Tiered preparedness and response. Good practice guidelines for using the tiered preparedness and response framework

Transcription

1 Tiered preparedness and response Good practice guideines for using the tiered preparedness and response framework

2 The goba oi and gas industry association for environmenta and socia issues 5th Foor, Backfriars Road, London SE1 8NL, United Kingdom Teephone: +44 (0) Facsimie: +44 (0) E-mai: Internet: Internationa Association of Oi & Gas Producers London office 5th Foor, Backfriars Road, London SE1 8NL, United Kingdom Teephone: +44 (0) Facsimie: +44 (0) E-mai: Internet: Brusses office Bouevard du Souverain 165, 4th Foor, B-1160 Brusses, Begium Teephone: +32 (0) Facsimie: +32 (0) E-mai: Internet: OGP Report Number 526 Date of pubication: January 2015 IPIECA-OGP 2015 A rights reserved. No part of this pubication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieva system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, eectronic, mechanica, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior consent of IPIECA. Discaimer Whist every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this pubication, neither IPIECA, OGP nor any of their members past, present or future warrants its accuracy or wi, regardess of its or their negigence, assume iabiity for any foreseeabe or unforeseeabe use made of this pubication. Consequenty, such use is at the recipient s own risk on the basis that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this discaimer. The information contained in this pubication does not purport to constitute professiona advice from the various content contributors and neither IPIECA, OGP nor its members accept any responsibiity whatsoever for the consequences of the use or misuse of such documentation. This document may provide guidance suppementa to the requirements of oca egisation. However, nothing herein is intended to repace, amend, supersede or otherwise depart from such requirements. In the event of any confict or contradiction between the provisions of this document and oca egisation, appicabe aws sha prevai.

3 Tiered preparedness and response Good practice guideines for using the tiered preparedness and response framework A photographs are reproduced courtesy of Oi Spi Response Limited, except page 7 which is copyright istockphoto.com, and page 13 which is courtesy of OWCN, UC Davis.

4 IPIECA OGP Preface This pubication is part of the IPIECA-OGP Good Practice Guide Series which summarizes current views on good practice for a range of oi spi preparedness and response topics. The series aims to hep aign industry practices and activities, inform stakehoders, and serve as a communication too to promote awareness and education. The series updates and repaces the we-estabished IPIECA Oi Spi Report Series pubished between 1990 and It covers topics that are broady appicabe both to exporation and production, as we as shipping and transportation activities. The revisions are being undertaken by the OGP-IPIECA Oi Spi Response Joint Industry Project (JIP). The JIP was estabished in 2011 to impement earning opportunities in respect of oi spi preparedness and response foowing the Apri 2010 we contro incident in the Guf of Mexico. The origina IPIECA Report Series wi be progressivey withdrawn upon pubication of the various tites in this new Good Practice Guide Series during Note on good practice Good practice in the context of the JIP is a statement of internationay-recognized guideines, practices and procedures that wi enabe the oi and gas industry to deiver acceptabe heath, safety and environmenta performance. Good practice for a particuar subject wi change over time in the ight of advances in technoogy, practica experience and scientific understanding, as we as changes in the poitica and socia environment. 2

5 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE Contents Preface 2 About this guide 4 Introduction 5 An oi spi preparedness and response framework 5 Deveoping the framework 5 Framework principes 6 The tiered approach 7 Using tiers to identify response capabiities 7 Risk management 8 Using risk to define capabiity 9 The tiered preparedness and response mode 10 Historica modes 10 The evoving mode 12 Capabiity types within the evoved mode 13 Fufiing capabiity through the tiers 15 Scenario panning 25 Iustration 1: Producing patform in the 25 UK sector of the North Sea Iustration 2: A driing campaign in a remote area 28 Iustration 3: Tanker panning 31 Iustration 4: Tanker incident 34 Iustration 5: Inand pipeine 35 The future of tiered preparedness 38 and response References and further reading 40 Acknowedgements 41 Defining the tiers 18 The three tiers 18 : Resources necessary to hande a oca spi 18 and/or provide an initia response Tier 2: Shared resources necessary to suppement 19 a response : Goba resources necessary for spis that require 21 a substantia externa response due to incident scae, compexity and/or consequence potentia Assessment of Tier 2 and capabiity 23 The importance of the incident management 24 structure in tiered preparedness and response Working together 24 3

6 IPIECA OGP About this guide This Good Practice Guide (GPG) supersedes the IPIECA Guide to Tiered Preparedness and Response (Voume 14 of the IPIECA Oi Spi Report Series, originay pubished in 2007). This new document buids on the principes described in Voume 14 to iustrate how the tiered preparedness and response mode has changed to match evoving oi spi risks. Core themes are strengthened and carified, and new approaches are introduced to aid the panner in the deveopment of oi spi response capabiities commensurate with risk. Previous interpretations of tiered preparedness and response are chaenged in this document, which promotes a mode for defining the three tiers according to the resources required to respond to the incident, not the scae of the incident itsef. This mode enabes the panner to consider a specific range of capabiities, which can be cascaded through the tiers according to requirements. This approach emphasizes that there are no rigid boundaries between the tiers, and promotes the deveopment of taiored capabiities corresponding to risk. The approach introduced in this document remains aigned with the principes of the Internationa Convention on Oi Poution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) to provide an efficient framework to buid preparedness and response capabiities matching the oi spi risks from a types of maritime operations, incuding shipping, oi handing faciities, ports and offshore instaations. 4

