Substa'on Automa'on Strategies for the Future IEEE PES Mee-ng Oak Brook, IL January 28, 2015

Transcription

1 2/3/15 Substa'on Automa'on Strategies for the Future IEEE PES Mee-ng Oak Brook, IL January 28, 2015 by Ray Wright NovaTech VP - U-lity Marke-ng ray.wright@novatechweb.com Substa-on Automa-on Strategies for the Future Box Consolida-on GeWng Data from s Instead of from Hard- Wired I/O Expansion of Ethernet More Ethernet Inside Substa-ons s with Built- in Switches Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet New Protocols DNP3 Secure Authen-ca-on IEC Web- Based SCADA Instead of PC- Based SCADA Protec-on using Process Bus Distributed Measurement, centralized protec-on 2 1

2 Box Consolida-on Legacy Approach Box Consolidation Approach SCADA Access External Access to Relays SCADA Access External Access to Relays PC-Based Substation HMI Alarm Annunciator PLC Security Gateway To I/O Legacy Direct Video HMI (VGA Monitor) with Alarm Annunciation S/W To Relays and s Automation Processor with security built in with PLC Logic built in Relay Communications Processor To I/O Legacy To Relays Fewer boxes performing more func-ons Reduce all costs 3 GeWng Data from s Instead of from Hard- Wired I/O Tradi-onal Uses hard- wired I/O modules Discrete I/O Connected to breakers Alarm contacts Cabinet Analog I/O Connected to analog transducers CPU Discrete Input Module Discrete Input Module Discrete Output Module Analog Transducer Cabinet To CTs and PTs Smart Minimal, if any, hard- wired I/O Most I/O accessed through s Automation Processor Protective Relay Protective Relay Protective Relay Protective Relay To CTs and PTs Analog Input Module Analog Input Module Analog Input Module Meter Meter Meter To CTs and PTs Reduce wiring and labor costs 4 2

3 Early Smart Example Wisconsin Public Service Orion #1 Orion #2 Legacy Opto 22 ( front-ended ) 5 Expansion of Ethernet More Ethernet in Substa-ons Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet s with Built- in Switches 6 3

4 Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet s Ethernet Switch GPS Receiver / Clock IRIG- B to s and Tradi'onal Approach 7 Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet Network Time Protocol (NTP) (NTP Client) s (NTP Clients) Ethernet Switch GPS Receiver / Clock and NTP server 8 4

5 Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet Network Time Protocol (NTP) (NTP Client) s (NTP Clients) Ethernet Switch Or alterna'vely from enterprise NTP Server 9 Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet Network Time Protocol (NTP) Sufficiently accurate for SER applica-ons Not sufficiently accurate for phasor measurement ( PMU ) applica-ons (NTP Client) s (NTP Clients) Ethernet Switch Or alterna'vely from enterprise NTP Server 10 5

6 Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) Sufficiently accurate for phasor measurement ( PMU ) applica-ons (PTP Client) Requires redesigned Ethernet port on PTP Clients! s (PTP Clients) Ethernet Switch GPS Receiver / Clock and IEEE 1588 PTP Server 11 Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) Sufficiently accurate for phasor measurement ( PMU ) applica-ons (PTP Client) Requires redesigned Ethernet port on PTP Clients! s (PTP Clients) Ethernet Switch GPS Receiver / Clock and IEEE 1588 PTP Server 12 6

7 Expansion of Ethernet More Ethernet in Substa-ons Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet s with Built- in Switches 13 Conven-onal Networking Using Ethernet Switch All connec'ons are point- to- point s Ethernet Switch 14 7

8 s with Built- in Switches Each has a switch built in Can form a ring Ring has higher availability s 15 with Built- in Switches Fault tolerance example Normal traffic 16 8

9 with Built- in Switches x x Cable failure or failure 17 with Built- in Switches x Poll from other side of ring x 18 9

10 New Protocols DNP3 Secure Authen-ca-on IEC DNP3 with Secure Authen-ca-on Mid- Atlan-c Applica-on s along feeder Substa'on Substa'on 20 10

