controls EMS Existing Functions New Functions Additional Functions NORMAL N R E SCADA/RTU SCADA/RTU + WAMS More Data Non-EL, A/V RESTORATION EMERGENCY ~40 years ago today tomorrow 27