7 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE Introduction An oi spi preparedness and response framework Tiered preparedness and response is recognized as the basis on which to estabish a robust oi spi preparedness and response framework. The estabished three-tiered structure aows those invoved in contingency panning to describe how an effective response to any oi spi wi be provided; from sma operationa spiages to a worst-case reease at sea or on and. The structure provides a mechanism to identify how individua eements of capabiity wi be cascaded. The aim is to provide suitabe response resources at the right pace at the right time, hence the resuting capabiity shoud: be commensurate with the assessed risk; encourage cooperation, mutua assistance and integration of shared resources; be fuy scaabe via a mechanism of escaation through the three tiers; be tested, maintained and verified as part of a defined preparedness framework; and empoy the most appropriate response options refecting a net environmenta benefit anaysis (NEBA). These principes are consistent with the OPRC Convention, which obiges ratifying States to deveop and maintain a nationa response system and to faciitate internationa cooperation and mutua assistance when preparing for, and responding to, major oi poution incidents. The Convention sets out a range of commitments on buiding eves of oi spi preparedness, which primariy incude: deveoping a nationa system for responding prompty and effectivey to poution incidents; designating a competent nationa authority to be responsibe for preparedness and response, and to act as a foca point for requesting and rendering assistance; deveoping a nationa oi spi contingency pan and ensuring operators have oi poution emergency pans that are coordinated with the nationa response system; estabishing a minimum eve of pre-positioned response equipment commensurate with risk; deveoping a programme of exercises and training; and faciitating internationa cooperation and mutua assistance by estabishing, either individuay or through biatera or mutiatera cooperation, mechanisms for coordinating response operations. Deveoping the framework Historicay, internationa oi spi preparedness and response arrangements have been shaped by a combination of key major oi spi incidents, the gradua change of risk over time and the refinement of avaiabe response techniques through research and deveopment. Key major incidents have prompted change in specific areas of preparedness and response, such as the impementation of doube-hued tanker design, or the deveopment of subsea we capping and containment capabiities. Additionay, the gradua change in risk profie as new shipping routes open, or as new fieds are expored, brings about a systematic shift in preparedness and response requirements. Research and deveopment programmes have heped define and expand the capabiities of response techniques and understand their imitations. The continued reevance and enduring egacy of tiered preparedness and response is testament to its resiience and fexibiity. 5

8 IPIECA OGP The estabished threetiered approach to oi spi preparedness aows those invoved in contingency panning to describe how an effective response to any oi spi wi be provided. Advances in response technoogy, ogistica capabiity and communication toos have improved the abiity for goba resources to be cascaded to an incident ocation, thereby enhancing the reevance of the tiered mode, even as increasingy remote and chaenging ocations are deveoped. Furthermore, stronger risk management for the ower-probabiity, higherconsequence events has driven an increase in demand for more technicay speciaized response toos and the associated requirements for more speciaized technica expertise. As compexity increases, toos must be used that enabe capabiities provided through the tiered mode to be taiored to the operation or to the specific requirements of the ocation. This evoving mode enabes this higher degree of detai to be iustrated by subdividing the response capabiity into distinct functions or types. Framework principes The primary focus to reduce the risk associated with any operation wi be through prevention. Tiered preparedness and response can provide further risk reduction by estabishing the means to mitigate the potentia environmenta consequences associated with any spi scenario, from sma ocaized reeases through to more compex arger-scae events which potentiay span nationa boundaries. One of the most powerfu principes of tiered preparedness and response is the importance of cooperation and partnership between governments and the oi, ports and shipping industries to deveop an integrated response capabiity. This singe principe underpins the concept by aowing oca, regiona and goba resources to combine in an effective and efficient manner to tacke a spi of any size and compexity. 6