11 DNP3 with Secure Authen-ca-on The feeder- mounted s can unambiguously determine they are communica-ng with the substa-on The substa-on can unambiguously determine it is communica-ng with feeder- mounted s Vulnerabili-es Addressed Spoofing Modifica-on Replay Eavesdropping - on exchanges of cryptographic keys s along feeder Substa'on Substa'on 21 Defini-ons Spoofing A person or program successfully masquerading as another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegi-mate advantage. Modifica-on Unauthorized changing of any por-on of the data transferred between devices. Replay Using a previously recorded or captured message to ahack a computer system or network or to gain access to somewhere one is not authorized to be (a form of iden-ty thei). Example: the sequence of DNP3 commands to get an to trip a breaker might be recorded and replayed. Eavesdropping (on key transfer) An unauthorized real- -me intercep-on of private communica-on, in this case the transfer of secret keys between DNP3 Master and Slave

12 DNP3 Secure Authen-ca-on (Version 5) How It Is Done 1) Both the Substa-on and the feeder- mounted s have secret keys 2) When the sends a cri-cal command to an (e.g a control command), the issues a challenge Prove that you are who you say you are 3) The then has to send down a value calculated by the key 4) If this matches up to the value created by the, then the command is acted upon. s along feeder Substa'on Cri'cal command Challenge Calculated Value Substa'on 23 IEC What problems are solved by IEC Establishes standardized names for all data in s s all provide a standardized file that describes what data they contain and what they do ( pick lists ) The en-re substa-on automa-on system can be designed at one -me, using one tool. Very high speed interlocking using GOOSE messages ( protec-on speed ) More complicated and costly than DNP3 Why so popular in the world market? Fewer, larger u-li-es in places like Europe Interna-onal s do not provide pick lists for s. This makes appear novel. Substa-on automa-on is mostly implemented by the big four interna-onal suppliers (ABB, Siemens, Alstom and Schneider). Their costs are reduced when designing substa-on automa-ons with all of their automa-on only. They can manage the complexity. Why not so popular in the US? Most substa-on automa-on is implemented by users; the complexity and cost scares users off. US suppliers provide pick lists which simplifies configura-on does not appears as novel. Most substa-on automa-on in the US is already implemented at low cost compared to European designs 24 12

13 Web- Based SCADA and Tradi-onal PC- Based SCADA Main Difference PCs and Servers contain all the soiware in tradi-onal PC- Based SCADA The Automa-on Processors ( s ) contain all the soiware in Web- based SCADA PCs only browse 25 Tradi-onal PC- based SCADA SCADA Master PCs and Servers for developers and users Remote U'lity users VPN into system 2) PC- based SCADA reads data from s #1 #2 #3 1) reads data from s 1) reads data from s 1) reads data from s #1 #2 #3 Substation #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #

14 Web- Based SCADA Browser PC 3) Data Concentra'on serves out webpages Data Concentration 2) Data Concentra'on reads data from s (usually with DNP3) Communications #1 #2 #3 1) reads data from s 1) reads data from s 1) reads data from s #1 #2 #3 Substation #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #3 27 Distributed WEBserver SCADA Browser PC Broadband Communications 2) Each serves out webpages OrionLX #1 OrionLX #2 OrionLX #3 1) reads data from s 1) reads data from s 1) reads data from s #1 #2 #3 Substation #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #

15 One- Line Diagram Typical Breaker Zoom Screen 15

16 Substa-on Automa-on Strategies for the Future Box Consolida-on GeWng Data from s Instead of from Hard- Wired I/O Expansion of Ethernet More Ethernet Inside Substa-ons s with Built- in Switches Time Synchroniza-on over Ethernet New Protocols DNP3 Secure Authen-ca-on IEC Web- Based SCADA Instead of PC- Based SCADA Protec-on using Process Bus Distributed Measurement, centralized protec-on 31 Protec-on and Recording using Process Bus IEC Merging Unit High Side Breakers Raw samples of current and voltage (e.g. 256 analog samples/cycle plus discrete I/O) Transformer Transformer Control Room Breaker Bus Tie Breaker Breaker Low Side Breakers 16

17 Protec-on and Recording using Process Bus Control Room Substa'on Protec've Relay Primary 1 and Primary 2 Control Room 1GB fiber op'c network Merging Units distributed Substa'on Recorder 33 Thank You 34 17