9 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE The tiered approach Using tiers to identify response capabiities Tiered preparedness and response provides a structured approach to estabishing oi spi preparedness, and a mechanism to buid the required response effort. The three eves, or tiers, provide a simpe structure from which oi spi response capabiities can be identified to mitigate any potentia oi spi scenario. Response capabiities are defined as the resources required to dea with the spi incident and can be broady considered in three categories: 1. Response personne 2. Equipment 3. Additiona support. Coectivey these resources combine to estabish response capabiity, and are categorized according to whether that capabiity is hed ocay, regionay or internationay (Tabe 1). This geographica distinction is at the core of the tiered mode, and enabes capabiity to be buit around the potentia severity of the incident and the time frame in which resources are needed on scene. capabiities describe the operator s Tabe 1 Geographica reach of each tier capabiity ocay hed resources used to mitigate spis that are typicay operationa in nature occurring on or near an operator s own faciity. In some situations extra resources may be required from nationa or regiona Tier 2 providers to increase response capacity or to introduce more Capabiity Tier 2 Geographica reach Loca Regiona or nationa Internationa speciaist technica expertise. capabiities are gobay avaiabe resources that further suppement Tiers 1 and 2. The resources hed at the three tiers work to compement and enhance the overa capabiity by enabing seamess escaation according to the requirements of the incident. An important concept is the cumuative nature of tiered response. The eements of a response are suppemented by higher tier capabiity and not superseded or repaced by it. The response resources required for each incident are infuenced by a number of factors such as ocation, oi type, season and voume spied. A common interpretation of the tiered mode has, historicay, used spi voume aone to define the threshods between the three tiers, but this approach is simpistic and may not resut in suitabe capabiity being estabished for a operations. For exampe, a reativey arge spi of ight oi in the open sea is ikey to require fewer response resources than a much smaer spi of heavy, persistent oi cose to sensitive wetand at a time of significant waterfow migration. This exampe indicates that a more hoistic approach to panning is beneficia. Voume is an important factor, but in this exampe the ocation, season and oi type a work to shape the scenario. Whie the voume of spied oi is an important consideration, the ocation, season and oi type are aso essentia factors in determining the most appropriate response, incuding the seection of resources required for each incident. The three tiers shoud ony be used to define the resources avaiabe to respond to the incident, not the scae of the incident itsef. Removing the artificia voumetric threshods between tiers opens access to the resources provided by a three tiers according to the needs of the incident and not as a function of a predetermined spi voume. 7

10 IPIECA OGP Risk management One of the founding principes of tiered preparedness and response is that capabiity shoud be commensurate with the assessed risk. A risk assessment is the process of defining, understanding and deveoping an effective and appropriate risk management strategy. The main purpose of an oi spi risk assessment is to provide the basis for the determination of suitabe response strategies and eves of tiered capabiity to achieve net environmenta benefit from the estabished preparedness and response (IMO, 2010). The IPIECA-OGP report, Finding 6: Oi spi risk assessment and panning for offshore instaations (IPIECA-OGP, 2013) provides the contingency panning team with a two-part process for assessing risk and determining response panning (see Figure 1). This process provides the toos to deveop capabiity commensurate with the risks identified through panning scenarios, and incorporates the principes of tiered preparedness and response. Figure 1 Two-part risk management process 8

11 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE Once understood, the panning team shoud impement measures, which reduce that risk, either through a reduction in ikeihood (i.e. prevention measures) or through impact mitigation (i.e. preparedness measures). Reducing the probabiity of a spi occurring through prevention is the primary aim of any operator, yet despite best intentions a residua risk wi aways remain. The chaenge for the panners is, therefore, to deveop a robust risk management strategy that keeps avaiabe the fu range of response techniques and resources (known as the response tookit). The capabiities at the three tiers are determined during panning based on assessed scenarios. During an incident, response resources are then avaiabe to be escaated and cascaded in proportion to the specific requirements of that incident, regardess of the panning tier designation (IPIECA-OGP, 2013). Using risk to define capabiity The three tiers are categorized for panning purposes using an assessment of potentia incident severity, compexity and scae of the response. Caution is advised when comparing simiar operations in different ocations (or even different operations in proximate ocations) within the tiered approach. It is entirey feasibe that contrasting tier definitions coud be estabished for different operations in the same ocaity as we as for the same type of operation in different ocaities. Infuencing factors wi vary between different ocations and operations, and their importance may be assessed differenty by operators, governmenta authorities and other stakehoders. The appication of the tiered mode is fexibe, in many cases driven by the ogistica constraints created by geographica or other chaenges. For exampe, a given operation in a remote ocation with poor ogistica inks is ikey to require greater and 2 capabiity compared to simiar operations in areas that are easier to access. This risk-based approach to defining capabiity recognizes the interacting variabes that work to shape the risk profie in a way that using spi voume aone does not. An operation in a remote ocation with poor ogistica inks is ikey to require greater and 2 capabiity compared to simiar operations in areas that are easier to access. 9

12 IPIECA OGP The tiered preparedness and response mode Historica modes The conventiona way of expressing the three tiers (Figure 2) provided a simpe, yet usefu mode to expain how the boundaries between the tiers are set by considering two key factors: spi size and ocation. Figure 2 The conventiona definition of tiered preparedness and response spis were considered operationa in nature occurring at or near an operator s own faciities, as a consequence of its own activities. Tier 2 spis were assumed to extend outside the remit of the response area and possiby be arger in size, where additiona resources are needed from a variety of potentia sources and a broader range of stakehoders may be invoved in the response. spis were cassified as those that, due to their scae and ikeihood to cause major consequences, ca for substantia further resources from a range of nationa and internationa sources. Current thinking has deveoped this approach in two ways. Firsty the use of the three tiers to categorize the spi itsef is no onger recommended. A preferred approach is to use the three tiers to describe where capabiities to mitigate the incident are sourced. Secondy, the potentia ambiguity surrounding the definition of tiered resources has been removed by providing a definition which ceary categorizes response resources as ocay avaiabe (), regiona or nationay avaiabe (Tier 2) and internationay avaiabe (). The conventiona and reativey simpe mode was then superseded by the concentric circe mode (Figure 3), which offered a coser representation of the fu range of operationa and setting factors and how they interact to infuence the boundaries between the three tiers. Operationa factors are those specific to the operation in question, such as potentia spi source, oi type and reease rate or voume. Setting factors pertain argey to the Figure 3 The concentric circe mode 10

13 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ocation, or setting of the scenario being used for panning, such as to the environmenta, socioeconomic or cimatic conditions. The broader consideration of these factors enabed the definition of tiered capabiity to form part of a more hoisticay considered risk management strategy. This mode aso introduced the concept that the boundaries between the three tiers are fexibe, with the impact or infuence of each of the factors varying between ocations or operations, and with their perceived importance as viewed and ranked differenty between various stakehoders. A key consideration in this mode was the infuence of response capabiity factors (see Tabe 2), which utimatey infuenced where the boundaries between the three tiers ay. Finay, recognition was aso given to the infuence of egisative factors which often override any other infuencing factor to drive the operator into a mode of compiance to meet imposed standards. Tabe 2 Exampes of factors infuencing the response capabiity needed and where the boundaries between tiers are set Legisative Response capabiity Setting Operationa Probabiity and frequency of an oi spi occurring Spi voume Oi type Impact of the spi on business operations Feasibiity to mount a safe, credibe response Proximity of the spi to operations Cimate, weather or operating conditions atering fate and behaviour of oi or impeding response operations Proximity to sensitive environments Proximity to socio-economic resources resources infuenced by budgetary commitments, provision of personne and ogistics Avaiabiity and capabiity of regiona Tier 2 options Access to support Poitica stabiity and cuture of host country Governmenta requirements for specific response actions or performance criteria Infuences of nationa, provincia or oca government authorities Stipuated subscription to designated Tier 2 or support Despite a preventive steps being taken, an oi spi risk wi aways remain. This risk needs to be catered for by designing and buiding oi spi preparedness. However, some operations carry with them inherent restrictions on feasibe response options. For exampe, on board a vesse, preparedness may entai principay the notification of an incident to reevant authorities. In contrast, a port, a network of offshore production faciities or a singe refinery, woud each potentiay have different eves of capabiity in pace. Prevaiing conditions that determine the behaviour/fate of oi, aong with the type of environmenta and socio-economic sensitivities at potentia risk, wi strongy infuence the type and capabiity of on-site resources. Thus in areas where potentiay severe consequences coud arise, the response capabiities at or Tier 2 eves coud be significanty greater than for simiar geographic areas that have a much ower risk attached to them. The presence or absence of, for exampe, an appropriate Tier 2 arrangement wi strongy infuence the capabiity required at the oca eve and the need to have ready access to resources. Thus, a capabiity may need to be buit in one ocaity that woud more cosey resembe a Tier 2 capabiity esewhere. Simiary for exampe, in particuary remote settings, where assistance from outside the area is extremey difficut to faciitate, or woud take significant time to arrive, a capabiity may be needed that more commony resembes resources esewhere. Legisative and reguatory contros may dictate capabiities and aso Tier 2 and arrangements. In some cases these requirements may not match the risk-based approach underying tiered preparedness and response. 11

14 IPIECA OGP The evoving mode Today, these factors remain embedded in the definition of tiered preparedness and response, but the mode is continuing to evove to capture the compex interpay that determines the appropriate overa response capabiity at each tier. One of the potentia shortfas of the concentric circe mode is the impication that there is a tangibe boundary or threshod between the tiers. This approach, abeit a fexibe one, had the unintended effect of creating the foowing misconceptions about tiered preparedness and response: 1. Resources from each tier are ony accessibe when a certain threshod of severity is breached. The capabiities hed at each tier shoud be accessibe according to the requirement of the incident. 2. Incidents are cassified as, 2 or 3 events. By assigning voumetric imits to each of the threshods, incidents themseves become tiered events, rather than a means of defining capabiities. This assumption often eads to a reuctance to mobiize for fear of eevating an incident to the next tier by caing for additiona support. Such reuctance eads to deayed mobiization time which, in turn, can reduce the effectiveness of the overa response operation. The three tiers shoud ony be used to define the resources avaiabe to respond to the incident not to define the scae of the incident itsef. Further deay can be created by the beief that the spi voume must be defined and confirmed before caing on support from the higher tiers. A more effective approach is to proactivey mobiize resources according to the incident s potentia impact. 3. Capabiities are buit according to set performance criteria. By assigning a voumetric imit to each of the tiers, capabiity is often buit to dea with spis of that size. This can ead to a numbers game where, for exampe, theoretica skimming rates are used to produce recovery figures without due regard to containment practicaities and ogistica constraints. For more information see the IPIECA-OGP Good Practice Guide on at-sea containment and recovery (IPIECA-OGP, 2015a). The identification and procurement of equipment is an important part of preparedness, but when this process is driven by compiance to a prescribed minimum voumetric capacity there may be a tendency for stakehoders to fee unduy confident that the picture is compete. The singe-ine differentiation between tiers beies a eve of compexity that is often overooked when considering response capabiity. In recognition of these factors, the mode for tiered preparedness and response has evoved to iustrate the enduring principes and their appication today. Figure 4 introduces the evoved mode of tiered preparedness and response, which aows the contingency panners to represent the specific groups of response capabiities required to mitigate risk and identify the sources from which these capabiities wi be provided. The evoved mode uses a segmented circe to represent a broad range of response capabiities. It aso gives a higher profie to the importance of an incident management system (IMS) 1 in deivering an effective response. 1 IMS: a systematic too used for the command, contro and coordination of emergency response. An IMS aows organizations to work together using common terminoogy and operating procedures controing personne, faciities, equipment and communications at a singe incident scene. It faciitates a consistent response to any incident by empoying a common organizationa structure that can be expanded and contracted in a ogica manner based on the eve of response required. 12

15 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE Figure 4 The evoving mode from concentric circe to a segmented representation of capabiity with the incident management system (IMS) at its centre Capabiity types within the evoved mode Each segment of the circe in the evoved mode shown in Figure 4 represents one of 15 specific eements of capabiity which, when combined graphicay, iustrate the fu response toobox for that area or operation. The segments are a of equa size and are intended to provide a quaitative iustration ony and do not represent any degree of importance or hierarchy of use. Where certain types of capabiity are not appropriate to the scenario they are simpy eft bank. For exampe, an inand spi from a pipeine wi not require offshore subsea dispersant appication, so this segment woud remain bank. The Scenario panning section of this document (pages 25 37) provides some iustrations of how the mode has been used to map capabiities against a seection of potentia panning scenarios. The fifteen areas of response capabiity have been seected as those that are most commony required to mitigate the consequences of an oi spi; these are described in Tabe 3 on page 14. Oied widife response invoving speciaist personne is one of 15 commony used response capabiities present within the evoving mode. Underpinning this mode is the recognition that, in order to effectivey utiize these capabiities, a robust IMS is required. An IMS ensures command and contro of an incident by organizing functions, responders and other resources as necessary in a scaabe structure with defined roes and responsibiities. For further information, see the IPIECA-OGP Good Practice Guide entited Incident management system for the oi and gas industry (IPIECA-OGP, 2014c). 13

16 IPIECA OGP Tabe 3 The fifteen areas of response capabiity most commony required to mitigate the consequences of an oi spi Response capabiity Surveiance modeing and visuaization Offshore surface dispersants Offshore subsea dispersants In-situ controed burning At-sea containment and recovery Protection of sensitive resources Shoreine and inand assessment Shoreine cean-up Inand response Oied widife response Waste management Stakehoder engagement and communication Economic assessment and compensation Environmenta impact assessment (incuding samping) Source contro Description Coection of important data from a wide variety of sources, and their conversion into usefu, we presented information to enabe informed decision making during a response. Provided by vesse or aeria patforms to combat oi spis rapidy. Appication of dispersants at the spi source during subsea reeases. Remova of surface oi by controed burning, empoying fireresistant foating booms. Use of foating booms and skimmers to corra and coect surface oi. Protection of specific sensitive resources from contact with oi Systematic coection of information about the ocation, nature and the degree of oiing in order to formuate the most appropriate methods for shoreine (or onshore) cean-up. Generay non-speciaist equipment and abour to remove oi from contaminated shoreines. Equipment and expertise required to minimize the impact of oi spis in various and-based scenarios. Equipment and expertise required to ocate, capture and rehabiitate oied widife. Faciities and expertise to manage the arge voumes of waste generated during oi spi response. Outreach and communication with a wide range of stakehoders incuding oca communities, responders, agencies and authorities and other interested and invoved parties at oca, nationa and internationa eves. Coection and anaysis of reevant data for the purposes of determining the economic impact caused by the oi spi. Coection and anaysis of reevant data for the purposes of determining the environmenta impact caused by the oi spi. Savage or intervention techniques intended to imit the reease of oi from the source. 14

17 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE Fufiing capabiity through the tiers The three tiers remain a centra theme in this evoved mode but, instead of representing the overa capabiities provided through singe distinct eves, contingency panners are encouraged to iustrate where the resources coud be sourced from to fufi risk mitigation aims. The identification of 15 discrete capabiities that may be required for oi spi response enabes a much more specific and taiored representation of response capabiity matched to each operation. Thus the response capabiity required is unique to a operations and ocations, with each situation being shaped by both setting and operationa factors which not ony affect the risk profie but aso infuence how resources wi be provided. Each capabiity can be considered independenty and can take account of at east the foowing four determining factors: inherent operationa-specific risks (e.g. the oi type, inventory and reated reease scenarios); ocation-specific risk (e.g. the proximity of oi-sensitive environmenta receptors); reative proximity and access to supporting resources and their ogistica requirements; and appicabe egisative requirements or stipuated reguatory conditions. Each of these factors may infuence the provision of response resources across the 15 areas of capabiity, which can be presented in the form of a unique pictogram of response capabiity for any operation. Once competed, the mode provides a simpe visua representation of the capabiities that are avaiabe and how they can be combined to provide the capacity required to mitigate the risk identified for each operation or ocation. Figure 5 The compete mode 15

18 IPIECA OGP Each segment is subdivided to iustrate how that specific capabiity wi be provided across a three tiers. In some cases there may be no specific oca or regiona capabiity, hence there wi be fu reiance on the provision of resources. In other cases there may be an emphasis on providing the majority of the required capabiity ocay through. The way in which the segments are apportioned is competey quaitative; the pictogram has no scae and it is not designed as prescriptive too. The contingency panners shoud give consideration to the various operationa and setting factors as mentioned and the reative priority paced on, Tier 2 and resources. Tabe 4 on page 17 provides exampes of how the requisite capabiity is buit, with each compete segment representing the fu capabiity required to mitigate the identified worst credibe case for that operation or ocation. In the three exampe scenarios A to C, the risk of an offshore reease of oi is panned to be partiay mitigated through the provision of surface dispersant. How the overa surface dispersant capabiity required is provided by the three tiers in each scenario is driven by various setting and operationa factors. The appication of surface dispersant may be considered, aong with other options, to hep mitigate an offshore reease of oi; how the tiered capabiity for dispersant appication wi be buit wi depend on various setting and operationa factors see exampes in Tabe 4. 16

19 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE Tabe 4 Tiered capabiity of surface dispersant provision in four exampe response scenarios Tier 2 Exampe A: This operation can be we served by due to strong ogistica inks, which have been tested and are robust enough to minimize the need for stronger oca or regiona capabiity. Some ocay avaiabe dispersant capabiity exists. In this case through vesse mounted spray systems. Additiona 10 m 3 of dispersant is provided through a mutua aid agreement. The majority of surface dispersant capabiity is provided through. In this case through wide area aeria capabiity and access to arge dispersant stocks. Operation B: This operation is very remote and the ogistica framework is uncertain due to weather and poitica instabiity. support is avaiabe but oca conditions have driven a need to buid oca capabiity to a eve that can mitigate most of the risk. Locay provided dispersant capabiity through a arge prepositioned stockpie, vesse and heicopter-mounted appication systems. An additiona 10 m 3 of dispersant is provided through a mutua aid agreement. Further stocks of dispersant are avaiabe from the provider, in addition to a arger aeria deivery system. Operation C: This operation is we served by a Tier 2 organization that is cose by; however, due to the risk of oiing of sensitive mangrove systems in the vicinity, the rapid first strike Tier1 capabiity is bostered. Robust ocay provided dispersant capabiity through the pre-positioning of vesse mounted appication systems in the fied. An additiona 100 m 3 of dispersant and a sma fixed wing aeria system is provided through a mutua aid agreement. Further stocks of dispersant are avaiabe from the provider, in addition to a arge aeria deivery system. Operation D: This operation is terrestria and so dispersants are not an appropriate response option. n/a n/a n/a 17

20 IPIECA OGP Defining the tiers The three tiers : Resources necessary to hande a oca spi and / or provide an initia response has been conventionay defined by the response capabiity required to dea immediatey with operationa spis. However, it is important to recognize that a spis, regardess of cause or consequence, have a component. is therefore the bedrock of preparedness and response for a spis, which may or may not utimatey escaate beyond the scope of initia actions and capabiities. Figure 6 Iustration of a response capabiity wi be infuenced by the proximity and timeiness of response for externa support from Tier 2 and resources. In some remote settings, for exampe, where specific eements of Tier 2 capabiity may be unfeasiby remote or non-existent, the corresponding capabiity must be sufficienty we resourced to bridge directy to support. Such an enhanced, stand-aone capabiity is necessariy robust as there is no fa-back position of readiy avaiabe intermediate support. Conversey, in a ocation where an estabished response infrastructure aready exists, or where there may be a range of convenienty ocated Tier 2 resource provision, some aspects of capabiity can afford to be more imited in scope without impacting the abiity to respond effectivey. Exampe of a ocaized incident for which a response woud normay be sufficient. In some cases a significant infuencing factor may be egisation. There are jurisdictions around the word which seek to prescribe a minimum eve of response capacity without direct reference to the assessed risk. Whist the impact of reguations may define some aspects of response capabiity (such as equipment provision) it is important to consider response capabiity hoisticay to ensure that unreguated gaps are not created in the overa capabiity provision. 18

21 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE In an offshore setting, a response to sma-voume operationa spis typicay invoves the use of dispersants appied using spray equipment mounted on suppy boats and simiar vesses. In other situations provision can amount to a stock of absorbent materias, which are used to mop up occasiona spis that occur. These consumabe products are easy to obtain, and minima training is required for their use; hence they are abe to meet the basic expectation of having resources on-site that are avaiabe for immediate use. In any case, response capabiity must be viewed as a comprehensive package that incudes not ony hardware (equipment) but aso the requisite training, exercising, maintenance and supporting ogistics to enabe effective depoyment whenever required. at a tactica eve is often focused on imiting the spread of contamination. This can invoke a range of actions designed to imit the impact of the spi incuding recovery, storage and arranging disposa of waste. The reaity at many operating ocations however is that the physica difficuties of recovering a product that is hazardous, free fowing and under infuence of tides, currents and winds, encourages a response that is geared towards imiting the spread and extent of the oi and thereby restricting the consequences to within an area of oca contro. Tabe 5 Summary of provision for a response resources Responders Trained response staff on-site and avaiabe for emergencies in addition to their norma duties. Loca contractors trained in oi spi response. Equipment On-site or ocay avaiabe arrangements in pace for rapid and effective mobiization. Amount and type is commensurate with risk, incuding ocation factors (e.g. weather, seasonaity or ogistica constraints due to remote geographies). Depoyment times and methodoogies) are often predetermined. Supporting ogistics provided. Additiona support Some eements of capabiity may not be kept permanenty onsite, but are readiy avaiabe at the time of need, such as: non-speciaized equipment such as waste skips, storage trucks, personne transport, etc.; support/infrastructure eements such as additiona security, accommodations, etc.; technica advice and/or speciaized resources. Tier 2: Shared resources necessary to suppement a response Tier 2 capabiity incudes a wider seection of equipment suited to a range of strategic response options. More importanty, Tier 2 deivers more peope, and a greater range of speciaism. Whie responders may be appropriatey trained and knowedgeabe, their response duties are invariaby subordinate to their operationa roe. Tier 2 service providers come with appropriate professiona training and have knowedge of nationa egisation and domestic practices in the countries/regions in which they work. In the context of the wider incident, Tier 2 contractors can aso provide access to expertise for specific eements of spi response (e.g. aircraft, communication systems, marine ogistics and other emergency-reated services), the absence of which may deay or hinder a response. 19

22 IPIECA OGP Figure 7 Iustration of a Tier 2 response Tier 2 response provision is typicay fexibe in nature, and can take various forms as it fis the gap between tangibe capabiity that often exists for and. This gap, which Tier 2 must fi, can be reativey sma or arge in scope but is an essentia eement in seamess response escaation, buiding upon the immediatey avaiabe oca capabiity and the integration of estabished resources which often have a onger mobiization-to-site time. The amorphous nature of Tier 2 provision has enabed a number of innovative soutions to fi identified Tier 2 gaps but, as a consequence, there is no singe mode that exempifies Tier 2 capabiity. Instead, a number of Tier 2 manifestations have evoved to fufi an identified need, incuding: mutua aid agreements between a group of industry operators; industry-funded oi spi response cooperatives; speciaized Tier 2 services; oca commercia operators/ service providers; and cooperation at the oca/ provincia government eve. The principe of Tier 2 works we in deveoped ocations, which often benefit from we-deveoped and robust infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, communications systems and strong private sector commercia providers). Other success factors incude efficient customs and immigration procedures aimed at reducing potentia deays in the transboundary movement of resources. A Tier 2 response is typicay fexibe in nature, fiing the gap between tangibe capabiity that often exists for and. Tier 2 provision is broader in scope than, and is often designed to cover a number of operators together with a broad range of their associated oi spi risks; hence the actua capabiities of any given service-provider may not be precisey taiored to the specificities of each risk ocation. It is therefore important to examine the actua Tier 2 requirements for a of the appicabe capabiity eements, which may need to be provisioned from a range of different sources. 20

23 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE In some countries, however, it may be mandatory for operators to demonstrate that they have response capabiity in pace by way of a contract with one or more Tier 2 service providers (such a requirement may not be directy reated to an operationa risk assessment or to the abiity to incorporate response services within a tiered structure). In such cases, care shoud be taken in the panning stage to ensure that none of the required capabiity eements are missing or have been overooked. Tabe 6 Summary of Tier 2 provision for a response Tier 2 resources Responders Dedicated response staff and additiona responders. Locay-sourced workforce may be supervised by the Tier 2 provider. Equipment resources used to mount initia response and industry s response toobox, incuding: dispersant capabiities; offshore containment and recovery equipment; protection booms; shoreine and inand cean-up equipment; recovered oi storage capabiities. Amount and type appropriate for potentia scenarios. Additiona support Designated oi spi response cooperatives. Speciaized services. Cooperation at the oca/ regiona government eve. Network of additiona responders. : Goba resources necessary for spis that require a substantia externa response due to incident scae, compexity and / or consequence potentia In the same manner that shoud dovetai smoothy with the incoming Tier 2 response, the service is simiary dependent upon smooth integration with the underpinning tiers to faciitate a seamess escaation of response capabiity. Where no Tier 2 capabiity exists, resources must integrate with the ocay avaiabe resources. Figure 8 Iustration of a response 21

24 IPIECA OGP provides additiona resources with the emphasis on a more comprehensive response that broadens the response capabiities avaiabe at and Tier 2. capabiity tends to be predetermined, with we-estabished industry-controed equipment stockpies and response personne at key strategic ocations and with defined geographica remits. It is through contracts and agreements that industry and governments can have access to the cooperativey hed resources therein. Physica response times to any given risk ocation can be ascertained, and agreements are in pace which guarantee specified response services and time frames to provide added security. provides additiona resources with the emphasis on a more comprehensive response that broadens the response capabiities avaiabe at and Tier 2; it does not simpy doube up capacity by providing more of the same type of equipment. For exampe, is ikey to provide high-voume aeria dispersant capabiity. This highy speciaized capabiity requires a comprehensive ogistica chain of support. It is aso a costy capabiity that requires infrequent but short-notice access to adapted or dedicated aircraft, which the mode for sharing costs across the industry is ideay suited to meet. In some countries there is a strong desire to estabish nationa centres. Whie the desire to have this capabiity avaiabe for immediate depoyment is understandabe, it risks undermining the principe of cascading resources and dupicates capabiity that can be provided in a suitabe time frame from existing internationa resources. Efforts are better paced strengthening ogistica inks and removing barriers to incoming internationa support. Tabe 7 Summary of provision for a response resources Responders Dedicated response staff equipped with speciaized skis. responders integrate with oca and Tier 2 responders at a eves, incuding the incident management structure. Equipment and Tier 2 resources used to mount an initia response and industry s response toobox, incuding: high-voume aeria and subsea dispersant capabiities; arge-scae containment and recovery equipment; protection booms; in-situ burning capabiities; speciaized shoreine and inand cean-up equipment; ogistics capabiities. Amount and type appropriate for potentia scenarios Additiona support Dedicated industry response centres. Governmenta or cooperative capabiities. Network of additiona expert responders. 22

25 TIERED PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE A common misconception about is that service providers wi deiver a arge number of trained responders. In reaity organizations are more accuratey measured by the skis and capabiity that their personne can offer rather than by the number of personne they provide. These trained personne can effectivey manage and train many more unskied, ocay sourced abourers enabing a powerfu force mutipier effect. Locay trained personne can benefit from the high eve of skis and capabiity typicay provided by organizations, and can make a major contribution to response efforts. Assessment of Tier 2 and capabiity To adequatey meet the requirements of the tiered mode, the Tier 2 and 3 service eve provision must be examined cosey to ensure that the back-up resources, ogistics and capabiities are matched to the provision (and avaiabiity) of appropriate equipment. The emphasis shoud therefore move beyond simpe equipment provision to a wider response service that truy integrates with the provision. The OGP-IPIECA Oi Spi Response Joint Industry Project has produced a report on the goba distribution and response effectiveness of major oi spi response resources, which aso incudes a goba oi spi response organization gap anaysis and assessment too. This wi enabe the user to evauate Tier 2 and response service provision, which might typicay incude the foowing considerations: Located at a poiticay stabe hub that affords easy access in and out 24 hours per day and 365 days per year. High eve of ogistics readiness to rapidy mobiize resources. Highy trained and quaified individuas with proven track records in response and preparedness. Technica advisers with broad understanding of response-reated issues and good anguage skis. Abiity through capacity of resources to respond to mutipe incidents at any one time. Equipment that is: non-committed (i.e. not on contract but aways avaiabe); readiy transportabe; packaged for freight; and customs-ceared for immediate export. A range of response capabiities incuding: wide-area dispersants; offshore containment and recovery; in-situ controed burning capabiity; near shore and shoreine capabiity; and inand response capabiity. 23

26 IPIECA OGP The importance of the incident management structure in tiered preparedness and response The incident management structure needs to grow commensuratey with the escaating scae of the incident. The key, therefore, is to be abe to enabe a of the resources from the identified tier eves, regardess of where the required resources are sourced from, and integrate these resources into the oca response in a panned manner. This woud aow both the response organization and corresponding response capabiity to grow in a seamess manner. The IMS is, therefore centra to the provision of a fuy scaabe and effective tiered preparedness and response mode. Working together Underpinning tiered preparedness and response is the requirement for a of the tiered response capabiity to be abe to work together towards a common goa. Roes and responsibiities: effective contingency pans ensure the success and safety of a response by ceary communicating the roes and responsibiities of a those organizations and personne who may be invoved. Identifying these roes and responsibiities aso means that response capabiity can be rapidy integrated into the response structure if mobiized. Further information can be found in the IPIECA-OGP Good Practice Guide describing an incident management system (IPIECA-OGP, 2014c). Training and exercising: the capabiities identified during the contingency panning phase, incuding peope, equipment and supporting services shoud be fuy integrated, foowed by training and utimatey tested through exercises. Further information can be found in the IPIECA-OGP Good Practice Guides on contingency panning (IPIECA-OGP, 2015), oi spi training (IPIECA-OGP, 2014) and oi spi exercises (IPIECA-OGP, 2014b). Deivering the response: appropriate ogistica arrangements shoud be in pace to ensure that the necessary response resources can be rapidy cascaded in to the spi area. For exampe, preagreed export/import cearance arrangements may need to be estabished to faciitate the priority movement of equipment across internationa borders. The abiity to appropriatey cascade the wide variety of resources that may be required for a response is one of the key factors underpinning the tiered preparedness and response mode. The mode aso reies on successfu cooperation between the different stakehoders that may be invoved in the response. For exampe, in a country that has a Tier 2 base, oca responders may be abe to faciitate the entry of resources into the country by the sharing of information on oca immigration requirements, infrastructure provision or transation services. 24